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A SHORT HISTORY OF
THE WAR WITH SPAIN
BY MARRION WILCOX



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
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
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**A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WAR
WITH SPAIN**

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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN

BY
MARRION WILCOX



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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

A MEDALLION OF SPANISH HISTORY—RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES—THE CUBAN PROBLEM

I

THE period in Spanish history that we realise most easily and most vividly illustrates the period that we may never have realised at all—the dim, the remote part of it, the dawn of it, the beginning of the whole story. We know very well what Spaniards of the sixteenth century thought of the Western Hemisphere : their land of mystery, enchantment, adventure, and, above all, their source of the precious metals. Well, three thousand years earlier, the nations inhabiting the eastern shores of the Mediterranean entertained similar views in regard to Spain. It was the land of brightest colours and the most ardent land : the sun went down *into* it. A mortal man might visit the infernal regions, or be lifted to the gods, but no one could go farther westward than Tartessus, or

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Tarshish : even Hercules, when he had reached that "world's end," raised his mighty pillars to mark an ultimate achievement : and the adventurous Phœnicians who gave the name Tartessus to the region about the mouth of the Guadalquivir, found the natives so rich in silver that their pots could not call their kettles black—both being made of the white metal ; and the Phœnicians got what treasure was in sight by giving coloured rags and beads in exchange ; and next they set the Spaniards of that day to work for them in dangerous mines, driving them to it and growing rich enough to be classed among millionaires at the time of the Trojan War.

The details are lacking. The point is that Spain was Mexico and Peru and Florida and Cuba to the Phœnicians ; it knew of these things subjectively about three thousand years before it made the experience conspicuously objective.

Instead of using the term "Iberian," or "Celtiberian," it is simpler and better to call this people "Spanish" from the first, and thus to emphasise the fact that from the first until our own day the strain has held its own—not by avoiding intermixture, but by an unexampled power of assimilation, itself persisting, unimpaired, through each new fusion. You may conquer Spaniards, but the only way to get rid of their influence would be to kill the last man and woman of them. They know this themselves : look at their policy in Cuba.¹

¹ We must bear in mind this persistent quality when reading such comment as the following, published in an evening paper of August 10, 1898 :

"A writer in the *Fortnightly*, who signs himself 'A Spaniard,' and who evidently knows his country well, draws a gloomy picture of what will happen after peace. The burden of taxation will be frightful. The public debt, swollen by the expenses of the war,

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A thousand inglorious years ! Spain ceased to be a land of separate savage tribes, an easy prey to the first comer, only to become a province. The rich mines in its mountains and a certain warlike quality in its people tempted Hamilcar Barca to cross the Straits of Gibraltar in 237 B.C. Spain, he thought, might be made to furnish the men and the money for Carthaginian campaigns against Rome. Then for a score of years both Rome and Carthage clearly realised that possession by either of the peninsula of the setting sun would determine their contest for supremacy in the known world ; and the elder Africanus brought it to pass that Spanish civilisation should be derived from Italy, rather than from the southern coasts of the Mediterranean, when he captured New Carthage, in 210 B.C.

Yet almost two hundred years passed before the inevitable subjugation was completed—before the “hitherto unconquerable Cantabrian” was Italicised, and the land will foot up more than \$2,000,000,000, the annual interest charge on which will amount to \$140,000,000. Yet the entire national revenue in prosperous years has not been much more than \$150,000,000. Repudiation or bankruptcy lies clearly in those figures. Then there will follow the destruction of those industries which the colonies have been made to support, turning thousands of operatives out of employment. More than 100,000 soldiers will likewise be set adrift, and 30,000 officers put on the retired list, where the pay for a captain (if he is lucky enough to get it at all) is about 60 cents a day. When all these helpless multitudes begin to feel the pinch of hunger, then, says this Spanish writer, the ‘tocsin of the revolution’ will sound, and it will depend upon the army whether Spain shall be Carlist or Republican. In any case, he thinks it out of the power of any party ‘to extricate my unfortunate, much-beloved Spain from the abyss on the edge of which she is now tottering.’ ‘Spain makes her melancholy bow to the vast continent which her enterprise once opened up to the world, and exclaims : *Moritura te saluto.*’”

guage, dress, architecture, and manners of Spain were all brought into faithful correspondence with the prevailing fashion of that day. But at last it was seen that the very difficulty of the task had made the work the more thorough: Spain was more completely Romanised than any other province so far away from the metropolis, and at least one of its cities, counting more than a million polite inhabitants, was itself fairly metropolitan. And the literary genius of the people took this earliest opportunity to flower. Seneca, Martial, Lucan, Quintilian, and other great writers of the Silver Age, were Spaniards.

II

A Roman general was required to have a certain quality termed *felicitas*—a happy knack of winning battles, conquering provinces, extending and securing the Empire. Having that quality, he was the man for the Roman people; without it, he might be a very excellent person—for any other nation that might care to give him employment. A Spanish general named Trajan (about 53–117 A.D.) proved that he had *felicitas*: the Romans made him their Emperor.

Now this Spanish Emperor of Rome is the man whose name is especially associated with the extension of the *limes Germaniæ*—the great “trocha” of the first century,—a barrier devised to restrain hostile tribes beyond the northern limits of the Empire, and to prevent their incursions. With embankment, ditch, here and there a fortification, a system of roads to aid in massing troops rapidly at any threatened point, the *limes* in Germany was the prototype of the eastern and western *trochas* in Cuba today; and Captain-General Weyler’s plan was Trajan’s.

It was a very good plan in its day. Barriers, cam-

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paigns, concessions, postponed the inevitable. The barbarous Germans were held—not in order, but more or less in place—for three hundred years ; and the fact that concerns us at present is, that during all this time a Roman peace was maintained in Spain, which prospered so admirably that it was then a finer land, and perhaps more populous, than it has ever been since. But the last year of the long peace, the last year of wise government that the Peninsula has known, was the year 408. In 409, while Rome was being sacked by one German tribe, three other German tribes ravaged Spain : Vandals, Suevians, Alanians in Spain ; West Goths in Italy. Five or six years later a West-Gothic host in Spain also ; and then a fine struggle among the four for the possession of delectable towns, treasures, women.

The outcome is expressed in the proudest single Spanish word—*hidalgo* (that is, *higo del Goda*, or “ son of the Goth ”). The Goths prevailed, and descent from them became a patent of nobility.

So then a Gothic (or, more strictly, a West-Gothic, or Visigothic) kingdom having been established in 418, endured until it was overthrown by the Saracens, in 711 ; and in the course of these three centuries a new force invaded the land, coming in the guise of a gentle religion, but establishing itself in the homes, in the fears, in the secrets of the people ; and then revealing itself as the most potent conqueror and constringer—oh, far and away the mightiest force in the national life from that day to this, except only the national instincts to which I have referred. First in importance, the persistent strain, that we may call Hispaniolism ; next in importance, Catholicism ; all other foreign influences comparatively *nada*. The contest for supremacy between Hispaniolism and Catholicism has by its fluctuations determined the history of Spain down to

the present time, and I think that the future weal or woe of Spain will be not otherwise determined.

Now, Catholicism entered in the latter part of the sixth century, when Recared was king. Both king and people were tainted with the heresy called Arianism, and when Recared was converted to the Roman form of belief it seemed to him that he had been miraculously cured of a mortal disease from which his subjects still suffered. Fumigation for the pestilent heresy ! and Arian books went up in smoke ; hospitals for the cure of souls ! and churches and monasteries were established ; expel the seeds of the disease—the germs of fatal unbelief ! and so came persecution of all who would not be cleansed by baptism ; no wholesome company but in the society of the Church, no safety elsewhere, no fashion or influence, no knowledge or preferment or licence elsewhere.

In one word, a second Romanising ; but Rome had changed.

III

Thus during seven centuries Spain had leaned upon Rome : through the four hundred peaceful years of its provincial life, and the three hundred years just characterised, of social and spiritual dependence. So when Tarik, with his five thousand brown athletic Saracens, came to raid the land, in the year 711, he found a people that could not stand alone. He and his fellows (for the incalculable force of the new, still crescent, Mohammedanism was behind him) remained to conquer almost as they pleased. A host under Roderick, “ last of the Goths,” fell before them near Jerez ; they were presently masters of the entire Peninsula, except the northern mountains ; and then for a score of years they tried to make equal gains beyond the Pyrenees.

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It has been customary for historians to say, in regard to this period (about 715-732), that France, and with France the whole of western Europe, was threatened with subjection to the successors of Mohammed ; but that view is not warranted by the facts. The easy conquest of Spain did not prove the Moors to be invincible ; it proved the Spaniards to be at that time wholly unprepared for resistance. In France, the monarchy was powerless enough, but among the great nobles were natural leaders, trained soldiers, of matchless vigour. That was the generation which begot the heroic personages of French history, or their sires—Charlemagne and his Paladins. Charles “ the Hammer,” who smote the Moors in 732, was Charlemagne’s grandfather. Moorish defeat in France, Moorish victory in Spain, were equally inevitable.

It took the Spaniards more than seven centuries to recover, first their lost valour, next their lost country.

Withdrawn to the southern side of the great wall of mountains, soon after the middle of the century, the Spanish Moors by almost imperceptible degrees put off their restless desire of war and conquest. The arduous, strenuous period in their development gradually passed.

For the Spaniards—or rather for the scattered bands of refugees in the mountains—the arduous and strenuous period began. The kingdom of Oviedo was firmly established by an Alfonso called “ the Chaste ” who reigned until 842. Now Oviedo lay very near to the shores of the Bay of Biscay—that is to say, it was as remote as it well might be ; but presently we find a new capital, Leon, about fifty miles farther towards the south, and a kingdom of Leon taking its name from the capital city ; and at the same time (we have now reached the early years of the tenth century) another new Christian kingdom called Navarre, founded by Sancho in the western Pyrenees.

The country lying between Leon and Navarre, and extending southward to the centre of the Peninsula, received the name Castile because so many castles had been built in it as a means of recovering the territory bit by bit from the Moslems. Another Sancho, called "the Great" (970-1035), secured the north-eastern portion of Castile by marriage and intrigue, conquered eastern Leon, and annexed Aragon, Sobrarbe, and Ribagorça. Thus in the year 1035, when Sancho died, his possessions formed a strip along the Bay of Biscay and the Pyrenees, reaching almost from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. During the lifetime of his sons, Aragon absorbed the eastern counties and made itself a strong kingdom in the north-east; Castile reduced Leon to the condition of a province and became a strong kingdom in the north-west. All the available strength in Christian Spain, during the latter half of the eleventh century, was gathered either in Castile or in Aragon, even the independence of Navarre being lost. Then Castile and Aragon, as the two great champions of Spain, from their strongholds in the north, faced the Moor, who held the centre and the south.

Centre and south, it should be said, had been most wisely, most beneficently ruled by their infidel masters. By a scientific system of irrigation, vast tracts of waste land had been reclaimed. Europe had never seen such agriculture. Industries that could only be envied or imitated in other countries grew easily from the quick wit of an ingenious race. In art and science Moorish Spain might well have been (and in a measure was) a school for the nations. The peace was kept even in remote districts. Commercial and diplomatic relations were maintained with all the principal cities and courts of the world; the navy was superb; the army, in respect to discipline and organisation, was unrivalled. Such is a fair characterisation of

Moorish rule at its best, as it was exemplified by Abd-al-Rahman III.

Yes, but the Christian states of Castile and Aragon had an infinite advantage, for their *expansion*, which is simply an irresistible force, was just beginning. Such a period occurs in the life of every nation : we saw it in France, when France turned back the Moors. Now the consciousness of strength, the mighty impulse to achieve, and the fervour of it all, were with the Spaniards in their hard-earned narrow northern strip of land. In the eighth century literally driven to the wall, it had taken them three centuries and a half to get fighting room. So much they had won, and no more, when the two Christian states, like two gigantic armed figures, wheeled, and—the one with the Bay of Biscay behind it, the other with its back to the Pyrenees—threatened the south.

But it is not necessary to personify Castile and Aragon. The period, the epoch of young Hispaniolism, is perfectly expressed in the Spanish champion Ruy Diaz Campeador, “ The Cid.”

IV

The Moors were whipped and driven, like so many mere trespassers, from the land they had beautified ; one city after another being reconquered by the Spaniards, until even Valencia was taken in 1094. But then Mohammedanism justified the Christian dread of it—showed that it was indeed an “ incalculable ” force ; for such assistance came from Africa that in a few years south and centre were reunited under the King of Morocco. The Cid died in 1099.

Then, during almost four centuries, such gallant fighting ! with gallant infidel against gallant Christian : rivals in courtesy not less than in valour—with ebb and flow of

conquest, torrent of the armed champions of Christ, recurrent flood of the armed champions of Mohammed : never before or since such demonstration of vitality, for it seemed that Spain was one great heart, with southward gains of the Christians, and northward gains of the infidels, as its systole and diastole.

This long period including the age of the Crusades, when Europe cared more to exchange blows with the Mohammedans in Palestine, the Spanish Christians received less assistance from beyond the Pyrenees than might have been expected. The "Crescent" was a geographical fact, then, with its eastern and western horns curving up along the eastern and western limits of the Mediterranean Sea ; a continental dilemma, of which the Crusaders most commonly chose the eastern horn. And that was fortunate for Spain. She had more than her share of difficulty—precisely the thing she required and enjoyed. *Res severa est verum gaudium* : those strenuous times were best of all, and many a Spanish peasant even to-day will refuse to be delighted with stories of a later date. Then, too, it must be remembered that the civilisation of the Moors was so superior that even hostile contacts were of inestimable advantage to the Spaniards. The western and eastern Crusades in the thirteenth century did more than all the schools and universities for the civilisation of Europe. And, that no element of interest should be lacking, on both sides religious zeal was intensified until it became a frenzy. Christians in Spain, when all the future in this world as in the world to come appeared to turn on a question of belief, became bigots, and their bigotry paved the way for the Inquisition ; Mohammedans in Spain required a fresh draught of the intoxicating doctrine that their tounder had dispensed, and so a new Mohammed, an Arab calling himself b' Abdallah,

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and asserting that he was the expected Mahdi, formed the sect of the Almohades.

Soon after the middle of the fifteenth century only a few of the fairest provinces in the south were still held by the Moors. The final issue was no longer in doubt. The expulsion of the Moors, the submission of the several states to a strong central government, the assertion of the nation's energies in every wide field of enterprise, adventure, exploration—such things were at hand.

Hispaniolism was triumphant.

V

Now in a very brief section we are to pass from the triumph of Hispaniolism to the triumph of Catholicism.

In 1469 Ferdinand of Aragon (under which designation we are to understand Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia) married Isabella of Castile. That was before the accession of either ; and when Isabella's brother Henry IV. of Castile died, in 1474, husband and wife were both claimants of the crown ; partisans of the former arguing that female succession was prohibited in Castile and that Ferdinand was, after his father, the nearest male heir. The determination of the dispute was admirable, the government being carried on in their joint names, foreign relations and military affairs becoming Ferdinand's especial care, while Isabella's unquestionable talent found ample scope and opportunity in domestic administration. Within thirty years the ordinary revenues had been multiplied by thirty—*i. e.*, in 1474 the ordinary rents of the Castilian crown amounted to 885,000 reals ; in 1504 to 26,283,334 reals.

Now single dates are chapters, volumes, whole libraries. In 1478 a bull of Sixtus IV. authorised the Spanish In-

quisition. In 1481 the final effort to drive the Moors from their last stronghold was begun, with the result that Granada fell in due time—as it happened, in 1492. Just before that consummation, a most important beginning : Inigo de Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, was born in 1491. As though to set off a superb surprise against the foregone conclusion in Granada, Columbus won a new world for Castile by his discovery of the West Indies—though he did not reach the continent of South America until six years later (1498). Ponce de Leon discovered Florida in 1512; Balboa the Pacific Ocean in 1513. The last decade of the fifteenth century saw Spanish territory increased on the north at the expense of France ; in the first decade of the sixteenth century a more violent and more important transfer between the same nations gave Naples to Spain ; by 1512 it was not merely true that the whole Peninsula was united (with the exception of Portugal which had already developed so strong a sense of separate nationality that it was destined never to be held by its great neighbour in a permanent union), but now Spain drew Italy to itself, somewhat as Italy, fifteen centuries before, had attached Spain—and now the Peninsula of the setting sun had been declared, by the most authoritative voice in Italy, mistress of all the lands she had discovered or should discover in the fabulous West.

(There were the inexhaustible mines of gold and silver; there were adventures to be had, that should satisfy hunger for such new things in the stoutest heart ; somewhere, and yet to be discovered, was the fountain of immortal youth.)

The Inquisition began to prove, somewhat more than two years after the papal licence for its infinite harm had been received, that the splendid national opportunity could never be fully realised—just because of the institu-

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tion itself, and the forces which underlay it, and its rank growth of abuses. In 1481 nearly three hundred persons were burnt alive in Seville alone, two thousand in the archbishopric of Seville and the bishopric of Cadiz. Including the last to suffer through this agency (a Jew and a Quaker schoolmaster, in 1826), there have been more than three hundred and forty-one thousand victims of the Inquisition, and one tenth of the whole number were burnt alive.

VI

It seemed that the growth of Spain before Ferdinand's death was a matchless thing, but the personal fortune of the next king fairly outstripped it. Charles I. of Spain is known in European history as the Emperor Charles V. Succeeding to the Hapsburg territories in Germany on the death of Maximilian ; chosen to be king of the Romans by the German electors in 1519 ; by favour and by force becoming land-owner and arbiter of the lives of men from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, in the fairest parts of Italy, and beyond the sea, in northern Africa ; Charles, as a simple matter of fact, had business of more importance to engage his attention than the conquest of Mexico by his Cortez or the conquest of Peru by his Pizarro. Spanish soldiers and Spanish money were the sinews of his European strength, yet he himself became only with reluctance and as a last resort a Spaniard by residence.

The second Hapsburg ruler, Philip II., made Castile the centre of interest in Europe, merely by living at Madrid. With Spain itself, with Burgundy, with Milan, with a new world, and with an incomparable navy at his command—where Philip sat, “ there was the head of the table.” It gives us a true idea of the greatness of his position to consider his losses : that he could indulge

his bigotry even at the cost of a revolt in the Netherlands ; could lose an " invincible Armada " which he had sent against England, and yet almost up to the time of his death (in 1598) could contend for a preponderance of Spanish influence in France. .

Literature and art, whose due season is a little later than the full summer of material expansion, had already caught the impulse, and their finer products came during the reign of Philip III. and Philip IV. Cervantes, Lope de Vega, Calderon, Velasquez, and Murillo are the great names in the first half of the seventeenth century : these men aimed nobly and achieved greatly, and so had their part in the splendour of Spain. Such expression was easy then ; it has not been possible since that time.

A golden flood had set from the shores of Central and South America to the south-western shore of Spain, during almost a century ; and Spanish financiers had thought that by controlling and directing this flood, as though it had been a well of water in a desert place, they could irrigate favoured provinces, and make them unspeakably rich. They required that the vessels bearing the gold should be entered at a certain port : Seville's Tower of Gold stands to-day in shabby mockery of their futile efforts. Their policy cut channels, as it were, for the derivation of the golden stream into golden irrigating streamlets ; and at the end of the experiment it was found that the provinces thus favoured had not been enriched, but had been sterilised. Those portions of the Peninsula which, through Castilian disfavour, had been suffered to cultivate the arts and industries of peace, were more prosperous.

Universal history does not furnish a more perfect demonstration of the fact that the mere accumulation of specie does not bring wealth, and it was about as plain then as now that Spain would get no real advantage from

her western colonies ; but the lesson was disregarded, nor has it yet been learned. Spain turned characteristically upon its instructor, and dealt Experience a blow in the face.

The most valuable element in the manufacturing and agricultural population was still Moorish. In 1609 all Moriscoes were ordered, on pain of death, to leave the country. They were allowed three days for their removal. Spain has suffered the consequences of her fatal impolicy through almost three centuries. In the reign of Charles II. the decay of industries and the persecution of Jews and Moriscoes reduced the population to less than six millions—that is, less than one half the estimated number under Ferdinand and Isabella, and little more than one fourth the estimated number during the beneficent rule of the Moors.

In diplomacy Spain was outclassed by her great neighbour, for the policy of France was directed by Richelieu until 1642, and then by Mazarin. To crown the decadent country's misfortunes, the campaigns of the century proved that the famous Spanish infantry were no longer invincible. One lesson of the Thirty Years' War was that battles were to be won in future by light-armed troops such as Gustavus Adolphus had employed ; but Spain refused to be convinced, and kept on sending her ponderous fellows into the field—to be beaten at every point. Outmanœuvred and outfought, losing the Austrian alliance through the Treaty of Westphalia, unable to prevent Mazarin from securing Cromwell's mighty interposition, barely able to maintain her authority at Naples, forced to recognise the independence of the United Provinces and virtually to acknowledge that the maritime supremacy she had claimed was now grasped in stronger hands, discouraging education for the sake of maintaining religious unity, choosing darkness rather than that splen-

did light which had begun to shine in art and letters—Spain reached the end of her century of disastrous change only to find all the shame of it condensed in a single act. Charles II. acknowledged total defeat, for himself and for his race, by selecting as his successor on the Spanish throne (October 3, 1700) Philip of Anjou, second grandson of the French Grand Monarque.

The accession of a Bourbon king gave Spain a share in the fortunes of a prominent family, and the application of French methods in government and administration by Philip V. and his successors had certain important results, at which we can only glance in passing. Trade, agriculture, and commerce were encouraged, and, in response to such intelligent efforts, the population doubled in the course of the century ; meantime indispensable measures had been taken to restrain the ambition of the Church. Charles III. expelled the Jesuits from the country ; the power of the Inquisition was at last subordinated to that of the Crown ; limits were set to the numbers and the wealth of monasteries.

But the continuity of national traditions was broken by Bourbon influences, and the Spanish genius was cast to play the part of a dependant.

VII

Gibraltar was taken by the English fleet under Sir George Rooke in 1704. From this time forward, during thirty-five years, the quarrelsome seamen of both nations injured and insulted each other on every possible occasion : the Englishmen were defiant and boastful smugglers ; the Spaniards seized and searched British vessels on the high seas. Finally, when a certain English captain named Jenkins asserted that a Don had tortured him and

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cut off his ears, English indignation and self-confidence insisted upon a declaration of war, which, accordingly, came in 1739. This declaration, however, was scarce more than an acknowledgment of a state of affairs that had long existed and added little to the zest of conflict. The Seven Years' War intervened, giving a wholly new direction to the energies of the principal European states, and decisive encounters on a grand scale, as between Spain and England, were postponed to the next century, during the first decade of which Spain occupied the position of the bull in her national pastime, with Napoleon and England as the skilful toreadors. The kinship of the two royal families and the passionate attachment of the Spanish people to the monarchical form drew Spain into the first coalition against France after the execution of Louis XVI. (January 21, 1793), but the new master of France first dazed his big victim by brilliant exploits, then baffled it with evasions, then lured it on with promises, then spent its strength in concessions of territory and in subsidies, then led it on to decisive overthrow by the other toreador at Trafalgar (October 21, 1805). But then he conferred the crown of Spain upon his brother, Joseph Bonaparte.

Napoleon's calculation had been perfect so far as it went, but in Spain as in Germany he reckoned without the people. In Spain as in Germany the people refused to accept the surrender of their rulers. The German struggle for liberty, which led to the withdrawal of French troops from Spain for service in central Europe, together with the assistance of the English under Wellington, terminated this crisis.

Spain survived, indeed, and with vitality enough to support the follies of the worst of her Bourbon kings, Ferdinand VII.; but she could not retain her colonies in

America, nor was she even allowed to govern her subjects in the Peninsula itself according to her own preference. During the second and third decades of the present century, fragments of her western possessions became new countries, occupying about one-half of the New World ; at home she had to resist the attempt of Austria, Russia, France, and Prussia to bully her into granting greater liberty to her kings (1822-3).

Ferdinand VII. died in 1833, and his daughter Isabella was proclaimed as queen with her mother Maria Christina of Naples as regent. Then Don Carlos, Ferdinand's brother, asserted that the choice of Isabella violated the Salic law, and that he himself should have been preferred ; and this view found many supporters in the north. Such was the origin of the Carlist party, which has been a constant menace to the government, when not in open rebellion against it. The character of Isabella II., who was declared of age in 1843, added new elements of perplexity. A successful revolution drove her from the throne, and in 1870 (the Ten Years' War in Cuba being then in progress), Amadeus of Aosta, the second son of Victor Emanuel, was invited to govern as a constitutional king. Three years later he resigned the office. Then a provisional republic, with Castelar at its head, was attempted ; next, for a brief time, a committee of officers undertook the administration. But in 1874 Alfonso XII., Isabella's son, accepted the crown ; and when he died, in 1885, his widow, Christina of Austria, was entrusted with the regency. Their son, " the little King of Spain," was born May 17, 1886.

VIII

When our first treaty with Spain was being negotiated, in 1795, our Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, declared

that we had "with sincere and particular disposition courted and cultivated the friendship of that country." During the years of French predominance in the Peninsula, culminating in 1807, we had reason to fear lest the Spanish possessions in the new world should pass into the hands of France. Strong ground was taken by our statesmen of that day to avert the danger; and when acquisitions in the same splendid domain were threatened by England, the American policy of opposition to any such transfers was not less resolutely asserted. The practical effect of this policy was, of course, in the highest degree favourable to Spain. During these years, however (the first two decades of this century), Spaniards in Florida were not by any means ideal neighbours; Spanish captures of our merchantmen were a menace to the friendship we had "courted and cultivated"; American claims to West Florida were pressed, in season and out. The cession of the Floridas in 1821 ended an irritating contact.

In 1825 Mexico and Colombia, being then at war with Spain and designing to invade Cuba and Porto Rico, refrained from this projected attack on the strength of a protest by the United States. A little encouragement offered to our young neighbour on the south—or even our acquiescence then—would almost certainly have resulted in freeing Cuba; the trouble was, it would also have freed the Cuban slaves. The new Spanish-American States "always marched under the standard of universal emancipation."¹ For twenty years the slave-owners of this country repeated in effect the assertion made by John M. Berrien of Georgia in 1826, that "Cuba and Porto Rico *must* remain as they are." Van Buren said in 1829: "It is the interest of the Southern section of the Union

¹ James Buchanan.

that no attempt should be made in Cuba to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence." Webster, in 1848, said that Cuban emancipation " would strike a death-blow at the existence of slavery in the United States." ¹ But in the course of time the idea of annexing Cuba quite inevitably came to the front, and, the plan to purchase the island for \$100,000,000 failing, expeditions were organised in this country by individuals wishing to encourage efforts for Cuban independence. About two hundred Americans took part in the ill-starred Lopez expedition of 1851. Lopez was defeated, and of the Americans who surrendered many were shot, in accordance with a barbarous usage of Cuban warfare.

Secretary Everett's important despatch, a year later, warned England and France that the United States would not admit the claim of any other power to intervene in a dispute of which Cuba was the subject. In February, 1854, the cargo of the American steamer *Black Warrior* was seized unjustifiably in Havana ; it seemed for a time that war, and the acquisition of Cuba by force, might ensue. But reparation was offered by Spain, and was accepted. Our own Civil War, with the grave problems preceding and following it, took our thoughts away from Cuba for a matter of ten years ; then came for the poor inhabitants of the rich island other ten desperate and bitter years (1868-1878) of struggle for liberty—a struggle marked with forms of cruelty strange and revolting to us. Midway in its ugly and rather tiresome story, the *Virgin-ius* was captured by a Spanish warship, taken into the harbour of Santiago de Cuba, and about fifty of her officers and men were shot without civil trial. But inasmuch as it was shown that the American register of the *Vir-*

¹ Vide "Century of Cuban Diplomacy," *passim*. *Harper's Magazine*, June, 1898.

ginius had been fraudulently obtained, an indemnity to the families of those who had been killed was accepted. Claims for losses sustained by American citizens resident or holding property in Cuba were adjusted in a spirit of conciliation. President Grant's intimation (1875) that, to put an end to the miseries of this war, "mediation and intervention" might become necessary, seems a mild utterance in the circumstances.

The treaty of Zanjón (1878), with its flavour of concession, restored in effect the old intolerably oppressive conditions. The cost of the war was made a new burden for the island to bear, while vexatious restrictions hampered its commercial relations with other countries; and yet, in the year 1894, the sum of the Cuban trade into and out of the United States was \$105,000,000. Underground Cuba, meantime, gathered its forces and perfected its organisation for a final effort under the direction of the Junta. In February, 1895, a little flame of insurrection was kindled. In the course of three years the whole island was wasted; and now brands from that burning have been scattered in both hemispheres and in the islands of both the great oceans.

"Notwithstanding the contrast in the habits and aims of the two nations," says Professor Hart, in his "Century of Cuban Diplomacy," "there has been (since 1821) but one serious cause of controversy with Spain—Cuba"; and, at the conclusion of his argument, "Reviewing the whole period, it seems an historical truth that—so far from the Cuban policy of the United States having been one of aggression—few nations have shown more good temper toward a troublesome neighbour."

IX

Soon after the outbreak of this insurrection the number of voices crying the news from Cuba increased to many hundreds ; then to many thousands—mostly unvarnished ; and this confusing outcry made it difficult to distinguish values. Only here and there have we been able to make quite sure we held in our hand, as it were, an authentic incident or episode or character, which we might consider for a moment at arm's length. The Ugly War was held (against our will, often) so close to our eyes that we could not see it ; shouted in such various tones and contradictory terms that we did not clearly hear its story. It is better for us now frankly to discard the partisan reports—whether inspired by servants of Spain or friends of the Junta—and to seize for our use in this rapid preliminary survey a few facts that will not lead us into controversies but rather guide us safely and quickly as we press forward to overtake with our story current events that are the story's inspiration.

It will be enough if your historian realises and makes actual to you these three periods in the growth of the insurrection : the first period, when Martinez Campos as Captain-General failed to prevent the spread of the revolutionary movement from the eastern to the western provinces ; the second period, when Captain-General Weyler inaugurated the policy of " reconcentration " ; the third period, that of Captain-General Blanco, who is now ¹ confronting graver problems than either of his immediate predecessors at Havana.

Campos, fighting fairly and like a gentleman, was fairly beaten by men who developed positive genius in guerilla warfare—especially Gomez and Antonio Maceo. By a

¹ This page was written August 8, 1898.

series of bold attacks (when the opportune moment presented itself), by skilful evasions, above all by taking the peasantry into partnership, Maceo made his way across the trochas into the western province, Pinar del Rio—thus carrying revolt from one end of the island to the other. Among the hills of Pinar del Rio he was able to maintain a considerable force, and to defy all efforts to dislodge him up to the close of the year 1896. Then he took his life in his brown hand once too often, and was shot.

We are galloping along through the centuries and the years almost too rapidly. The narration seems to me (as I turn back and re-read it) blurred by our rapid advance—like the blur of the landscape when one's horse runs away. It may be worth while to stop for a moment in order to realise Maceo and the spirit of the time, as though his death had just occurred and we were again in December of 1896 reading in our own daily papers the Cuban Junta's eulogies of their dead hero—their "martyr."

And first we should recall the very phrases in which the man's life (while the news of his death was still an unprobed wound) got itself expressed by the Cuban partisans. Here are the English equivalents of some of the words that were confessedly spoken "with broken heart, and tears that, by turns, afflict or console" (*llanto mortificante o consolador*):

The chief Cuban warrior, the moderate and conciliatory politician, the patient and long-suffering citizen, the heroic champion, the mild and modest and sympathetic man, Antonio Maceo—thus he was characterised by one of his friends; and it was asserted that his epic achievements made him grand as Bolivar on the peaks of the Andes, or as Washington at Valley Forge. The whole world was fixed in astonishment at the overthrow of this colossus, it was said; and again Maceo's fate was likened

to the unexpected eclipse of the sun in the zenith. We were assured that the valour and the exploits of Maceo reverberate from the tomb, and that in history they will live forever ; in fact, *El Porvenir* averred that only an "accursed mischance" thwarted a plan for seating him in the presidential chair as the chief magistrate of the republic—an honour which it was no longer possible to confer upon him for the simple reason that "this giant of flesh and soul has been laid low, and has converted himself into carbonic acid and other substances. . . ."

Such things as these (which seem a bit overwrought) were uttered in a language that made them very smoothly eloquent. But other things you may read—things so intrinsically pathetic that no harsh Englishing can quite destroy their charm ; as when, in the newspaper just mentioned, we find this : "*Maceo fue un predestinado* ; he was even at the gates of the capital, but could not enter. Those who conceive great ideas do not realise them" ; or, in another column, this : "The Cubans, *the disinherited of the earth*, bow their heads."

Next it is worth while to see how the same event struck the partisans of Spain.

Almost all of us are familiar with the methods in use by the professional trappers and "hunters" for securing large game. The professional "hunter" or trapper is engaged in a serious business, like the business of modern warfare, and after taking pains to safeguard his own person, just as the soldier does, by associating himself with others in the same calling, by establishing camps or forts, bases of supply, etc., he thinks it no shame to practise all sorts of deceit in order to lure the game within shooting distance.

Yes ; but the obvious reply is, "Your 'hunter' is after the *inferior* animals."

That is exactly the point.

For people of Maceo's complexion the Spanish language has some polite terms. They will be called *morenos*, "brown people," or *pardos*, "gray people"—that is to say, brown or gray they are while friendly or serviceable; but if it be an enemy's skin, it is black—with all the significance in that word which Americans, unfortunately, can remember.

Throughout the year 1896 the Spaniards in Pinar del Rio were hunting one indomitable brown-skinned man—to them the descendant of a slave, and therefore an inferior animal. Where a Cuban has written, "The Spanish populace, seventeen millions of human beings transformed into wild beasts, dashed out into the streets in a frenzy and cheered for the death," a Peninsular editor might have written that the same number of Spanish people impulsively manifested their joy on learning that the most dangerous of wild beasts had been killed—no matter how.

The contrast thus suggested will seem too sharp, the frankness in expression will seem unlikely to those who, before the present entanglement, have not cared to understand our southern neighbours.

The circumstances in which Maceo met his death have been scandalously in dispute, and even the principal features of his campaigns are blurred by conflicting statements and misstatements. It is not too soon, however, to base upon the undisputed portions of his record an estimate of Maceo that may at least be saner than the views of intense partisans; or, to put it quite plainly, it is possible even now to make an estimate that, being in accord with the facts so far as facts are known, may serve for the present. We have certain knowledge that when this brown man stood out, almost alone, against the Treaty

of Zanjón, twenty years ago, he stood for a principle that was the generous inspiration of his whole life. The proof of it is all at hand.

For ten years, from 1868 to 1878, day after day he had fought the Spanish strength and the Cuban weakness and his own ignorance. Just an uneducated peasant in the beginning, he had qualified himself for leadership, then had demonstrated his right to lead, and then had led tirelessly—until the other insurgents were ready for peace. Then came the much harder test of his resolution during the sixteen years of inaction, when one plan after another was thwarted. And in 1895 and 1896 there was a full manifestation of the same principle. That makes a long record of adherence to one idea, or ideal. Having this record in mind, one can understand the less extravagant passages in the eloquence of the brown man's friends, though not venturing to compete with them. For the present purpose it is enough to say that this is *not* the record of a servile character or an inferior animal.

So much for his moral quality ; and as for the mental part, the evidence is not less complete. Even the published reports of engagements directed by him show a plan of action common to all, but skilfully modified to fit the varying conditions in each instance. The little battle of Peralejo may be referred to as typical of the long series. Simply and briefly, it was a plan he had conceived when he was learning his lessons of attack and defence during the 'Ten Years' War. His successes prove that the lesson was thoroughly learned, that the plan was intelligently formed. Now, such steadfastness of mind, consistently and persistently, through years of varied and sore trials, applying to each problem as it arises one approved solvent, is not a mark of intellectual inferiority.

Antonio Maceo was born in Santiago de Cuba in 1848.

When the 'Ten Years' War broke out, he and his father and his brothers chose insurrection as their work in life. Just as they had been muleteers, carters, day-laborers, they became soldiers; and in their chosen occupation they died, one after another, in different provinces. It is customary to say that the father's house had been destroyed by fire, when he called his sons before him and made them swear to fight until Cuba should be free; in point of fact, the sons fought as only men can fight who do not need the constraint of an oath or the compulsion of a promise; and the father was killed while serving in Antonio's command.

And so no more about Maceo. All that we have said is absolutely true to the spirit of a time which, though separated from us by only two years, seems to belong in another century. It makes queer reading, now that our views of Cuban human nature at its best and worst have been revised in the light of the disclosures of the Santiago campaign.

Campos failing to check the insurrection, Weyler had been sent to crush it. The reasoning of the latter was very simple and strictly logical. He learned that peasants supplied the insurgent bands with food, with information in regard to the movements of Spanish troops, and even with ammunition. Perhaps not every one has heard of a singular exchange that often took place, a picturesque accommodation of supply to demand, a barter in death-warrants.

Imagine a party of Spanish soldiers on an expedition into the country. They are grumbling about the rations. "One meal a day—a little bacon, a handful of white beans, a scrap of bread. All from Spain, all of inferior

quality. The government has paid enough for good food, and plenty of it, God knows, but the contractors give us only *this*, and they are growing rich out of the war." Then they come upon a *criollo* (*i. e.*, intensely Cuban) settlement, and the natives, feigning distress, run out to meet them, crying : " For the love of God, give us something to eat. We are starving." " Nothing for you, dogs of Cubans," is the response; and the disappointed soldiers march away. But then the Cuban bands hovering in the rear, waiting for an opportunity to strike, come to the same destitute peasants. " Do *they* [being all patriots, though of many colours] lack food? Will they deign to accept hospitality?" They are led into a peasant's hut, the bed is shoved aside, a pit is disclosed that the bed had hidden, and in this pit is a store of sweet potatoes, and of pork cured in the smoke of *guayabo* leaves. That is good food for the insurgents. The meat thus cured can scarcely be regarded as a dainty bit, but it holds its own ; it does not deteriorate for years.

And meantime the invading column has pressed on to an encampment, where other peasants come in, offering fruit and new cheeses for sale.

" How much for this little cheese?" a hungry soldier asks.

" One dollar."

" That 's too much, rascal!"

" Well, nobody is looking. Suppose I say *five cartridges?*"

Another soldier to another countryman : " How much for an orange?"

" Twenty-five cents."

" Extortioner!"

" Well, when the officers are n't around, *two cartridges.*" So, more or less on the sly, the exchange is effected,

and when the peasants withdraw they have *capsulas* with which to slay their customers.

That is one way in which ammunition was secured by the insurgents.

Very well, then ; the aid of the peasants being indispensable to the insurgents, General Weyler did not shrink from the extreme cruelty involved in the removal of the peasants from their homes to cities and towns, where, as "reconcentrados," under the control of Spanish garrisons, they should become quite harmless. "With the peasants in our hands, and with my army of two hundred thousand to surround the detached camps of the rebels, one after another, I shall pacify the western provinces, at any rate!" And we remember Weyler's announcements, from time to time, that he had "pacified" the west. On October 21, 1896, the infamous proclamation was issued. Uncounted thousands of Cuban families were pent in towns, "out of harm's way"; and as time went on were permitted to starve.¹

The assassination of Spain's prime minister, Cánovas del Castillo, August 8, 1897, compelled certain important changes and admitted others. His indomitable spirit and unbounded influence at court upheld the Cuban policy which in this country has been identified with Weyler

¹The confusion of mind that exists in regard to Weyler's motives in issuing this *bando* is well illustrated in the following citations:

"The policy of driving *peaceable Cubans* of the four western provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara into certain specified stations of concentration."—Correspondence of *Harper's Weekly*, May 29, 1897.

"The proclamation was directed to people who were known to be, although non-combatants, aiding the insurgents, and even holding office under their government."—Correspondence of the same, July 3, 1897.

alone. In point of fact, it was Cánovas who insisted that the war of repression—of extermination, if nothing less would serve—should be relentlessly prosecuted ; for this staunch champion of the integrity of the kingdom believed that Spain could not only keep the old colonies, but could acquire new ones. “Spain may still be a great nation on land and sea,” Cánovas used to say, “forming a peaceable and lawful union with Portugal, its sister state, buying or reconquering Gibraltar, and expanding along the neighbouring coast of Africa.”¹

The policy of compromise and humbug that was brought to Cuba by General Blanco, after Weyler's recall, could never have been permitted during Cánovas's lifetime, or while his influence was paramount. It was the shabbiest sort of a futility. Blanco offered to the island autonomy, which he was not really empowered to bestow and which the insurgents scorned to consider ; he also professed a disposition to feed the starving reconcentrados, when he knew his inability to feed or pay his own soldiers. To emphasise their rejection of his “autonomy” proposals, an insurgent commander shot General Blanco's emissary, Colonel Ruiz ; and the proposal to undo Weyler's worst misdeed dwindled to an intimation that charitable persons in America might forward supplies to their consuls in Cuba for distribution. This suggestion was conveyed to the authorities at Washington by the Spanish minister, Señor de Lome. Public notice of the need was given, and an appeal for contributions was made. Formidable riots in Havana expressed resentment of the proffered relief from the United States, which was regarded as the entering wedge for intervention in the government of the island. Consul-General Lee reported that the situ-

¹ See Appendix, “Cánovas.”

ation was critical. By the middle of January it was announced that for the protection of American interests at Havana our Atlantic squadron would make its headquarters at the Dry Tortugas, within six hours' sail from the Cuban capital. On the 25th of January the battleship *Maine* was sent to Havana harbour, the Spanish Government consenting somewhat reluctantly to her presence at that point, but, when certain notes of angry protest and remonstrance were uttered in the Peninsula, proposing to correct all unfavourable impressions of the *Maine's* errand, and to express the Government's own friendly interpretation of it in the most striking manner—namely, by sending the Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya* to visit us in turn.

X

[Text]

[Translation]

LEGACION DE ESPAÑA,
WASHINGTON.

EXMO SEÑOR
DON JOSÉ CANALEJAS.

Mi distinguido y querido amigo. No tiene V^d que pedirme excusa por no haberme escrito, yo debí también haberlo hecho y lo he dejado por estar abrumado de trabajo y *nous sommes quittes*.

Aquí continua la situación lo mismo. Todo depende del éxito político y militar en Cuba. El prólogo de todo esto, en esta segunda manera de la

My distinguished and dear friend: You need not apologise for not having written to me. I should have written you also but I put it off, being overpowered with work, and *nous sommes quittes*.

The situation here continues unchanged. Everything hangs on the political and military issue in Cuba. The prologue of all this, in this second method

guerra, terminará el día en que se nombre el Gabinete Colonial y nos quiten ante este pueblo parte de la responsabilidad de lo que ahí sucede y tenga que echarla sobre los Cubanos, que tan immaculados creen.

Hasta entonces no podrá verse claro y considero como pérdida de tiempo y adelantar por un mal camino, el envío de emisarios al campo rebelde, negociaciones con los autonomistas aun no declarados legales y averiguación de las intenciones y propósitos de este Gobierno. Los emigrados irán volviendo uno por uno y en cuanto vuelvan irán entrando por el redil y los cabecillas volverán poco á poco. No tuvieron ni unos ni otros el valor de irse en masse y no lo tendrán para regresar así.

El Mensaje ha desengañado á los insurrectos que esperaban otra cosa y ha paralizado la acción del congreso, pero yo lo considero malo.

Ademas de la natural é inevitable groseria con que

of the war,¹ will end the day the Colonial Cabinet is appointed and we are relieved in the eyes of this country of part of the responsibility for what happens there, and [the Americans] must throw it upon the Cubans, whom they consider so immaculate.

Until then we shall not be able to see clearly, and I consider it a loss of time and a step in the wrong direction, the sending of emissaries to the rebel camp, the negotiating with the autonomists who are not yet legally constituted, and the finding out of the intentions and purposes of this Government. The exiles will return one by one, and as they do so they will walk into the sheepfold, and the chiefs will return gradually. As neither [exiles or leaders] had the courage to leave *en masse*, so neither will dare to return in a body.

The message has undeceived the insurgents, who expected something else, and has paralysed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad.

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with

¹ That is, the new Cuban policy of Sagasta and Blanco.

se repite cuanto ha dicho de Weyler la prensa y la opinion en España demuestra una vez mas lo que es McKinley, debil y populachero y ademas un politicastro que quiere dejarse una puerta abierta y quedar bien con los jingoes de su partido.

Sin embargo en la practica solo de nosotros dependerá que resulte malo y contrario.

Estoy de acuerdo en absoluto con V., sin un éxito militar no se logrará ahí nada y sin un éxito militar y político hay aqui siempre peligro de que se aliente á los insurrectos ya que no por el Gobierno, por una parte de la opinion.

No creo se fijan bastante en el papel de Inglaterra. Casi toda esa canalla periodística que pulula en ese hotel son ingleses y al propio tiempo que correspondales del Journal lo son de los mas serios periodicos y revistas de Londres. Así ha sido desde el principio. Para mi el único fin de Inglaterra es que los Americanos se entretengan con nosotros y les dejen en paz y si hay una guerra

which is repeated all that the press and public opinion of Spain have said of Weyler, it shows once again that McKinley is weak and caters to the rabble, and is moreover a low politician who wishes to leave a door open for himself and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.

Nevertheless, whether it will prove bad and adverse to us, will depend practically on ourselves alone.

I absolutely agree with you that without military success nothing can be attained there, and without military and political success there is always the danger here that the insurgents will be encouraged, if not by the Government, at least by part of the public opinion.

I do not think that enough attention is paid to the rôle of England. Almost all the newspaper canaille which swarms in your hotel are English, and at the same time that they are correspondents of the *Journal*, they are also correspondents of the best newspapers and reviews of London. It has been like this from the beginning. In my opinion England's sole object is to allow the

mejor, eso alejaria la que la amenaza, aunque no llegará nunca.

Seria muy importante que se ocuparan, aunque no fuera mas que para efecto, de las relaciones comerciales y que se enviase aquí un hombre de importancia para que yo le usara aquí para hacer propaganda entre los Senadores y otros en oposicion á la Junta y para ir ganando emigrados.

Ahí va Amblard. Creo viene demasiado empapado en politica menuda y hay que hacer [algo] muy grande ó perdemos.

Adela devuelve su saludo y todos le deseamos que en el proximo año sea mensajero de la paz y lleve ese aguinaldo á la pobre España.

Siempre su atento amigo y servidor, q. b. s. m.

ENRIQUE DUPUY DE LOME.

Americans to pass the time with us, leaving her in peace; and should war be declared, so much the better, for that would further remove the war that is threatening her—although that will never take place.

It would be very important that the matter of commercial relations should be broached, were it only for effect, and likewise that a man of prominence should be sent here, in order that I might use him to make a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and to win over exiles.

Amblard is on his way to you. I believe he is too deeply imbued with minor political matters, and something very great must be done or we shall lose.

Adela returns your salutations and we all wish that in the new year you should be a messenger of peace and take that New Year's present (Christmas box)¹ to poor Spain.

Yours very truly,
(Literally, "always your compliant friend and servant, who kisses your hand.")

ENRIQUE DUPUY DE LOME.

¹The Spanish word *aguinaldo* will have, as a proper name, so many repetitions in the course of this story that the writer may

The publication of the foregoing letter on February 9th led to the resignation of Señor Dupuy de Lome, Spanish Minister to the United States. That was the first consequence, which may be described as immediate ; but more important consequences were hardly less prompt. The phrases applied to President McKinley, the cynical reference to the autonomy scheme, and the suggestion of bad faith throughout Spain's dealings with our government and our people were found to be extremely irritating, and added to the passion which had begun to characterise public discussion of Cuban affairs and of this country's responsibilities and duties in that connection—as when the Senate debated the question of intervention, and when resolutions calling for information in regard to the autonomy proposals and relief of reconcentrados were adopted by both Houses, February 14th.

Señor Luis Polo y Bernabe was appointed to fill the exceedingly difficult position thus left vacant—Señor Du Bosc, as *chargé d'affaires*, representing Spain at Washington until the new minister should arrive.

be pardoned for dwelling on its significance when it occurs for the first time. Aguinaldo means, in De Lome's letter, and so far as we are concerned, not a Christmas present, but a gift for the New Year.

The translation was made and the text of the letter transcribed from a facsimile of the original, with the kind assistance of Mr. L. B. Sanchez. The popular impressions were, of course, based upon translations published at the time, which were more or less inaccurate.

CHAPTER II

DESTRUCTION OF THE "MAINE"—PROVISION FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCE—SENATOR PROCTOR'S STATEMENT—THE "MAINE" INQUIRY REPORT.

AND so to February 15, 1898.

The battleship *Maine* was destroyed that night by an explosion that jarred and jostled a nation otherwise at rest and well content with its own wide boundaries. A forward movement then begun, and therefore begun, and at first apparently limited to intervention for the rescue of a neighbouring island, was destined to grow and to receive new names—"national expansion," "imperialism"—before the noon of the year.

A bare statement of events in their sequence begins to be rather stirring at this point. On the 17th of February, the following officers were appointed to investigate the cause of the *Maine* disaster: Captain W. T. Sampson, of the *Iowa*, Captain F. E. Chadwick, of the *New York*, Lieutenant-Commander W. P. Potter, of the *New York*, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolf Marix, of the *Vermont*. On the 18th the *Vizcaya*, returning the *Maine's* "visit of courtesy," reached the outer harbour of New York.¹ On the 19th our government declined a request of the Spanish officials in Havana for a joint investigation of the wreck of the *Maine*. The distribution

¹The *Vizcaya* was anchored off Staten Island from February 20th to 25th.

of supplies sent from this country to the starving reconcentrados began to be effective under the direction of the Red Cross Society. Spain objected to the use of our cruisers in the transportation of these supplies ; objected also to General Lee's presence (or, more accurately speaking, to his activity) in Havana. Rumours of the gathering of a Spanish fleet of torpedo-boats (at that time assumed to be vessels of terrible power) grew into reports that our warships or our coast-towns were to be attacked, and Spain's naval force, it was said, was to be augmented through the purchase of vessels of the newest pattern. Each day brought its own argument or suggestion or confident assertion touching the cause of the disaster to the *Maine*; each day the popular impression advanced one step towards the conviction that the explosion had been caused by some external agency.

On the 8th of March, the House, by a unanimous vote, passed a bill appropriating fifty million dollars for national defence ; by a unanimous vote and without debate the Senate passed the same measure next day. The bill had the President's cordial approval and received his signature immediately. Preparations for defence were undertaken on a liberal scale. Among other things, Spain and the United States entered the shipyards of the world as rivals for the purchase of cruisers and smaller vessels of war.

The new Spanish Minister, Señor Polo y Bernabe, presented his credentials to President McKinley March 12th. Four days later the remonstrance of his government against our measures of defence and the presence of our fleet at Key West was received and respectfully entertained ; but the moment was not well chosen for such representations. Senator Redfield Proctor's statement, read to the Senate March 17th, and published throughout the country next day, did not make for peace or peaceful

concessions. The story he told was one that had become familiar—horribly familiar—in American ears, but it had not before reached their hearts with the power of absolute conviction. Mr. Proctor had been Secretary of War in President Harrison's administration ; his eminence in the public service had acquainted everyone with his character and uncommon ability, so that after his statement appeared there was no longer any question about the facts touched upon. Reports of misery and of cruelty were not exaggerations after all, but literally true. To this appalling fact the Senator from Vermont—not wishing to make an impression, but as a matter of duty narrating what he had seen—awakened thousands of conservative Americans. Men said : “ Well, that is so ; now what is to be done ? ”

“ MR. PRESIDENT,” the Senator said, “ more importance seems to be attached by others to my recent visit to Cuba than I have given it, and it has been suggested that I make a public statement of what I saw and how the situation impressed me. This I do on account of the public interest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct any inaccuracies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in some of the reported interviews with me. My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion ; not suggested by anyone. The only mention I made of it to the President was to say to him that I contemplated such a trip and to ask him if there was any objection to it, to which he replied that he could see none. No one but myself is responsible for anything in this statement. Judge Day gave me a brief note of introduction to General Lee, and I had letters of introduction from business friends at the North to bankers and other business men at Havana, and they in turn gave me letters to their correspondents in other cities. These letters to business men were very useful, as one principal purpose of my visit was to ascertain the views of practical men of affairs upon the situation.

“ Of General Lee I need say little. His valuable services to his country in his trying position are too well

known to all his countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high character, and courage, he possesses the important requisites of unflinching tact and courtesy, and withal his military education and training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable adjuncts in the equipment of our representative in a country so completely under military rule as Cuba. General Lee kindly invited us to sit at his table at the hotel during our stay in Havana, and this opportunity for frequent informal talks with him was of great help to me. In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many questions that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen and heard on our trips through the country. I also met and spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas and with Captain Barker, a staunch ex-Confederate soldier, at Sagua la Grande, a friend of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Walthall). None of our representatives whom I met in Cuba are of my political faith, but there is a broader faith not bounded by party lines. They are all true Americans, and have done excellent service.

"It has been stated that I said there was no doubt that the *Maine* was blown up from the outside. This is a mistake. I may have said that such was the general impression among Americans in Havana. In fact, I have no opinion about it myself and carefully avoided forming one. I gave no attention to these outside surmises. I met the members of the Court on their boat, but would as soon approach our Supreme Court in regard to a pending case as that Board. They are as competent and trustworthy within the lines of their duty as any court in the land, and their report, when made, will carry conviction to all the people that the exact truth has been stated just as far as it is possible to ascertain it. And until then surmise and conjecture are idle and unprofitable. Let us calmly wait for the report.

"There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having about an equal sea-front on the north and south borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its south-west corner, being separated from it else-

where by a narrow peninsula of Santa Clara province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west, Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the four western provinces, which constitute about one half the island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the few fortified towns. These two large provinces are spoken of to-day as 'Cuba Libre.'

"Havana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen its sights—the tomb of Columbus, the forts, Cabaña and Morro Castle, etc.,—I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the country. Everything seems to go on much as usual in Havana. Quiet prevails, and except for the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police duty, and their abounding presence in all public places, one sees little sign of war.

"Outside of Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a *trocha* (trench), a sort of rifle-pit, but constructed on a plan new to me: the dirt being thrown up on the inside, and a barbed wire fence on the outer side of this trench.

"These *trochas* have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are really small block-houses, many of them more like a large sentry-box, loopholed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each. The purpose of these *trochas* is to keep the *reconcentrados* in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven into these fortified towns and held there, to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison-yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except the walls are not so high and strong, but they are sufficient, where every point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor *reconcentrado* women and children. Every railroad station is within one of these *trochas*, and has an armed guard. Every train has an armoured freight-car, loopholed for musketry, and

filled with soldiers, and with, as I observed, and was informed is always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent block-houses inclosed by a trocha, and with a guard, along the railroad track.

“ With this exception there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills, where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no house or hut in the four hundred miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio province in the west, across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas. There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures, except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns have reached, is under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation. This is the ‘ pacified ’ condition of the four western provinces.

“ West of Havana is mainly the rich tobacco country ; east, so far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills are destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Two or three were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as are the villages, by trochas and ‘ forts,’ or palisades of the royal palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos have been able to obtain special favours of the Spanish Government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all the railroads, pay taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I have no means of verifying this. It is the common talk among those who have better means of knowledge.

“ All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns when Weyler’s order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry (many of them farmers) some land-owners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches—and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family. It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from that which prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity was not high measured by our own. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory. They live mostly in cabins made of palm or in wooden houses. Some of them had houses of stone the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show that the country was ever inhabited. The first clause of Weyler’s order reads as follows :

“ ‘ I order and command : First, all the inhabitants of a country [district] outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall within the period of eight days concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.’

“ The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authority, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, prescribe that eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal districts, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of it will serve as a ‘ recommendation.’

“ Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. It was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all who did not obey, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When

they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and after a year's wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporise, and with large families or with more than one in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food, or none, what wonder that one half have died, and that one quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved. A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless.

"Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our Consuls that they have been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the *re-concentrados*, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words.

"Of these I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and they had given free play to a strong natural and highly cultivated imagination. Before starting I received

through the mail a leaflet published by the *Christian Herald*, with the cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these would be rare specimens got up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and worse ; many that should not be photographed and shown. I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and disease caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our Consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish-born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realised. The Los Pasos Hospital in Havana has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen could not do that. He visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton's very able and efficient assistants [in the Red Cross work], had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when four hundred women and children were lying on the stone floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags—and such rags! Sick children as naked as they came into the world. And the conditions in the other cities are even worse.

“ Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known and esteemed her for many years, but had not half-appreciated her capability and devotion to her work. I especially looked into her business methods, fearing here would be the greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and extravagance, but found she could teach me on these points. I visited the warehouse where the supplies are received and distributed ; saw the methods of checking ; visited the hospitals established or organised and supplied by her ; saw the food distributions in several cities and towns, and everything seems to me to be conducted in the best manner possible.

The ample fire-warehouse in Havana, owned by a Cuban firm, is given, with a gang of labourers, free of charge, to unload and reship supplies. The children's hospital in Havana, a very large, fine, private residence, is hired at the cost of less than one hundred dollars per month, not a fifth of what it would command in this city. It is under the admirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser of New York, a German lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there, all Miss Barton's assistants being excellently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything to commend. American people may be assured that their bounty will reach the sufferers with the least possible cost, and in the best manner in every respect. And if our people could see a small fraction of the need they would pour more 'freely from their liberal store' than ever before for any cause.

"When will the need for this help end? Not until peace comes and the reconcentrados can go back to their country, rebuild their homes, reclaim their tillage plots, which quickly run up to brush in that wonderful soil and clime, and until they can be free from danger of molestation in so doing. Until then the American people must in the main care for them. It is true that the alcaldes and other local authorities and relief committees are now trying to do something, and desire, I believe, to do the best they can. But the problem is beyond their means and capacity, and the work is one to which they are not accustomed.

"General Blanco's order of Nov. 13th last, somewhat modifies the Weyler order, but is of little or no practical benefit. Its application is limited to farms 'properly defended,' and the owners are obliged to build 'centres of defence.' Its execution is completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they know the terrible military efficiency of Weyler's order in stripping the country of all possible shelter, food, or source of information for an insurgent, and will be slow to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months ago, I saw no beneficent results from it worth entertaining. I do not impugn General Blanco's motives,

and believe him to be an amiable gentleman and that he would be glad to relieve the condition of the reconcentrados if he could do so without loss of any military advantage, but he knows that all Cubans are insurgents at heart, and none now under military control will be allowed to go from under it.

“ I wish I might speak of the country, of its surpassing richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point I agree with Columbus, and I believe everyone between his time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land “ where every prospect pleases and only man is vile.’

“ I had but little time to study the race question, and have read nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that there are nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of 1,600,000. They live principally in the towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks are mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, is in their hands. They have an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way of trade and legalised monopolies in which the country abounds is given to them by the government, many of them acquire property. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insurrection.

“ There are, or were before the war, about one million Cubans on the island, two hundred thousand Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than a half-million of negroes and mixed blood. The Cuban whites are pure Spanish blood, and, like the Spaniard, usually dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond, so far as I heeded, than the Spaniard. The percentage of coloured to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is now not over twenty-five per cent. of the total. In fact, the number of coloured people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and labourer are by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted, and improvident. There is a proverb among the Cubans that ‘ Spanish bulls cannot be bred in Cuba,’ that is, that the Cubans, though they are

of Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament. Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull-fight ; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and maintained and patronised by the Spaniards.

“One thing that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education as his own country furnished. The coloured people seem to me by nature quite the equal, mentally and physically, of those in this country. Certainly physically they are by far the larger and stronger race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there were one half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion was slowly increasing until emancipation.

“It is said that there are about 60,000 Spanish soldiers now in Cuba fit for duty out of over 200,000 that have been sent there. The rest have died, been sent home sick, are in the hospitals, and some have been killed, notwithstanding the official reports. They are conscripts, many of them very young, and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They are quiet and obedient, and if well drilled and led, I believe, would fight fairly well, but not at all equal to our men. Much more would depend on the leadership than with us. The officer must lead well and be one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about them of many persons, and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw, perhaps, 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery nor a tent. They live in barracks in the towns and are seldom out for more than a day, returning to town at night.

“They have little or no equipment for supply trains or for a field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry

horses are scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds, tough and hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one of the mounts of Don Quixote and his Squire. Some of the officers, however, have good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cavalry is considered the favourite and the dangerous fighting arm. The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by an eye-witness and participant in some of their battles, is for the infantry, when threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire away *ad libitum* and without ceasing until time to march back to town. It does not seem to have entered the minds of either side that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse everywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there are everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage.

“ Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of safe-conduct to Gomez’s camp, and was told that if I would write him, an answer would be returned safely within ten days at most. I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was sought out by an insurgent field-officer, who gave me the best information received as to the insurgent forces. His statement was moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men now in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the time in Havana province itself, organised as four small brigades, and operating in small bands.

“ Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half of the railroad, and about fifteen miles out of Havana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more travelled than any other and which I went over four times. Aranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles, from Havana. They were well armed, but very poorly supplied with ammunition. They are not allowed to

carry many cartridges, sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry especially are poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the streets of Havana and one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average Spanish soldier. Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was bound by the arms and wrists by cords, and they were all tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the amenities of their warfare. About one third of the Cuban army are coloured, mostly in the infantry. A field-officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of those coloured soldiers: that they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the whites, could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and come in fresh at night.

“The dividing lines between parties are the most straight and clear-cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It is Cuban against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other. I do not count the Autonomists in this division, as they are so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting. General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been Autonomists and were still classed as such. But the march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late. It falls as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year or two of our war. If it succeeds it can only be by armed force, by the triumph of the Spanish army, and the success of Spanish arms would be easier by Weyler's policy and method. . . .

“I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members; nor did I have with any of the Juntas which exist in every city and large town of Cuba. None of the calls I made was upon parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew some of them were classed as Autonomists. . . . Some favoured a United States protectorate, some annexation, some free Cuba. . . . They were business men and wanted peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sove-

reignty. They characterised Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can. I could not but conclude that you do not have to scratch an Autonomist very deep to find a Cuban. There is soon to be an election, but every polling-place must be inside a fortified town. Such elections ought to be safe for the 'ins.'

"I have endeavoured to state, in not intemperate mood, what I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave everyone to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal is not the barbarity practised by Weyler nor the loss of the *Maine*, if our worst fears should prove true, terrible as are both of these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge. But whether our action ought to be influenced by any one or all of these things, and, if so, how far, is another question. I am not in favour of annexation, not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training and without any strong guiding American element. The fear that, if free, the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good self-government are far more favourable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, the peaceable temperaments of the people, whites and blacks; the wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institutions.

"But it is not my purpose at this time, nor do I consider it my province, to suggest any plan. I merely speak of the symptoms as I saw them, but do not undertake to prescribe such remedial steps as may be required and may safely be left to an American President and the American people."

On the 28th of March Mr. McKinley sent to Congress the report of the *Maine* Court of Inquiry, together with

the testimony taken by the court, and a message summarising its findings and conclusions.

The full text of the report follows :

“ UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP ‘ IOWA,’

“ FIRST RATE,

“ KEY WEST, FLA., Monday, March 21, 1898.

“ After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court finds as follows :

“ (1) That the United States battleship *Maine* arrived in the harbour of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from five and a half to six fathoms of water, by the regular government pilot. The United States Consul-General at Havana had notified the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the *Maine*.

“ (2) The state of discipline on board the *Maine* was excellent ; and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out. All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled. Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell-rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there. The magazines and shell-rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the *Maine* the keys were found in their proper place in the Captain’s cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at eight P.M.

“ The temperature of the magazines and shell-rooms was taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the *Maine* was destroyed. The torpedo war-heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship under the ward-room, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the *Maine*. The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft and remote from the scene of the explosion. Waste was carefully looked after on the *Maine* to obviate danger. Special order in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer. Varnishes, dryers,

alcohol, and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck, and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the *Maine*.

“The medical stores were stowed aft under the ward-room, and remote from the scene of the explosion. No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other storerooms.

“The coal-bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shell-rooms, four were empty, namely: ‘B 3, B 4, B 5, B 6.’ ‘A 15’ had been in use that day, and ‘A 16’ was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time on account of bunkers ‘B 4’ and ‘B 6’ being empty. This bunker, ‘A 16,’ had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty. The fire-alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the *Maine*.

“The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch. These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition.

“On the night of the destruction of the *Maine* everything had been reported secure for the night at eight P.M., by reliable persons through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the *Maine* was destroyed the ship was quiet, and therefore least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.

“(3) The destruction of the *Maine* occurred at forty minutes past nine in the evening of the 15th day of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, in the harbour of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first

explosion was more in the nature of a report, like that of a gun ; while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

“ The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part. The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony.

“ (4) That portion of the port side of the protective deck which extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41 was blown up aft and over to port. The main deck from about frame 30 to about frame 41 was blown up aft and slightly over to starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part. This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

“ (5) At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one half feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water ; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured. The outside bottom-plating is bent into a reversed V-shape, the after wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

“ At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about six feet above its normal position.

“ In the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

“(6) The court finds that the loss of the *Maine*, on the occasion named, was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

“(7) In the opinion of the court the *Maine* was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines.

“(8) The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons.

“W. T. SAMPSON, Captain U. S. N., President.

“A. MARIX, Lieutenant-Commander U. S. N.,
Judge-Advocate.

“The court, having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at 11 A. M., to await the action of the convening authority.

“W. T. SAMPSON, Captain U. S. N., President.

“A. MARIX, Lieutenant-Commander U. S. N.,
Judge-Advocate.

“U. S. FLAGSHIP ‘NEW YORK,’ OFF KEY WEST, FLA., March 22, 1898.”

“The proceedings and findings of the court of inquiry in the above case are approved.

“M. SICARD, Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.”

In his message to the Congress of the United States, President McKinley said :

“For some time prior to the visit of the *Maine* to Havana harbour our consular representatives pointed out the advantages to flow from the visit of national ships to the Cuban waters, in accustoming the people to the presence of our flag as the symbol of good will, and of our ships in the fulfilment of the mission of protection to American interests, even though no immediate need therefor might exist.

“ Accordingly, on the 24th of January last, after a conference with the Spanish Minister in which the renewal of visits of our war-vessels to Spanish waters was discussed and accepted, the peninsular authorities at Madrid and Havana were advised of the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits to Cuban ports, and that, in that view, the *Maine* would forthwith call at the port of Havana. This announcement was received by the Spanish government with appreciation of the friendly character of the visit of the *Maine*, and with notification of an intention to return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the principal ports of the United States. Meanwhile, the *Maine* entered the port of Havana on the 25th of January, her arrival being marked with no special incident besides the exchange of customary salutes and ceremonial visits.

“ The *Maine* continued in the harbour of Havana during the three weeks following her arrival. No appreciable excitement attended her stay ; on the contrary, a feeling of relief and confidence followed the resumption of the long-interrupted friendly intercourse. So noticeable was this immediate effect of her visit that the Consul-General strongly urged that the presence of our ships in Cuban waters should be kept up by retaining the *Maine* at Havana, or in the event of her recall, by sending another vessel there to take her place.

“ At forty minutes past nine in the evening of the 15th of February, the *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion, by which the entire forward part of the ship was utterly wrecked. In this catastrophe two officers and two hundred and sixty-four of her crew perished ; those who were not killed outright by her explosion being penned between decks by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate sinking of the hull. Prompt assistance was rendered by the neighbouring vessels anchored in the harbour, aid being especially given by the boats of the Spanish cruiser *Alphonso XII.* and the Ward Line steamer *City of Washington*, which lay not far distant. The wounded were generously cared for by the authorities of Havana, the hospitals being freely opened to them, while the earliest recovered bodies of the dead were interred by

the municipality in a public cemetery in the city. Tributes of grief and sympathy were offered from all official quarters of the island.

“The appalling calamity fell upon the people of our country with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense excitement prevailed which, in a community less just and self-controlled than ours, might have led to hasty acts of blind resentment. This spirit, however, soon gave way to the calm processes of reason and to the resolve to investigate the facts and await material proof before forming a judgment as to the cause, the responsibility, and, if the facts warranted, the remedy due. This course necessarily recommended itself from the outset to the Executive, for only in the light of a dispassionately ascertained certainty could it determine the nature and measure of its full duty in the matter.

“The usual procedure was followed, as in all cases of casualty or disaster to national vessels of any maritime state. A naval court of inquiry was at once organised, composed of officers well qualified by rank and practical experience to discharge the onerous duty imposed upon them. Aided by a strong force of wreckers and divers, the court proceeded to make a thorough investigation on the spot, employing every available means for the impartial and exact determination of the causes of the explosion. Its operations have been conducted with the utmost deliberation and judgment, and, while independently pursued, no source of information was neglected, and the fullest opportunity was allowed for a simultaneous investigation by the Spanish authorities.

“The finding of the court of inquiry was reached, after twenty-three days of continuous labour, on the 21st of March instant, and, having been approved on the 22d by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States naval force of the North Atlantic station, was transmitted to the Executive.

“It is herewith laid before the Congress, together with the voluminous testimony taken before the court. Its purport is, in brief, as follows :

“When the *Maine* arrived at Havana, she was conducted by the regular government pilot to buoy No. 4, to

which she was moored in from five and one half to six fathoms of water. The state of discipline on board and the condition of her magazines, boilers, coal-bunkers, and storage compartments are passed in review, with the conclusion that excellent order prevailed, and that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion existed in any quarter.

“At eight o'clock in the evening of February 15 everything had been reported secure, and all was quiet. At forty minutes past nine o'clock the vessel was suddenly destroyed. There were two distinct explosions, with a brief interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of the ship very perceptibly ; the second, which was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.

“The evidence of the divers establishes that the after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the explosion. The forward part was completely demolished.

“Upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the court is as follows :

[As in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Report.]

“I have directed that the finding of the court of inquiry, and the views of this government thereon, be communicated to the government of Her Majesty, the Queen Regent, and I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honour and the friendly relations of the two governments. It will be the duty of the Executive to advise the Congress of the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is invoked.

“WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 28, 1898.”

Resolutions on the Cuban question were introduced next day in both Senate and House ; in both Senate and House the Cuban question was discussed on March 31st ; and the temper of the popular branch of the government was shown on the 1st of April by the passage of the Naval

Appropriation Bill with an important increase in the number of torpedo-boats and destroyers. Intervention in Cuba was hotly discussed in both Houses on April 4th, and on April 5th an immediate declaration of war with Spain was advocated by five members of the Senate. But the resistless tendency of events was not yet fully discerned, for the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the six great European powers called at the White House on April 7th to present the following joint note :

“The undersigned representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorised in that behalf, address in the name of their respective governments a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba. The Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and disinterested character of this representation will be fully recognised and appreciated by the American nation.”

Mr. McKinley's reply to the joint note was criticised at the time for its extremely moderate and conciliatory tone ; but in view of the fact that it made our position entirely clear, while studiously avoiding all ground of offence to the six polite governments, it should rather be praised for its temperance and friendliness. It expressed appreciation of “the humanitarian and disinterested character” of the note, and made no secret of our government's desire that equal appreciation should be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavours to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable.

CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS

THE days were filled with confusion, and in the retrospect it need not excite surprise that our people did not easily choose their course of conduct, or immediately decide what their duty was in the circumstances, for almost every fact from which, as a starting-point, they should reason to a just conclusion, was in dispute.

Such difficulties and uncertainties in a well-governed republic either invite a leader of public opinion to come forward, or prove that the officials in whom the public has reposed its trust are unworthy of that distinction.

What was the situation then ? Out of the confusion can we yet extract a clear statement of the principles involved, and so decide what we *should* have done ? We may at least attempt to take the point of view of an observer in the second week of April, 1898, and reconsider our duty in the light of what has happened since that time, as well as the experience of our government at other critical points in its history.

Let us assume, then, that we have gone back to April 11, 1898, and are actually considering the grave crisis that arose in the relations of the United States to Spain, by reason of the warfare that for more than three years had raged in the neighbouring island of Cuba.

We realise the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own Union, and the grave rela-

tion the course which it was then incumbent upon the nation to adopt bore to the traditional policy of our government and to precepts laid down by the founders of the republic and religiously observed by succeeding administrations.

The revolution was but the successor of other similar insurrections which occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which during its progress had subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing the neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilised practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.

Since the beginning of the revolution, in February, 1895, this country had seen a domain at its threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequalled in the history of the island, and rarely paralleled as to the number of the combatants and the bitterness or the contest by any revolution of modern times where a dependent people, striving to be free, have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state.

Our people had beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want ; its lucrative commerce virtually paralysed ; its exceptional productiveness diminished ; its fields laid waste ; its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution.

We had found ourselves constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and which the law of nations commands, to police our own waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlaw-

ful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade had suffered ; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba had been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people had been so severely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens, which inevitably found expression from time to time in the national legislature ; so that issues wholly external to our own body politic engrossed attention and stood in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements.

In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war had already become so onerous that President Cleveland made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of our government, in any way that might tend to an honourable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation, or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant.

The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished. The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the despatch of fresh levies and by the addition to the horrors of war of a new and inhuman phase, happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilised Christian peoples.

The policy of devastation and concentration which had been inaugurated by Captain-General Weyler's *bando* of October 21, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the

power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in the agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops. The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and burned, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contesting parties, and executed by all the powers at their disposal.

The Spaniards laid waste the country ; the insurgents attacked and burned the towns.

By the time Mr. McKinley took office, in 1897, reconcentration, so called, had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of 300,000 or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death-rate increased in an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and the disease thereto incident, exceeded fifty per centum of their total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from general dearth, could give no aid. The so-called " zones of cultivation " established within the immediate area of effective military control about the

cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed, or shelter, for their own support or for the support of the cities.

The concentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result. It was not civilised warfare. It was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.

Meanwhile, the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterised the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural parts of the country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted, however, the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset.

In this state of affairs our government found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. The President's message of December, 1897, reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to some form of honourable settlement.¹ The assassination of the Prime Minister,

¹ Compare Señor de Lome's letter, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs.

Cánovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The former administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto Rico. The overtures of our government, made through its new envoy, General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new government of Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that by the end of November not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection remained in a Spanish prison.

While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by judicious expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated expressly for their succour by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities.

On the 24th of December, President McKinley issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions for

the succour of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this, on the 8th of January, by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross Society and the religious and business elements of the community. The efforts of that committee were untiring, and accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba greatly aided the charitable work. The President of the American Red Cross Society and representatives of other contributory organisations generously visited Cuba, and co-operated with the Consul-General and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly \$200,000 in money and supplies had already reached the sufferers, and more was forthcoming. The supplies were admitted free of duty, and transportation to the interior was arranged so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, was extended through many of the towns where the suffering existed. Thousands of lives had thus already been saved.

The war in Cuba was of such a nature that, short of subjugation or extermination, a final military victory for either side seemed impracticable. The alternative lay in the physical exhaustion of one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which, in effect, ended the Ten Years' War. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the revolution was a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilised world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we were, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.

Realising this, it appeared to be Mr. McKinley's duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans, who had so much to lose by the prolongation of

the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end he submitted on the 27th of March, as an outcome of much representation and correspondence through the United States Minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October 1st for the negotiation of peace. In addition, he asked the immediate revocation of the order of concentration, so that the people might be permitted to return to their farms, and the needy relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, cooperating with the Spanish authorities.

The reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received on the night of the 31st of March. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular Parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government were not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament was not to meet until the 4th of May, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from the General-in-Chief, to whom it would pertain in such case to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice.

The propositions submitted by General Woodford, and the reply of the Spanish Government, were both in the form of brief memoranda, and substantially in the language above given. The function of the Cuban Parliament in the matter of "preparing" peace, and the manner of its doing so, were not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions preceding the final conference it was understood that the Spanish Government proposed to give

the insular Congress full powers to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents—whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by means of legislation does not appear.¹

With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive was brought to the end of his effort.

In the President's annual message of December, 1897, he said: "Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants; and intervention in favour of one or the other party. I need not speak of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression."

Thereupon the President reviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when, after several years of sanguinary, destructive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba, he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible, and that the recognition of belligerency was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. Mr. McKinley commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconvenience and positive danger of a recognition of belligerency which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.

Nothing had occurred to change Mr. McKinley's view

¹ This policy of shifting responsibility, and discrediting the insurgents by making it appear that they were responsible for the continuation of hostilities, is more bluntly stated in the second paragraph of Señor de Lome's letter, chapter i., section x.

in this regard. He clearly saw that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerency is published, could, of itself, and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which our government laboured : the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicted the island.

Turning to the question of recognising the independence of the insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. He said :

“ In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to the crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both from the European governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish-America, so wisely consistent with just principles has been the action of our government that we have under the most critical circumstances avoided all censure and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to decide.

“ It has thus been made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognise the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views, or to the merits of the original controversy. . . . But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle.

“ In the contests between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof and waited not only until the ability of the new States to protect themselves was fully established, but

until the danger of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognised. Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself.

“ It is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly organised government of Texas annihilated within its confines. But, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican republic, under another executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its lost dominion.

“ Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended ; and were there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions.”

Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest, in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus :

“ Prudence, therefore, seems to indicate that we should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall recognise the independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by

them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established policy of our government, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad, and inspired confidence at home."

These were the words of the resolute and patriotic Andrew Jackson. They were the evidence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state should "constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability," and forming *de facto*, "if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state"), had imposed for its own governance, in dealing with cases like these, the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away.

This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The Congress to whom President Jackson referred the question as one "probably leading to war," and, therefore, a proper subject for "a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when the President should be satisfied that the republic of Texas had become "an independent state." It was so recognised by President Van Buren, who commissioned a *chargé d'affaires* March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory and

when there was at the time no *bona-fide* contest going on between the insurgent province and its former sovereign.

Surely no support for those who favoured recognition of the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic could be found in these precedents.

Nor from the standpoint of expediency did that course seem wise or prudent.

Such recognition was not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To have committed this country to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might have subjected us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation towards the organisation so recognised. In case of intervention, our conduct would have been subject to the approval or disapproval of such government ; we should have been required to submit to its direction, and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.

There remained the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that, during the few months immediately preceding, the relation of the United States had virtually been one of friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence towards an ultimate pacific result, just and honourable to all interests concerned.

The spirit of all our acts hitherto had been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood of American citizens.

The forcible intervention of the United States to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighbouring

states have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifice of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, was justifiable on rational grounds. It involved, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement.

The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarised as follows :

First, in the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries which the parties to the conflict were either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say that this was all in another country, belonging to another nation, and was therefore none of our business. It was especially our duty, for it was right at our door.

Second, we owed it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there could or would afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprived them of legal protection.

Third, the right to intervene might be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, the condition of affairs in Cuba was a constant menace to our peace, and entailed upon our government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us, and with which our people had such trade and business relations ; when the lives and liberty of our citizens were in constant danger, and their property destroyed and themselves ruined ; when our trading vessels were liable to seizure and were seized at our very door by the warships of a foreign nation ; when irritating questions and entanglements arose out of the filibustering expeditions that we were powerless alto-

gether to prevent, our peace was constantly menaced, and we were compelled to keep on a war-footing with a nation that in name was our friend.

These elements of danger and disorder had been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which had deeply and justly moved the American people—the destruction of the battleship *Maine* in the harbour of Havana during the night of the 15th of February.

The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commanded the unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the *Maine* was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility.

In any event, the destruction of the *Maine*, by whatever exterior cause, was a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that was intolerable. That condition was thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government could not assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbour of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there.

President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparently indefinite prolongation, said :

“ I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible, mediation and intervention. Owing perhaps to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula . . . the contending parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of peacemaker. In this view, in the earlier days of the contest, the good offices of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good

faith, without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties ; but were at the time declined by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received that, in the opinion of Spain, that time has been reached. And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent upon the existence of peace in the island ; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under the circumstances, the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must, sooner or later, be invoked for the termination of the strife."

In the last annual message of President Cleveland, during the pending struggle, it was said :

" When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life, and the utter destruction of the subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognise and discharge."

And, referring once more to Mr. McKinley's annual message to Congress in December, 1897, we find that he then said :

" The near future will demonstrate whether the indis-

pensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests, so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain. . . . When that time comes, that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honour, and to humanity. Sure of the right, keeping free from all offence ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honourable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilisation, and humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part, and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilised world."

The long trial had proved that the object for which Spain had waged the war could not be attained. The fire of insurrection might have flamed or smouldered with varying seasons, but it had not been, and it was plain that it could not be, extinguished. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which could no longer be endured was the enforced pacification of Cuba.

"In the name of humanity, in the name of civilisation, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop." Such was President McKinley's conclusion, and the statement in his message of April 11th— which we have been paraphrasing.

For better or for worse, this was and is the Administra-

tion's argument. By the statement which we have now repeated, its motives and its intelligence will be judged.

Mr. McKinley continued:

“In view of these facts and of these considerations I ask the Congress to authorise and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

“And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

“The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the constitution and the law, I await your action.”

The President's message concluded with the statement that he had received official information that the Queen Regent of Spain, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, had directed General Blanco to proclaim a suspension of hostilities.¹

¹ At the cost of a good deal of repetition, the message of April 11 has now been given almost in full, and with the least possible change in its wording.

The proclamation issued by Captain-General Blanco in accordance with these instructions was as follows :

“ His Majesty’s Government, yielding to the reiterated wish expressed by His Holiness the Pope, has been pleased to decree a suspension of hostilities with the object of preparing and facilitating the restoration of peace on this island, in virtue whereof I believe it convenient to order :

“ Article 1. From the day following the receipt in each locality of the present proclamation hostilities are ordered to be suspended in all the territory of the island of Cuba.

“ The details for the execution of the above article will be the subject of special instructions that will be communicated to the several commanders-in-chief of the army corps for easy and prompt execution according to the situation and circumstances of the case.

“ BLANCO.”

Promises made and never kept.

And there were other promises lacking also the guaranty of fulfilment. The orders of General Weyler had been revoked ; it was reported that the reconcentrados were to be permitted to return to their homes, that public works had been ordered to give them employment, and even that the sum of \$600,000 had been voted for their relief. Spain had offered to submit to arbitration the differences which might arise in the matter of the *Maine*.

The President called attention to all these things, and requested that they should be given full weight in the deliberations of the Congress. Neither he nor the Congress thought that any such promises could possibly be taken at their face value.

The reports of the American consular representatives in Cuba, accompanying the message, and reaching the whole body of the people immediately through their publication in the principal newspapers, added weight to every word of Mr. McKinley’s remonstrances, and made his most

radical positions seem rather moderate. It was not so much that they multiplied the examples of distress given by Mr. Proctor ; it was rather that they stated conditions which could not be improved without forcible intervention. The United States Consul in Santa Clara reported that it was forbidden to give food to any one having relatives in the insurgent forces, a rule which excluded seventy-five per cent. of the destitute.

And that was American literature on Tuesday.

The next day, being Wednesday, April 13th, the House passed a resolution directing the President to intervene in Cuba at once, and authorising him to use the land and naval forces of the United States to stop the war of insurrection. By the end of that week the Senate had felt its way to a more or less determined position in the matter, and passed, as a substitute for the House resolution, a joint resolution declaring the island to be free, recognising the republic, demanding Spain's relinquishment of authority in Cuba, and requiring that the Spanish forces should be withdrawn. It directed the President to call out the militia in addition to the regular land and naval forces, and finally disclaimed any intention of annexing the island.

Spain appealed to the Powers, in a memorandum dated April 18th, and signed by Señor Gullon, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The memorandum invited attention "to the moral and material aid the Cuban rebels have received in filibustering expeditions and in the operations of the Junta." It renewed Spain's denials of cruelty towards the Cubans, and asserted that Spain had complied with the condition made in President Cleveland's despatch of September 7, 1896, in having given the measure of autonomy needed to insure peace. It most solemnly asserted, in reference to the *Maine* disaster, the

absolute innocence of Spanish officials and Spanish subjects generally. The memorandum declared that the United States had not accepted these concessions, and that the good offices of the Pope had been equally unavailing, and asserted that the *Maine* disaster was used by political parties in America as a pretext for "most gratuitous and intolerable calumnies." Inevitable race wars were foreshadowed in the memorandum, wars which "are certain to wreck the existence of Cuba as a state should Spain be deprived of sovereignty." Then, expressing the Spanish conviction that right and equity were on her side, the memorandum concluded that Spain "will not and cannot surrender her sovereignty in Cuba."

The Senate resolution was adopted by the House at the end of a long and bitter struggle, on Tuesday, April 19th, the proviso recognising the republic of Cuba being stricken out. The resolution as agreed upon by the conferees was in the following terms :

"Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

"WHEREAS, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilisation, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbour of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited ; therefore be it resolved,

“ First—That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.


“ Second—That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“ Third—That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

“ Fourth—That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.”

And on the same day, in the Senate Chamber at Madrid, Prime Minister Sagasta declared : “ We prefer to ruin ourselves and be abandoned by all rather than let Cuba go.” He appealed to all the sons of Spain to answer promptly and repel with all the national might “ a most odious outrage, the like of which had never been seen in history.” Prolonged and frenzied cheers for the Queen Regent, the King, the Army, and the Navy greeted Sagasta’s statements.

It would be impossible—indeed, it would not be profitable—to attempt at this point a review of all the various voices of complaint, remonstrance, and criticism that arose in our own country and in the European capitals of friendly nations. Let one example serve our turn—one bitter and elaborate attack, full of misconception, and misrepresentation.



“ There are, of course, many worthy private citizens in the United States,” says the *Saturday Review* of April 23d, “ but what we have to think of now are the people of that country as read in their social, civil, and political customs. Socially it is sordid to the last degree, its courts of law and all its civil institutions are corrupt . . . it has contributed nothing to the self-respect of humanity. On the contrary, it has shown all the world to what a depth of public depravity civilisation is capable of descending.”

Mr. McKinley's reference to the moral sense of the people of the United States is thus characterised : “ Mr. Pecksniff, rebuking vanity and selfishness, never struck a more beautiful attitude.” “ America was not ready for the war,” the *Saturday Review* explained ; and, as for its professed readiness, “ the authorities at Washington know how much all this pot-valiant bragging is worth ” ; and if, as seemed probable, this was to be a naval war, “ sea-fighting is such an unknown quantity that no one can pretend, in a case where there is no manifest and overwhelming superiority, to predict the result.” While the American seamen were “ the sweepings of the quays of New York and New Orleans, men who deserted their own ships, attracted by the high pay and easy life of the American marine, to whom in most cases fighting was the last thing thought of . . . the Spaniards, on the other hand . . . are still capable of sublime heroism and daring on the high seas, and it is not at all clear that Chili and Peru and Mexico may not before the fight is over discover that they too have a moral sense which is capable of being outraged by oppression and injustice.” And this about that vague terror, the Spanish torpedo fleet : “ Everything depends on the Americans bringing these small craft to action in the heavy swell of the Atlantic, when short of coal, and with the crews exhausted by a long

voyage under most trying conditions." And the *Oregon*, it seemed to a contributor in the same number of the *Review*, was in imminent danger of being intercepted and destroyed.

Applications poured into the War and Navy Departments for the immediate protection of exposed points along the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard. The papers were eagerly scanned for reports of the gathering of the Spanish fleet at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and the names of warships, *Vizcaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and the rest, fairly loomed on the first page of the more sensational journals. Meanwhile our regular army with its equipments was being moved to points of embarkation for Cuba. There were eager if somewhat immature expressions of zeal and preparedness on the part of volunteers. Chickamauga National Park was chosen as the chief rendezvous. A squadron was formed to patrol our Atlantic coast, under command of Admiral Howell, while Schley commanded the "flying squadron" at Hampton Roads, and the Key West squadron had been placed in Sampson's competent hands.

Additions to the navy, some of which were destined to useful or even conspicuous service, were the transatlantic liners the *Paris* (rechristened the *Yale*), the *New York* (rechristened the *Harvard*), the *St. Paul*, and the *St. Louis*; with merchantmen, yachts, sea-going tugs, light-house tenders—almost an armada of these, and a career for the more fortunate among them, as we shall see.

There was hardly a reply to our critics in words; the reply was to come in the shape of a demonstration of fitness for an undertaking that was as terribly difficult as our censors claimed. But there was admission, reluctant admission or frank admission, of all the uncertain, threatening, and unfavourable elements in that crisis, together

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with a spirit as far as possible removed from the "blatant Americanism" that certain foreign critics seemed to consider as universally characteristic. To those who observed closely and sympathetically, it seemed as though the nation were ready to accept external as well as internal problems and difficulties, and to ask to have judgment suspended until the whole matter had been put to the test ; as though Americans felt that America was strong enough, for example, to let the yellow journals do their utmost damage ; strong enough to hold a nation of foes at arm's length and subject it to an almost friendly scrutiny, as a subject for artistic treatment ; strong enough to stand the sale of legislation for actual money or for the retention of office by party or individual ; strong, like the strong man whose passions are riotous, who is in his strength lustful and cruel, but who controls and superintends these forces by his intelligence and will, even as our government directed our national policy at this crisis ; strong enough, if opposed by defeat, by corruption, by flood and fire, from our eastern ocean to our western ocean, to renew our strength and to advance inevitably to our destiny, to the perfect expression in our national life of the ideals of our founders ; strong enough to outgrow these ideals, and yet to realise them ; withal so honest that not even the declaration of one-half of our voters that we ought to pay fifty cents on the dollar could make the world believe we would ever shirk one honourable obligation.

To the noisy enemies of our institutions at home and abroad there were some who quietly said : Do you want our contempt ? Then claim that Americanism means the blackguardly motives you impute. Americanism means self-control, worship of right and justice, devotion to the truth, assurance that in the end Right wins. American ambition is just a prayer with a resolve that our destiny

may be prolonged into that future when, with the reign of Right throughout the world, we may have our place as one of the forces of the great mass of humanity, surviving because from time to time we staked lives and fortunes upon the beauty and the potency of righteousness.

And if the Administration meant less than this, then the Administration was un-American.

CHAPTER IV

SPEECH FROM THE THRONE BY THE QUEEN REGENT—THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS—FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR

AT eleven o'clock on the morning of April 20th, an ultimatum was cabled to Spain. This was a formal demand that Spain should at once—that is, before the hour of noon of April 23d—relinquish authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw both land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. The full text of the ultimatum follows :

“ To WOODFORD, Minister, Madrid : You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th inst., approved to-day, in relation to the pacification of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act, the President directs you to immediately communicate to the Government of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the Government of the United States that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people, under such free and independent government as they may establish. If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant, there be not communicated to this

Government by that of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said joint resolution to such an extent as may be necessary to carry the same into effect."

Within the next half-hour the President signed the Cuban joint resolutions.

Upon receiving notice of these facts, the Spanish Minister, Señor Polo y Bernabe, at once requested his passports, and, receiving them, took the 7.20 train for Canada. In his party was a certain Lieutenant Carranza, Naval Attaché, to whose activity in Canada we shall have occasion to refer again. Before leaving, Señor Polo y Bernabe wrote to Secretary Sherman stating that the direction of the Spanish interests would be entrusted to the French Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

Another scene—another capital. Enthusiasm had its opportunity there ; for the Spanish people at Madrid were ardent, and apparently without a premonition of disaster. The Queen Regent, accompanied by the boy King in the uniform of the Infantry Cadets, with the insignia of the Golden Fleece, went from the royal palace to the Senate, receiving every token of popular support and enthusiasm for their cause and the nation's cause. Such interminable cheering as announced the approach of the royal procession had not been heard in Madrid for many a day. In the Senate, when the doors were thrown open for the royal personages to enter, spectators, deputies, and senators received the royal mother and son with thundering acclamations. The Queen Regent, seated, read her speech in a calm, clear voice, while all her audience stood :

“ Grave preoccupations continue to fill my mind. They have been increased since last I addressed you, and the public disquietude has been augmented by the presentation of new and greater complications owing to the direction given to affairs in Cuba by a section of the people of the United States. But the rapid application to Cuba of the principle of political autonomy which I referred to in my last message indicates that a free expression of their wishes by the Cuban people in their own Parliament will frustrate forever the plans of those who have desired to end Spanish sovereignty in the island, and will destroy the hopes of those who, from neighbouring shores, have, by supplying the rebels with material resources, kept alive the fires of insurrection.

“ In this supreme crisis the sacred voice was heard of him who represents on earth Divine Justice. That voice gave advice of peace and prudence, which my Government has had no difficulty in following, feeling strong in the right and in the calm and scrupulous fulfilment of its international duties ; and if Spain owes deep gratitude to the Pope for his intervention in the cause of peace, she is also under obligations to the great Powers of Europe, who, by their friendly action and disinterested advice, have strengthened our conviction that the cause of Spain deserves universal sympathy.

“ Is it possible that an outrage is to be committed, and that the efforts of His Holiness, our own right, and the moderation which we have displayed, and the express wishes of the Cuban people will not be able to stop the passions which have been unchained against Spain ?

“ In prevision of the arrival of that moment when reason and justice have no other defence than the valour of the Spanish people, I have hastened the meeting of the Cortes, whose supreme decision will undoubtedly indorse the indomitable resolution which inspires my Government to defend our rights with whatever sacrifices may be asked from us, in order that that resolution may be carried out. In identifying myself in this way with the national cause, not only do I fulfil the duties I have sworn to perform, but also seek to fortify my maternal heart, in confidence

that the Spanish people, rallying round the throne, will support it with invincible force."

But, also in Madrid, there was a scene of a very different nature the next day, when General Woodford, the American Minister, received Secretary Sherman's despatch. Immediately after the despatch had been placed in his hands a note came to General Woodford from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, informing him that diplomatic relations no longer existed between the United States and Spain, inasmuch as "the President of the republic had sanctioned a resolution of both chambers of the United States which denies the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and threatens armed intervention in Cuba, which is equivalent to a declaration of war." General Woodford placed the legation and all American interests in Spain in the care of the British Minister.

Mr. McKinley directed Secretary Long to order the vessels of the North Atlantic squadron to proceed at once to Cuban waters, and blockade Havana and other ports of the island.

A proclamation calling for volunteer troops was signed by President McKinley, at noon, on the 23d of April. The proclamation called for 125,000 men in the following terms :

" A PROCLAMATION.

" WHEREAS, By a joint resolution of Congress approved on the 20th day of April, 1898, entitled ' Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry this resolution into effect,' and

“ **WHEREAS**, By an act of Congress entitled, ‘ An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war and for other purposes,’ approved April 22, 1898, the President is authorised, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue this proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States :

“ *Now, therefore*, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000 in order to carry into effect the purpose of the said resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department.

“ In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“ Done at the city of Washington this twenty-third day of April, A.D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

“ **WILLIAM MCKINLEY.**

“ By the President :

“ **JOHN SHERMAN**, Secretary of State.”

The War Revenue Bill, a measure to be long debated and greatly modified before its passage, was introduced in the House by Chairman Dingley on the same day.

Spain’s war proclamation, a declaration regarding treaties, rights of neutrals, and privateering, was published in the Official Gazette of April 24th, and at the time a good deal of comment was caused by the attitude of the Spanish Government, shown in this proclamation, on the subject of privateering. The solicitude expressed both at London and at Washington proved to be wholly unnecessary.

A message from the President recommending a declaration of war against Spain was sent to Congress on April 25th. This communication of the President cited some of the facts which we have now recalled—those that were essential to introduce his request ; and, in view of the measures which had been taken, recommended the adoption of a joint resolution declaring that a state of war existed between the United States of America and the kingdom of Spain. This proposal was received in both Houses without demonstrations, and the following bill was adopted in both Houses by a unanimous vote, a round of cheers greeting the announcement of its passage :

“ A bill declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. Be it enacted, etc.,

“ 1. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

“ 2. That the President of the United States be and he is hereby directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the active service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.”

Mr. John Sherman, after a service of more than forty years in the House of Representatives and the United States Senate, as Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State, now, at the age of seventy-five years, requested the President to relieve him from the responsibilities attached to his office in time of war, and presented his resignation. On the same day the call for troops was sent out by R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, requisitions being made on the governors of the different States for the quotas which each State was required to furnish.

It was not thought probable at that time that the volunteers would be called on for active service or serious campaigning before September or October, and the suggestion was made, even by those who should have been thoroughly well informed, that our army might look forward to spending the greater part of the spring and summer in acquiring drill and discipline and hardening themselves to camp and field life. As for the regular army, a bill to increase its numbers, in fact to double them, was passed by the Senate on the 25th of April.

A second circular letter to the Powers, supplementing that of April 18th, was sent out on April 26th by the Spanish Government. The conduct of General Fitzhugh Lee was characterised therein as " execrable." The last words of the resolution of Congress¹ were explained as an attempt to deceive the Cubans, and the prophecy was ventured that the island of Cuba would not be declared pacified until ready for annexation. " The Spanish people await the attempt with tranquil serenity," the circular concluded, " and are decided to sell their lives dearly, and to defend energetically their right to remain in America, *confident that in this work they will have the assistance of the Cubans, who are Spaniards like themselves.*" The possibility of such a miracle as the turning of the hostile Cubans into friends of Spanish rule—or misrule—suggested in the words which we have italicised, was given this emphatic assertion in the note probably in reliance upon the total ignorance of Cuban affairs on the part of the governments addressed. Our own efforts to learn exactly what we should have to expect from the Cubans and

¹ "Fourth—that the United States hereby . . . asserts its determination . . . to leave the government and control of the island to its people." See pages 79 and 80.

Puertorriqueños will be described before we reach the end of this chapter.

On the 26th of April a proclamation of neutrality was issued by Great Britain, and the instructions of the Foreign Office and Admiralty to the colonial authorities regulating the belligerents' use of British ports, and giving the belligerents twenty-four hours to leave, was dated April 23d. The departure of the United States squadron at Hong-Kong, and the orders given to the Spanish torpedo-boat *Audaz* to leave Kingston are thus explained. The treaty of Washington, of May 8, 1871, was expressly referred to in the despatch to Sir Julian Pauncefote ; and it will be remembered that one clause of this treaty provides that a neutral government is bound not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports and waters as a base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms or the recruitment of men.

A despatch from Shanghai of this date, April 26th, contained two items of very uncommon interest : first, that Commodore Dewey, commanding the Asiatic squadron, had been ordered to await definite instructions before attacking Manila ; and second, that Prince Henry of Prussia, who had been ordered by Emperor William to make the Far East sensible of his mailed hand, was quite openly expressing German sympathy with Spain.

The President, by a proclamation, defined the position of the United States in regard to privateering, blockades, and Spanish and neutral merchant vessels with their cargoes, reaffirming the intention of the United States Government to adhere to the Declaration of Paris. In Madrid, Premier Sagasta, when questioned as to the Spanish Government's attitude in regard to privateering, made an evasive reply.

The first action of the war occurred on the 27th of April, when the *New York*, *Puritan*, and *Cincinnati* bombarded and silenced the forts at Matanzas. The object of the attack was to prevent the completion of breastworks at Punta Gorda, though it was suggested at the time that it was probably the first step towards seizing a port and establishing a base for military operations in Cuba. The circumstance that was to direct our attention to quite a different portion of the island had not cast its shadow before it.

It was at two o'clock in the afternoon of this day that Commodore Dewey's squadron sailed from Mirs Bay for Manila.

In order to gather the events of the war into our hands as we advance from day to day, it is necessary to speak at this point of the Spanish prizes captured up to the evening of April 27th. These prizes began with the taking of the *Buenaventura* on the 22d of April, followed by one or more captures each succeeding day—on the 24th half a dozen vessels of various kinds, schooners and steamers, falling an easy prey to the warships of the blockading squadron.

The presence of the Spanish torpedo flotilla, together with several first-class cruisers, at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, a Portuguese port, occasioned a good deal of uneasiness in regard to Portugal's attitude at this time, and it was understood that a despatch from President McKinley calling attention to the unfriendliness of harbouring these vessels was tantamount to a threat that the United States would regard Portugal as an ally of Spain, and treat her accordingly. On the 29th of April, the Official Gazette published the neutrality decree of Portugal. It is interesting to note the other members of the large family of nations which had promptly adopted the

same course : Italy, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, France, Korea, Argentine Republic, Japan, and Uruguay.

Following hard upon Portugal's announcement of neutrality the news came that a Spanish squadron comprising the cruisers *Marta Teresa*, *Almirante Oquendo*, *Vizcaya*, *Cristóbal Colon*, and the torpedo-boat destroyers *Pluton*, *Terror*, and *Furor*, had sailed from the Cape Verde Islands for a destination in regard to which much curiosity was expressed and many conflicting opinions given. The significance of the report was found chiefly in the fact that this was Spain's first real move in a game that even Koreans were watching.

There was another unimportant engagement on the Cuban coast before the end of the month, when the *New York* made a target of a company of Spanish cavalry. More noteworthy, among these minor happenings, were two arrivals—that of the steamer *Paris*, which had sailed for New York after the outbreak of hostilities, and that of the battleship *Oregon*, which reached Rio de Janeiro from San Francisco.

A speech by Señor Silvela at the session of the House of Deputies at Madrid on the last day of the month made a profound impression. He declared that, as the Cuban difficulty was now reduced to a question of honour for the Spanish arms, it behooved the Ministers to decide when the point of honour had been satisfied. When that time had been reached, an appeal should, in his opinion, be made to the European Powers, so that they could prescribe what ought to be done to restore peace and determine the fate of Cuba. This sentiment was delivered on the eve of an event that was decisive enough in its way, and yet made escape from further conflict and from further loss absolutely inevitable. The next day, Sun-

day, May 1st, was the day of the victory of the American fleet off Manila.

With the space at our disposal we can give but a glimpse of the preparations that were being made for our campaigns in Cuba and Porto Rico. The secret missions of Lieutenant Rowan to the former island and Lieutenant Whitney to the latter should, however, receive more than a word in passing; and to sketch the exploits of these young officers we must now revert to a date somewhat earlier than the President's message to Congress which justified forcible intervention by the United States to restore peace in Cuba.

Andrew Summers Rowan, Lieutenant in the 19th United States Infantry, left Washington, April 9th, on a secret mission to General Garcia, commander-in-chief of the Cuban forces in the eastern half of the island—that is, wherever there were men in little bands, from the Jucaro-Moron trocha to Cape Maysi. We shall give the story of his adventure precisely as he narrated it to the writer immediately after his return.

He took the Atlas Line steamship *Adirondack* to Kingston, Jamaica, and there awaited instructions by cable. After completing arrangements for the trip, to which end he placed himself unreservedly in the hands of agents of the Cuban Junta in Jamaica, he got his orders and left Kingston on April 23d—the day, it will be remembered, on which President McKinley signed the proclamation calling for 125,000 volunteers.

Leaving Kingston at two o'clock, Rowan crossed the island in a north-westerly direction to St. Anns, where he got a little sailing-boat, whose captain he calls a pirate (and heartily admires—that is evident). Then they sailed one hundred miles from St. Anns to the coast line of Santiago province, near that jutting point where the

Sierra Maestra lifts its peaks out of the sea—one of them, a bit nearer Santiago, to a height of eight thousand four hundred feet, while another, by Portillo, is a mate for any mountain we have between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. Rowan's "pirate" knew of the movements of the Spanish patrol boats along that majestic shore as though he himself controlled them. He would not land "el delegado Americano" immediately, but waited until the coast was clear. Then, running in by a place called Gran Rincon, west of Portillo, he successfully discharged his duty to the Junta and to his passenger. The latter found himself on shore in the care of other friends of Free Cuba.

From the coast the first day's march took Rowan's party well into the mountains. There the next day was passed in collecting provisions for the trip to Calixto Garcia's camp, and in securing information, too, as to the General's whereabouts—for they supposed he was still moving from place to place, in the manner of insurgents.

On the 28th of April the Spaniards abandoned Bayamo. Garcia entered and established himself comfortably in that famous old town. A day earlier (April 27th), Rowan's party set out across the Sierra Maestra; on the 28th, pressing on towards the north-east, they got among the foot-hills; the last day of the month found them nearing the goal, but marching across a trail so rough that they were glad to camp on the river Buey, "to swim, and sleep in hammocks."

(On the other side of the world Dewey's fleet entered Manila Bay that night.)

Only about twenty miles farther to Bayamo; and so, at noon on "Manila Day," May 1st, Rowan and his companions reached the outskirts of Bayamo. They saw the people who had been exiled from the city, three years before, rushing in to claim their own again, now that the

insurgents were established there. Bayamo had formerly about thirty thousand inhabitants; now perhaps two thousand. It is easy to realise the full force of Rowan's statement, in regard to this remnant, that they were "all insurgents at heart."

The Spanish forts, when he arrived, were smouldering ruins. The life of the city was beginning again under changed conditions. In the Bayamo River, a third of a mile wide here, women were standing in the shallows to wash their clothing on the bowlders.

The horses of the party were tied opposite a Cuban flag that distinguished Garcia's headquarters. Rowan was received in an agreeable office, where he delivered the despatches that had been entrusted to him. It is a pleasure to be able to add that he was promptly invited to breakfast with the General, in this especially wasted and harried portion of poor Cuba. There was a "long talk," says Rowan, "and despatches passed between us. And at five o'clock he announced that he had his despatches all ready, and asked me if I could start north, as he wished to get his replies to the United States Government as soon as possible. He detailed General Callazo, Colonel Hernandez, and Dr. Bieta, an expert on the diseases of that section, to accompany me."

With these companions Rowan started away that evening, crossing Bayamo River and camping near the Cauto River before midnight. At sunrise the next morning they took up the march again, crossed the Cauto (the largest river of Cuba) at Cauto el Paso, and then made their way through tropical jungle and over meadow-land, until, at Las Arenas, they went into camp for the night. Next morning they started at sunrise, and reached Victoria de las Tunas, outside of which ruined town they met a force of Cubans, four or five hundred men. Rowan inspected

the fortifications, and on passing through this singularly misnamed "Victoria," discovered that not a single building was habitable now—"the whole being razed to the ground."

A long ride brought Rowan and his party to a hill called Damanuecos, at the foot of which they camped. And now, being within easy distance of the north coast, they devoted a day to preparations for the voyage, making sails out of the canopies of their hammocks. Climbing to the top of the peak early the following day, they were rewarded with a beautiful view, not the least characteristic feature in the landscape being an enormous palm forest stretching northward. For hours their course lay through this stately growth—through brush, where the poisonous guao-tree gave lasting proof of its presence; then a fortress with walls of coral rock was passed; and finally they came to the coast and to the *salinas* (salt-works). The work of collecting the sea-water in kettles and evaporating it to obtain a supply of salt for the Cuban forces was carried on by offenders in the army, and a very good form of punishment it was.

Breakers outside the capes were thundering in a way that seemed decidedly unpleasant when one listened to them and looked at the little boat which was much too small to hold all the party. Even when the weather grew calm enough for embarking, it was necessary to send Dr. Bieta and others back to General Garcia, while only six embarked—Lieutenant Rowan, General Callazo, Hernandez, his chief of staff, and three sailors. After passing out and laying the course due north (this brings us now to May 5th), they met Admiral Sampson's fleet on its way to Porto Rico. By a piece of good luck the party in the little life-boat overhauled a sponging steamer with a crew of thirteen negroes, who carried them into Nassau. There

the American Consul made arrangements for sending Rowan by the schooner *Fearless* to Key West, at which place he arrived four days later.

While crossing the island from south to north, Rowan saw that this district in Santiago (which on the latest map appears to be peppered with towns) was really almost a wilderness. The names that make such a showing may designate a single plantation, perhaps a deserted farmstead or a ruin.

And the account of the other little preliminary study comes to us not less directly and personally.

Henry H. Whitney, Lieutenant of the 4th Artillery, was selected in April for a confidential mission to Porto Rico. Leaving Washington on April 12th, he returned on June 8th. In less than two months he had completed his task, and, by personal observation and skilful inquiry in various parts of Porto Rico, collected information for the use of the President and the Secretary of War in their plans for the campaign in the smaller island.

It was necessary to play many parts. At one time his rôle was that of a newspaper correspondent; at another time he had all the appearance of being a member of the crew of the steamship that took him to Ponce, on the southern coast of Porto Rico; and while going about among the Puertorriqueños he permitted his hosts to assume that he was an English officer. Curiously and deplorably unattached at this time, the little island, while it was separated from us by ignorance of our language and our institutions, was separated from Spain also by hatred. But as between the mother-country and the colony the smouldering hostility was not due to ignorance. The so-called inquisition of '87, the torturing of persons

suspected of disloyalty, and the years of oppressive occupation had strengthened an impulse, springing from too intimate knowledge, to revolt from such maternal caresses.

Whitney's impression of Porto Rico's isolation is not less noteworthy than certain other impressions, as, for example, that in regard to the delightful hospitality of its people, which he holds in grateful remembrance ; and again, that it is a " right little, tight little " island, fit to be compared with the best of the eminently delectable bits of earth's surface, and to make a military strategist's mouth water ; and again (although this was a good deal more than an impression), that the strength of the Spanish forces had been absurdly overestimated.

In the neighbourhood of Ponce the leader of the Spanish element, a soldier of local renown, was explaining to a young lady (and to the " English officer ") the ability of his forces to resist the Yankees at any time they might make a landing ; and while he was speaking, the pretty young Puertorriqueña playfully drew his sword from its sheath and struck it across her arm a few times, half in sympathy with his confident mood and half with a bantering intention. The sword blade bent under the light blows ; it was literally a tin sword.

Whitney will say that he has no story of personal adventure to narrate ; that there were no old-fashioned hand-to-hand encounters ; that he carried a revolver, but never used it. But one may find the distinction of his exploit, and its modern note, so to speak, in this very circumstance. Playing a cool game, with life at stake every minute of six or seven weeks at least, he had no time for other diversions. During the six or seven weeks of continuous exposure he did not forget for a minute that violence is not strength. There was a certain duty to be done, and to be done quickly.

**“Your gentleness shall force
More than your force move us to gentleness.”**

Yet one old-fashioned feature the story certainly has,— in its agreeable ending. The young officer was ordered to report to President McKinley and went to the Executive Mansion in company with Secretary Alger. At the door of the President's room he stood still, finding himself for the first time in the presence of his commander-in-chief. So Mr. McKinley came all the way to meet him, holding out his hand.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF MANILA—RIOT AND DISORDER IN SPAIN— LORD SALISBURY'S ADDRESS

“KEEP perfectly cool and pay attention to nothing but orders.”

A seaman on board the *Olympia* says that the Commodore assembled his men and told them, in case of an engagement, just to keep perfectly cool and pay attention to nothing but orders.

A proclamation of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, dated April 23, 1898, offers such an effective contrast to Dewey's brief and comprehensive directions that it may be worth re-reading now, though the Spanish text has probably not received full justice in a rather painfully foolish translation, the only form in which this document has come to hand :

“Spaniards : Between Spain and the United States of North America hostilities have broken out. The moment has arrived to prove to the world that we possess the spirit to conquer those who, pretending to be loyal friends, take advantage of our misfortunes and abuse our hospitality, using means which civilised nations count unworthy and disreputable.

“The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

" The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of victories will give us one as brilliant as the justice of our cause demands. Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those States that, without cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of Chambers in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism.

" A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honour, and liberty. Pretending to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable, the North American seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realisation the substitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion you profess, to treat you as tribes refractory to civilisation, to take possession of your riches as if they were unacquainted with the rights of property, and to kidnap those persons whom they consider useful to man their ships or to be exploited in agricultural or industrial labour.

" Vain designs ! Ridiculous boastings !

" Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt to carry them into realisation. You will not allow the faith you profess to be mocked, impious hands to be laid on the temple of the true God, the images you adore to be thrown down by unbelief. The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, they shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honour, or appropriate the property that your industry has accumulated as a provision for your old age. No, they shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valour and patriotism will suffice to punish and abase the people that, claiming to be civilised and cultivated, have exterminated the natives of North America instead of bringing to them the life of civilisation and of progress.

" Filipinos, prepare for the struggle, and, united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will

crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies let us oppose, with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry of ' Viva España ! ' " Your General,
 " BASILIO AUGUSTIN Y DAVILA."

And this confident spirit did not confine itself to words. We are told that large pens had been erected by the Spaniards, in which they had planned to put the officers and men of Dewey's fleet, whom they expected to take prisoners. The pens were divided into compartments. Some were intended for the reception of the American officers and men, while separate compartments were provided for the insurgents.

So Admiral Montojo waited with his fleet in Manila Bay until Dewey should arrive.

Now let us first give the story of the battle in the form of a digest of the news as it was cabled and published in the daily and weekly papers in this country.

Commodore Dewey's squadron (the earliest reports said) entered Manila Bay in the night, and at five o'clock in the morning of May 1st his ships took up their positions in line of battle. The forts opened fire at long range, and the Spanish warships off Cavité, the fortified arsenal, immediately followed with their heavy guns. The flagship *Olympia* then signalled the rest of the American fleet to close in, and for thirty minutes guns of all calibres were used. Next, withdrawing his ships beyond the range of the smaller guns, Dewey poured shells from his big guns upon the Spaniards during a little more than a quarter of an hour. The enemy, though greatly weakened, continued to reply. Dewey therefore closed in again, and the rapid, incessant cannonading was renewed. The Spanish vessels were overwhelmed, one of them sinking, and three, including Admiral Montojo's flagship, catching fire. Admiral Montojo then transferred his flag to the

Isla de Cuba. The land batteries, under a still fiercer bombardment, were also silenced in their turn. Our loss was but six wounded. None of our men was killed, and our ships escaped serious injury. The Spaniards showed desperate bravery, losing two commanders and having seven hundred men killed or wounded. All their vessels, eleven in number, were destroyed. Demanding the surrender of the city and being met with a refusal, Dewey notified Captain-General Augustin that the bombardment of the city would begin at half-past eleven on Tuesday morning.

Such was the substance of the earliest form of the story. Incomplete, and, as we shall see, somewhat inaccurate accounts were made the basis for well-rounded descriptions ; a sketch became a painting full of exciting colour. We had even conquered an empire without losing a man, it was said.

Well ; let us think a moment about these stories and our claims.

We have plainly, and it may seem unsparingly, stated and disclosed the Spaniards' boastfulness and confident provision for American prisoners ; we shall not lack the courage to confess, one of these days, that our own assumptions were quite as absurd. . . . We had already "conquered an empire without losing a man," and could hold and control, or freely dispose of the Philippines.

With God's help we may conquer and hold and wisely govern in the East Indies and in the Antilles. But presently we shall read how Dewey trained his men, Jack and Captain, to win a fight at sea.

It was not until the 13th of June that a full and authoritative account of the action appeared. On that day the Navy Department received a letter from Dewey, which read in part as follows :

“FLAGSHIP ‘OLYMPIA,’ CAVITÉ, May 4, 1898.

“The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27th, arrived off Bolifiao on the morning of April 30th, and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon. The *Boston* and the *Concord* were sent to reconnoitre Port Subig. A thorough search was made of the port by the *Boston* and the *Concord*, but the Spanish fleet was not found. Entered the south channel at 11.30 P.M., steaming in column at eight knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. The *Boston* and *McCulloch* returned the fire. The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 A.M. by three batteries at Manila and two near Cavité, and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal-water in Canacao Bay.

“The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship *Olympia*, under my personal direction, leading, followed at a distance by the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord*, and *Boston*, in the order named, which formation was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5.41 A.M. While advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000 to 2000 yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective. Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the *Olympia* with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before they were able to fire their torpedoes.

“At 7 A.M. the Spanish flagship *Reina Cristina* made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such a galling fire, the entire battery of the *Olympia* being concentrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shell at the

time were not extinguished until she sank. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by my squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance of the Pasig River, the second on the south position of the walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-half mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them.

" At 7.35 A.M. I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for breakfast. At 11.16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship and almost all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12.30 the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burned, and deserted.

" At 12.40 the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the *Petrel* being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavité. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels: Sunk, *Reina Cristina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*; burned, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marquis del Duero*, *El Correo*, *Velasco*, and *Isla de Mindanao* (transport); captured, *Rapido* and *Hercules* (tugs), and several small launches.

" I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded, but believe their losses to be very heavy. The *Reina Cristina* alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded. I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. There was none killed and only seven men in the squadron were slightly wounded. Several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle.

" I beg to state to the department that I doubt if any commander-in-chief was ever served by more loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the squadron

now under my command. Capt. Frank Wildes, commanding the *Boston*, volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving Hong Kong. Assistant Surgeon Kindelberger of the *Olympia* and Gunner J. C. Evans of the *Boston* also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them had arrived. The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieutenant Brumby, Flag Lieutenant, and Ensign E. P. Scott, aide, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. Caldwell, Flag Secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a sub-division of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the New York *Herald*, volunteered for duty as my aide, and rendered valuable service. I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieutenant C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the *Olympia*, who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proven by the excellence of the firing.

“On May 2d, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavité, where it remains. On the 3d, the military forces evacuated the Cavité arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day the *Raleigh* and *Baltimore* secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, paroling the garrison and destroying the guns. On the morning of May 4th the transport *Manila*, which had been aground in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize.”

Mr. Joseph L. Stickney's letter to the New York *Herald*, as published in that paper on the 19th of June, contained some details of the highest value, which should now be added.

“It was in the latter part of last February,” he writes, “that Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic station of the United States Navy, began to feel the drift

of events was toward a warlike rather than a peaceful settlement of our differences with Spain. At any rate, he decided to bring all his squadron together, and he chose Hong Kong as the place of rendezvous for strategic reasons. The vessels attached to this squadron were as follows: *Olympia*, flagship, Captain C. V. Gridley commanding; *Boston*, Captain Frank Wildes; *Concord*, Commander Asa Walker; *Petrel*, Commander E. P. Wood. The *Raleigh*, Captain J. B. Coughlan commanding, arrived from New York soon afterward, and just before the battle of Manila Bay the *Baltimore*, commanded by Captain N. M. Dyer, was detached from the Pacific station and given to Commodore Dewey.

"These vessels were all cruisers, not, as many people have supposed, 'ironclads,' or armoured battleships. Except the armour four inches thick around the turret guns of the *Olympia*, there was no armour in the squadron. These six cruisers may be briefly summed up as follows:

"The 5800-ton *Olympia*, carrying four 8-inch and ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns and fourteen six-pounders, with Lieutenant C. P. Rees as executive officer.

"The 4400-ton *Baltimore*, four 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles and four six-pounders, with Lieutenant-Commander J. B. Briggs as executive officer.

"The 3000-ton *Boston*, carrying two 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles and two six-pounders, with Lieutenant-Commander J. A. Norris as executive officer.

"The 3200-ton *Raleigh*, carrying one 6-inch and ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns, with Lieutenant-Commander Frederic Singer as executive officer.

"The 1700-ton *Concord*, carrying six 6-inch rifles and two six-pounders.

"The 900-ton *Petrel*, carrying four 6-inch rifles, with Lieutenant E. M. Hughes as executive officer.

"The total number of officers and men in the squadron was 1695. There were, of course, some vacancies in the ships' companies, but just before sailing for Manila the Commodore brought one hundred men and several officers from the obsolete *Monocacy* and filled up the complements of his active ships.

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“ Accompanying the squadron was the revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, which had arrived at Hong Kong on her way from New York to the Pacific coast. She carried four light pieces, and was commanded by Captain Hobson, of the Revenue Marine Service, who was ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Commodore Dewey.

“ Two merchant steamers, the *Nashan*, laden with 3000 tons of Cardiff coal, and the *Zafiro*, carrying 7000 tons of similar coal, having been bought by Commodore Dewey, went with the squadron.

“ Commodore Dewey withdrew from the harbour of Hong Kong on Monday, April 25th, in response to a request from the acting governor of Hong Kong. The Commodore remained at Mirs Bay, in Chinese waters about thirty miles from Hong Kong, until the afternoon of Wednesday the 27th, when he sailed for the Philippines.

“ Gun drills and other exercises kept the officers and men occupied continuously during this run, and from the time the squadron left Mirs Bay until it came into the presence of the enemy there was not an hour in which preparations for battle were not underway.

“ When the tired ships' company had finished its day's work on Wednesday, and the *Olympia* had settled down to the quiet of the first watch, the stillness was broken with abrupt harshness by the blare of the bugle, red and white lights flashed up and down the masts of all the ships in response to the Commodore's peremptory signal, 'Prepare for action,' and in two minutes each vessel was alive with men, who only a few minutes before had been sleeping soundly.

“ From the bridge of the flagship sharply uttered orders proceeded, and in seven minutes the executive officer was ready to report to Captain Gridley: 'The ship is ready for action, sir.'

“ Looking back along the line of ships, dimly visible in the moonlight, it was easy to see that every one of them was stripped for battle also, and the Commodore was naturally greatly pleased with the quick and thorough response to his signal.

“ When the squadron left Mirs Bay no official notice

Final Preparations for Battle 111

that war existed had been received from Washington, but private cable messages of Tuesday had brought the news that Congress had declared war upon Spain. Accordingly, at the usual 'quarters for inspection' Wednesday evening, the division officers made the announcement to the men that war existed, and the rousing cheer that went up from every division showed that the men regarded the long-expected news with the keenest satisfaction.

"A little while later, when the men read on the bulletin board the bombastic proclamation of the Governor of the Philippines, the roar of derisive laughter that went up from the whole berth deck was an indication that the men were only anxiously longing for a chance to show the new Furioso what they thought about him and his proclamation.

"Bandmaster Valifuoco selected the music for the evening concert on Thursday with especial reference to rousing the patriotism of the boys in blue, choosing many of the airs that were popular in the north during the civil war; but though these were favourably received, it was not till the band struck up 'Yankee Doodle' that the boys cheered. When the concert closed with 'Star-Spangled Banner,' the voices of at least fifty men took up the words of each verse, the young apprentices particularly being prominent in the lead, and the chorus spread through the ship from fore-castle to cabin with an enthusiasm that carried the hearts of all on board.

"Search-light and night-signal exercise took place during a large part of the first watch Thursday night, and the progress made in working both the lights and the signals was very satisfactory.

"Friday was passed without incident, except that the weather became very warm and muggy, and the work of the men below deck, particularly in the firerooms and engine-rooms, was exhausting far beyond what it had been at any previous time this year.

"In spite of the heat and the rather heavy sea, however, the men did their work so thoroughly that every ship kept her position with a precision that I have never seen surpassed even in merely practice evolutions.

"Land—the island of Luzon—was sighted early Satur-

day morning, and being now in close proximity to the enemy the whole squadron began its final preparations for the battle that everyone knew was near at hand. Aboard the *Olympia* and *Baltimore*, and possibly some of the other ships, the sheet chain cable was 'bighted,' or coiled, around the ammunition hoists so as to give them considerable protection. There is little doubt that these improvised shields would have kept out many a shell if the Spaniards had shot straight enough to hit them. Nets of tough, pliable Manila rope, about as thick as one's little finger, were stretched beneath all the boats and were drawn across the front of the wardroom bulkheads. These splinter nets were intended to prevent the woodwork from throwing deadly missiles when struck by shot or shell.

"All unnecessary material was thrown overboard, and in most of the ships the men preferred to dispense with many of their usual comforts rather than to keep dangerous woodwork in the parts of the ships where they would have to do their fighting. Mess chests, mess tables, diddy boxes, chairs, wardroom bulkheads, and a vast quantity of other impedimenta went swimming also.

"On the afternoon of April 30th, commanding officers came over to the flagship, all vessels lying motionless on an absolutely calm sea. When the war counsel broke up, we soon learned that the Commodore had told his captains that he intended to enter Manila Bay that night, largely because he felt sure the Spaniards would not expect him until the favourite reckoning day in Spanish affairs, 'mañana.'

"The moon had risen, and although it was occasionally obscured by light clouds the night was not one in which a squadron ought to have been able to run through a well-defended channel without drawing upon itself a hot fire. Consequently, at a quarter to ten o'clock, the men were sent to their guns, not by the usual bugle call, but by stealthily whispered word of mouth.

"Every man was long since ready, and the final steps of battle-clearing were completed in deathly silence in a very few minutes. Off to port we could see the sullen loom of the land, where, for all we knew, the enemy was already watching our approach. Astern we could dimly

make out the phantom-like hulls of our consorts. Not a light was permitted to show in any vessel except one at the very stern, which was necessary as a guide for the following ship, and this one was shaded on each side.

“The speed was increased to eight knots, and we slipped past the batteries that we believed existed on the point north of the entrance without seeing anything to lead us to think we had been seen. Then Corregidor Island came abeam, and every glass was turned on its frowning front. But not till we had swung into the chief channel—Boca Grande, as it is called—did the lookouts of Corregidor catch sight of us.

“Then a bright light flashed up in the centre of the island, and it was answered by a similar one on the north shore. At last a rather feeble rocket staggered aloft over Corregidor, and we felt sure we should soon hear from their guns. But no; on we went, deeper and deeper into the bay, and still no hostile move was made.

“Not until most of the squadron had passed the narrowest part of the entrance did a gun greet us.

“Shortly after eleven o'clock a bright flash on our port quarter was followed by the boom of a heavy gun, and simultaneously we heard the vindictive whistle of a shot far over our heads.

“The first hostile shot had been fired, and the fight was on.

“The battery whence this shot had come was too far astern to receive any return fire from the *Olympia*, but the Commodore was somewhat uneasy about the three non-combatant ships. He therefore signalled to the *McCulloch* to take position on the flagship's port quarter, as in that place she and the two that were following her would be less exposed to attack.

“A few minutes later the *McCulloch* signalled that her chief engineer had been taken with a stroke of heat prostration and medical consultation was asked for. Chief Engineer Randall died twenty minutes after, and his was the only life lost in the operation before Manila.

“The *Raleigh*, which was steaming along third in line, had the honour of firing the first shot in anger on our side. One of her 5-inch guns returned a ready response

to the Spaniards' tardy salutation, and presently the *Boston* followed suit. Then another shot came from the shore batteries, and as our ships were on the close lookout for the flash the *Concord* placed a 6-inch shell so exactly over the spot whence the enemy had fired that we felt confident of its good results. We heard afterward that this shell had burst among the Spanish gunners, killing several, and, if this report was true, it was a marvellous shot. At any rate, there were no more shots fired from shore, and as the Commodore did not want to waste time on the batteries the squadron kept on its course.

"Speed was now reduced to less than three knots, as there was no haste. The Commodore wished to arrive off Manila at the first break of dawn, but not earlier. The men wanted to lie down beside their guns to get what sleep they could, and the very strictest lookout was kept for the enemy's ships and torpedo boats.

"At four o'clock coffee and hardtack were served out to the men, and the officers were glad to get the same frugal provender. The light of Manila had long been in sight, and Lieutenant Calkins, the navigator, knew his position to a nicety. Indeed, much of the success of this bold entry into Manila Bay by night was due to the skill and judgment of the navigator, who continued his patient and harassing labours all through the battle with never-failing accuracy and success. It should be remembered that navigating a harbour that is well lighted and buoyed is not always the easiest thing in the world, and in this case Lieutenant Calkins had no lights or range-marks to guide him.

"The dawn began about half-past four o'clock, when we were almost six miles from Manila. As the sun came up exactly behind the city the shadow cast by the land obscured the harbour foreground. Finally we made out the presence of a group of vessels in the port, but before five o'clock we were able to recognise them as merchant-ships.

"Our cruisers were now in close battle order. We had passed to the northward of Manila and were holding to the south when we sighted the Spanish squadron in the little bay of Cavité. At this point we knew the Spaniards

had a well-equipped navy-yard, which they called Cavité Arsenal. The officer in command of this arsenal, Rear-Admiral Patricio Montejo y Pasaron, was also the commander-in-chief of the squadron, the second in rank being Comandante General Enrique Sostoa y Ordoñez, a captain in the navy.

“ Following is a list and brief summary of the important characteristics of the vessels in Admiral Montejo's command :

“ *Reina Cristina*, flagship, Captain L. Cadarso commanding ; 3500 tons ; battery, six 6.2-inch, two 2.7-inch, six six-pounders, and six three-pounder rapid-fire guns ; speed, 17.5 knots ; crew, 400 officers and men.

“ *Castilla*, Captain A. M. de Oliva commanding ; 3334 tons ; battery, four 5.9-inch, two 4.7-inch, two 3.3-inch, four 2.9-inch, and eight six-pounder rapid-fire guns ; speed, 14 knots ; crew, 300.

“ *Isla de Cuba*, Captain J. Sidrach, and *Isla de Luzon*, Captain J. de le Herian ; 1030 tons each ; battery, four 4.7-inch, four six-pounder and two three-pounder rapid-fire guns ; speed, 16 knots ; crew, 200 each.

“ *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, Captain E. Robion, and *Don Juan de Austria*, Captain J. de la Concha ; 1130 tons ; batteries, four 4.7-inch, two 2.7-inch, and two three-pounder rapid-fire guns ; speed 14 knots ; crew, 200 men each.

“ *General Lezo*, Commander R. Benevento, and *Marques del Duero*, Commander S. Morena Guerra ; 524 and 500 tons respectively ; batteries, two 4.7-inch, one 3.5-inch, and two three-pounder rapid-fire guns ; speed, about 11 knots ; crew, 100.

“ The *Velasco* was also in the harbour, but she was undergoing repairs and her guns—three 5.9-inch and two 2.7-inch rapid-fire guns—were mounted in earthworks on shore. There were four torpedo boats, two of which were sunk during the action, and two fine transports, the *Manila* and the *Isla de Mindanao*, one of which was captured and the other sunk.

“ It will be seen that the Spanish squadron was inferior in every way to the attacking fleet. If it had been obliged to come out into the open sea to fight, it would not have

had the ghost of a chance. But that which gave the Spaniards an equalising element was the position they had taken under the protection of shore batteries.

“It is estimated by all experts that one gun mounted on shore is worth several aboard ship. It has a fixed platform, and is, therefore, able to fire with much greater accuracy.

“Another great advantage our enemy had was the knowledge of the exact distance of our ships at all times during the action. Having no range-marks to go by, and receiving no aid from the few range-finders installed in our vessels, it was an exceedingly difficult matter for our officers to determine the proper elevation to be given to our sights.

“We were constantly moving,—sometimes in and sometimes across the lines of fire,—so that even when a shot was seen to strike in the right spot it was no guide for the next one. At a distance of 4000 yards or less the Spaniards ought not to have missed one shot in five, especially from their shore batteries, and the fact that we suffered so little is the best evidence that our enemies were not capable of taking advantage of all their opportunities.

“Five times we made the circuit in front of the Spanish position. From the bridge of the flagship I was able to watch every move of our own and the enemy’s vessels, and, seeing the storm of shells striking about us or bursting close aboard the ships of our squadron, we had good reason for fearing that our loss had been heavy.

“Of course we knew that the *Olympia* had escaped without casualties, but as we had a dozen hairbreadth misses it did not seem possible that our consorts had been equally fortunate. I began, at first, to keep count of the shells which barely cleared our hull or which burst right in our faces, for I had an idea that the fight would not last more than half an hour at the outside, and I thought it would be interesting to know how many times we escaped being hit, but I got tired of that very soon.

“When a shell comes straight along through the air one does not have time to catch a sight of it till it has passed, although one has no difficulty in knowing that it has been trying to scrape an acquaintance, as many shells

did. It screams out its salutation only a few feet away from one's head. But when it bursts in the air before one's face, the air seems to be full of chunks of metal, some of them apparently the size of a washboiler, and then one is liable to lose the faculty of differentiating between the fragments and the whole shell.

"So I stopped trying to count for fear I should be accused of exaggeration.

"Another very unpleasant thing about the Spanish shells was the way they had of coming at us even when they had not been properly aimed. Thus it often happened that a projectile which not only fell short, but which was not even a good line shot, would be 'upset' by its impact with the water, and would come tumbling, end over end, far out of its original direction.

"And how those fellows did roar, plainly visible, if they came anywhere near us; and as they rose from the water and spun around and around they seemed to be about the size of a barrel, especially if an observer happened to be close in the line of their eccentric flight!

"When the *Baltimore* went in and cleared out the shore batteries in the second action, what cheers she got from the *Olympia's* men, who had been at the front during the whole of the first fight! And they yelled with glee again when the little *Petrel* went into the inner harbour and finished off the craft that were still afloat."

On the 3d of May the Spanish Cortes assembled, and the opening session was marked by scenes of great excitement. Official misrepresentations in regard to the battle of Manila had delighted the people with the false hope of victory; now there seemed to be no barrier left between the government and popular disgust and exasperation when the fact of disaster was ascertained. In the Chamber of Deputies the Republican leader, Señor Salmeron, demanded explanations of the defeat in the Philippines, declaring that it would be necessary to establish the responsibility attaching to the Crown. In reply, Prime

Minister Sagasta appealed to the House to sink partisanship. Carlists and Republicans threatened Sagasta, and made assaults on the ministry.

Naturally Admiral Bermejo, the Minister of Marine, came in for a large share of indignant criticism, and when he desired to be heard in his own defence, was howled down by the Republican members. In many provinces of the Peninsula riots and disorder were suppressed with difficulty.

On the 4th of May, and at this inauspicious moment, the Cuban Parliament was inaugurated in Havana by Captain-General Blanco, with much pomp, and with enthusiastic demonstrations by the autonomists.

Three other events of this 4th of May should have special notice :

First, an excursion on which Rear-Admiral Sampson set out with his good ships the *New York*, the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Puritan*, *Cincinnati*, *Marblehead*, and *Mayflower*. The excursion began at Key West, from which point the fleet sailed toward Porto Rico, proceeding along the northern coast of Cuba at the time Lieutenant Rowan was making the best of his way towards Nassau in an open boat. Without an effort to follow, we shall presently overtake these men-of-war.

The second item of interest on this day was the publication of a long list of army nominations which President McKinley sent to the Senate. The list included Fitzhugh Lee, Representative Wheeler of Alabama, J. H. Wilson of Delaware, and Senator Sewell of New Jersey, all to be major-generals.

And in a third paragraph we should not omit to mention Lord Salisbury's very significant statements in his address at the annual meeting of the Primrose League. In closing his speech the English Premier gave utterance to a

foreboding of what would happen to such countries as Spain and China. "These states," he observed, "are becoming weaker, and the strong states stronger," and he pointed out as an inevitable result of that condition that the "living nations" would gradually encroach upon the territory of the "dying states." On the one side were the great countries, able to assemble armies of a magnitude never dreamed of in past generations, with weapons growing in their efficiency of destruction. On the other side were the states in which disorganisation and decay were advancing, while their misgovernment and corruption seemed beyond hope of reform or amelioration.

The world found it easy to share Lord Salisbury's views at a time when every message from Spain was adding to the story of disturbances caused by the high prices and the scarcity of food in the provinces, and the nation that had received the crushing blow at Manila and a sentence of death from London barely confessed its despondency before taking courage for new efforts. Ten days after the battle we find Sagasta asserting that the Spanish Government had done everything to avoid a conflict—"more even than it should have done." "When our adversaries began to treat us with contempt," he added, "war became inevitable. The situation is very simple, and unfortunately cannot be concealed. Spain is desolated and worn by internal troubles, and the United States has coveted Cuba for a long time."

We must not close the chapter without one word more in regard to the victor at Manila; and the right word is to be found, no doubt, in Mr. McKinley's message to Congress, transmitted on May 9th.

"By the 4th of May," the President said, "Commodore Dewey had taken possession of the naval station at Cavité, destroying the fortifications there and at the entrance to

the bay, and paroling their garrisons. The waters of the bay were under his full control. He has established hospitals within the American lines, where two hundred and fifty Spanish sick and wounded are assisted and protected. . . . I now recommend that the thanks of Congress be given *Acting Rear-Admiral* George Dewey of the United States Navy."

CHAPTER VI

THE INTEREST OF THE PERIOD—ENGAGEMENTS AT CARDENAS AND CIENFUEGOS—BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN—RESIGNATION OF THE SPANISH MINISTRY—MUSTERING OF VOLUNTEERS—NEW CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS—ADMIRAL CERVERA AT SANTIAGO—COMMODORE SCHLEY AT SANTIAGO

IF one were to write a history of the period between the two battles of Manila—between the 1st of May and the 13th of August, 1898, and should omit all mention of the Spanish-American war, the period would still seem uncommonly noteworthy. Let us accordingly touch in passing some of the events that seem crowded into the space of three months and twelve days.

The death of Gladstone in May, and the death of Bismarck in July, seemed to mark the end of an epoch. Their two characters stand out of the level of contemporaneous life like cliffs (the last of a mountain range) above a plain. And Edward Bellamy, the author of *Looking Backward*, died in May; Sir Edward Colley Burne-Jones, painter of symbolism, a month later. Then Germany lost a scholar of note and a writer of historical novels that had charmed and still continue to charm the people of several nations, when Georg Ebers, Egyptologist, author of *Uarda* and *An Egyptian Princess*, died. But the advance of Anglo-Egyptian forces upon Omdurman during these months, to avenge Gordon, to end the slave trade, and to open a path for England from the Cape to the Mediterranean, made a more wonderful Nile story.

Reckless speculation in the markets of the world in the same period is exemplified in two rather lurid careers. In Chicago, "the Leiter gamble in wheat," to use one of Chicago's own pet phrases, and very soon afterwards "the collapse of the Leiter deal," compete in interest with the bankruptcy of Hooley in London—of Hooley, promoter of many companies with gigantic capital, paying men of social prominence thousands of pounds for an introduction, and tens of thousands for a name or so on the lists of stockholders, buying editorial commendation, and telling all about it at great length and with minute attention to every scandalous detail !

And then the very acme of scampishness seems to have been reached in the Jernegan scheme for extracting gold from sea-water, ensnaring shrewd yet always rather credulous New Englanders, and taking in large sums of money in the aggregate from numerous individual pockets not too well lined.

While the sea-water kept its treasure, the element hydrogen, at the compulsion of legitimate science, did not refuse to take on a new form, and its liquefaction is an achievement that to many persons would make the month of May, 1898, rather memorable.

The second trial of M. Zola, his conviction, and his flight from Paris would make a little serial story (or in his hands a long one) for the months May, June, and July; and in the last month fell the unspeakable horror of the sinking of *La Bourgogne*.

The diplomatic contests of England and Russia, ostensibly to control certain properties in China, actually for predominance at the capital of the East, threatened war in the first week of August. And in a nearer field, during the weeks which will bring us to the end of this narration, we should note the publication of the Canal Report in

New York, with its disclosure of our most intimate peril in corrupt and dishonest politics ; while new stories of Klondike's wealth made a not very effectual appeal, in the late summer and early autumn, to public interest which was preoccupied with Manila and Santiago and Camp Wikoff.

Preoccupied? Yes. Even Martin Thorn, who paid the penalty of his crime towards the close of July, did not quicken a taste for horrors. Scandalous lynchings for once got as little attention as the friends of decency could desire ; and, on the other hand, little heed was given to a splendid undertaking like that of Lieutenant Peary, who set out to win the North Pole in a three or four years' war against elements that have resisted every assault. He reached the North Water at Etah on August 13th.

And what of the Milan riots during the first weeks of June? . . .

The story of these things would in itself be a little history and a study of the condition of society at the time when new forces, welcomed by some and feared by others, put an end to our nation's isolation and gave resistless force to new measures. It must surely be undertaken when the days of the war shall have stopped throbbing, and when fact may be distinguished from misrepresentation.

Now, only attempting to trace the events of the conflict in their sequence, we must go back to the day, May 10th, when bread riots in Madrid were reported, together with a sensational advance in the price of wheat in New York and Chicago.

It was at that time that the Spanish fleet, so long harboured at the Cape Verde Islands, was said to have returned to Cadiz. And, for all our confidence in modern news-gathering, those most concerned to know the truth were utterly unable to prove that this report was false.

Intimations of Spain's intention to recover her prestige in the Philippines were gathered at Madrid, communicated to foreign capitals, and everywhere accepted with more or less caution, more or less apprehension. The Spanish army was to be largely increased, it was said, forty thousand men of the reserves having been ordered to join the colours; and this pointed to an expedition strong enough to expel Admiral Dewey.

Meantime, the selection of Major-General Wesley Merritt as Military Governor of the Philippines was assured, and the first event in the long series leading up to the final capture of Manila occurred on May 11th, when General Merritt, then commanding the Department of the East, went to Washington to receive instructions, and, in regard to the force necessary to the successful accomplishment of the work in hand, to *give* instructions. He would not undertake the responsibility with the wholly inadequate force that had been provided.

On the same day, an engagement occurred at Cardenas, Cuba. Spanish gunboats and shore batteries opened fire on the blockading vessels *Wilmington*, *Hudson*, and *Winslow*. The *Winslow*, a torpedo boat, was disabled. Ensign Worth Bagley and four sailors were killed, and Lieutenant Bernadou and two others were wounded.

At a point just west of the harbour of Port Cabañas, Cuba, a little skirmish took place which perhaps receives too much distinction when it is characterised as the first land fight of the war. The transport steamer, *Gussie*, which left Key West May the 10th, carrying members of the 1st Infantry, with Cuban scouts, and rifles, ammunition, and supplies of food for the insurgents, made a temporary landing after a brush with the Spanish troops. The expedition proved to be a rather ridiculous failure.

On the 11th of May there was a more important engage-

ment at Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba. The cruiser *Marblehead* and the gunboat *Nashville*, in attempting to cut the cable at that point, were attacked by Spanish infantry, and one of the Americans was killed and seven were wounded. The purpose our men had in view was carried out successfully : they cut the cables under fire. The Spanish loss was heavy for a small affair.

On the 12th of May occurred the bombardment of San Juan de Puerto Rico (or St. John, Porto Rico, as it will probably be called). A portion of the squadron under the command of Admiral Sampson attacked the batteries which defended that harbour, expecting to find a Spanish fleet under their guns. The attack, beginning at 5.15 o'clock, lasted for three hours, and it was reported at the time that much damage had been inflicted upon the fortifications, and that incidentally a portion of the city had suffered. The fact is, this experience proved once more that land fortifications, well built and well placed, possess advantages which casual assaults from a fleet cannot overcome. On our ships but two men were killed and seven were wounded, the vessels themselves sustaining no serious injury.

And now the mysterious Cape Verde squadron was coming nearer, though it was still to play a long game of hide-and-seek. Instead of returning to Cadiz, it had sailed westward and had at last been sighted off Martinique, Windward Islands. Secretary Long of the Navy received official advices to this effect on the 13th of May, and on the same day the fleet under command of Commodore Schley, which was distinguished as the "Flying Squadron," put to sea. The armoured cruiser *Brooklyn*, the battleships *Massachusetts* and *Texas*, the despatch boat *Scorpion*, and the collier *Sterling* got away in the afternoon, while the cruisers *Minneapolis* and *St. Paul*

received orders to follow immediately. And while they were hastening southward to strengthen the blockade at whatever point it might be attacked, and while Rear-Admiral Sampson's fleet, having left San Juan, was steaming towards Cuba along the northern coast of San Domingo, the news was received that the Cape Verde squadron, from this time forward to be known as Cervera's squadron, in honour of its gallant admiral, had reached the island of Curaçao. That was on the 15th of May.

The resignation of the members of the Spanish Cabinet on the same day, due rather to dissensions or personal considerations than to a change in the government's policy, started rumours of a peaceful attitude in Madrid which were promptly and almost fiercely contradicted.

In London cordial approval was expressed of a speech delivered at Birmingham on the 13th of May by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. "Though war be terrible," Mr. Chamberlain had declared, "it would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance." It is in the highest degree interesting to note that on the very day when Mr. Chamberlain made this eloquent profession of friendly regard and mutuality of interests, Admiral Dewey sent a despatch from Cavité to our government, informing them that he was maintaining a strict blockade, that the rebels were hemming in the city by land, that provisions in Manila were scarce, that he could take the city at any moment, that he had captured the gunboat *Callao*, which had attempted to run the blockade, and that British, French, German, and Japanese vessels were in Manila Bay and were observing his operations.

The resignation of the Spanish Ministry having been formally handed to the Queen Regent by Prime Minister Sagasta, he was charged with the formation of a new

Cabinet. Señor Moret, Minister for the Colonies, expressing what was undoubtedly the controlling sentiment in Spain at the time we have now reached (May 16th), said that changes in the composition of the Cabinet would favour a more active war policy, and that "the greatest reliance was placed upon Admiral Cervera's squadron and upon the skill of its commander." As a counterpoise for Spanish confidence, we may place the activity of the American navy at that moment, the blockaders of the southern coast of Cuba, as well as our two squadrons then proceeding toward that island, one from the east and the other from the north, having been informed about the course of Admiral Cervera's fleet.

The new Spanish Cabinet, with Señor Sagasta as President of the Council of Ministers, was announced on May 18th. It included, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Señor Leon y Castillo, who until this appointment had been Minister at Paris; Lieutenant-General Correa, Minister for War; Señor Aunon, Minister of Marine; Señor Lopez Puigcerver, Minister of Finance; Señor F. R. Capdepon, Minister of the Interior; Señor C. Groizard, Minister of Justice; Señor Gamazo, Minister of Public Instruction; and Señor Romero Giron, Minister of the Colonies. Señor Leon y Castillo, however, declined the Foreign Office portfolio, feeling that he might be more useful in his position as Ambassador to France than as a member of the government. A Madrid correspondent of the *London Times* made the following comment: "Recent events, especially Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham, have opened up new political horizons. Spanish statesmen anticipate the possibility of a universal conflagration wherein Spain would find efficient allies, and their eyes naturally turn toward France and Russia. Therefore it seems important that Spain should be pre-

sented at Paris by an ambassador well acquainted with the tangled skein of European diplomacy and *persona grata* to the French Government. It is believed that Señor Leon y Castillo will fulfil these conditions. Hence Señor Sagasta's hesitation to recall him."

On the 23d of May, the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs was accepted by Duke Almodóvar de Rio.

The impression prevailing at this time, that the new Spanish Cabinet intended to push the campaign vigorously, was cultivated by means of very readable despatches, many of which proved to be as misleading as that of May 20th, which stated that "between 8000 and 10,000 troops, drawn from Catalonia, Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia, were actually embarking at Barcelona for the Philippine Islands." On May 22d, the world was informed that increased activity was noticeable at the Spanish navy-yards, that the defences of important harbours were being strengthened, and that the reserve squadron was to be prepared without delay for service wherever it might be needed. It is amusing to recall the published lists of vessels in the squadron at Cadiz, now that we know what mouse crept forth from a groaning mountain. It was said to comprise the battleship *Pelayo*, the armoured cruiser *Carlos V.*, the protected cruiser *Alfonso XIII.*, three or four torpedo-boat destroyers, with perhaps an equal number of torpedo boats, the despatch boat *Giralda*, half a dozen armed trans-Atlantic liners (among these the *Normannia* and *Columbia*, formerly Hamburg-American vessels), and possibly other warships from Ferrol and Barcelona. At Cadiz and at Madrid it was asserted that "the destination of the fleet" was Manila; at Gibraltar that it was "probably the Antilles." But there were those who suggested that Spain would keep her ships on the home station for the defence of her ports.

The rate of growth of the American volunteer army is interesting. Up to May 16th, 70,000 volunteers had been mustered into the service. Two days later, the total muster of volunteers, as announced by Adjutant-General Corbin, amounted to 92,580, and the following States had completed their muster of the troops apportioned by the War Department: California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. On the 25th of May, the President issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 more volunteers, thus increasing the nominal strength of the army to 278,500 men, including both the regulars and the volunteers. About a week earlier, when somewhat more than 100,000 volunteers had been mustered in, the comment of General Miles upon the condition and efficiency of this force was significant. "Better raw material for a magnificent army," said he, "was never collected together, but more than that is required for effective operations in a hostile country under adverse climatic conditions. The army is not now in shape for the invasion of Cuba, and a great deal of hard work will be necessary before it can be put in proper condition for such a campaign."

We have already spoken of General Merritt's positive views in regard to the force necessary to enable him to do the work assigned to him in the Philippines. On the 17th of May his representation that a substantial proportion of regular troops was indispensable was made the occasion for rumours to the effect that he had declined the position of Military Governor of the Philippines, except under certain difficult conditions. As a matter of fact, General Merritt offered a suggestion which he supported with

cogent arguments, and which received such favourable consideration that a sufficient number of regulars were placed at his disposal as soon as possible. It may seem a mere coincidence that at this very time the man who as leader of the insurgent Filipinos was soon to prove himself a more difficult, if not a more formidable, antagonist than the Spaniards was on the point of returning to the scene of his activity. General Emilio Aguinaldo landed in Cavité on May 19th, and immediately sent word to his followers on the island of Luzon that he had returned to lead them against the Spaniards. How rapidly his following grew to large proportions, how signal and somewhat disconcerting his successes, due in part to his native sagacity, but in no small measure to the presence of the American fleet in the bay of Manila, we shall soon have occasion to notice. It is but fair to call attention to the fact that General Merritt's precautions were justified by this synchronous event.

On the 18th of May, the cruiser *Charleston*, bound for the Philippines to aid Admiral Dewey's squadron, sailed from Mare Island, San Francisco. The *Charleston* had no troops on board. Her mission was to carry ammunition and supplies to Dewey, and she also took a force of machinists and engineers, with ample equipment for the repair of damaged warships. Delayed for several days, she proceeded on Wednesday, May 25th, as an escort to three transports (the *City of Peking*, the *City of Sydney*, and the *Australia*), which carried about 2500 men, with supplies to last a year, and a cargo of ammunition and naval stores. The 1st Regiment of California Volunteers, with the 2d Oregon Volunteers, and one battalion of 14th United States Infantry, and a detachment of California heavy artillery, consisting of an officer and fifty men, constituted a brigade of expeditionary forces under

the command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, United States Volunteers, sailing on these transports.

On the 18th of May, Major-General E. S. Otis, who had been ordered by the War Department to proceed to the Philippines as second in command to Major-General Merritt, arrived in San Francisco. On the 21st of May, General Merritt started for San Francisco, and at the same time it was announced that the *Monterey* had been ordered to reinforce Admiral Dewey.

Spain was looking for the East Indies four centuries ago when she found the West. Now it seemed that we, when preoccupied with affairs of the West Indies, had, to our surprise, found our problem in the East. Already we had begun to see that the East Indies, which lured old voyagers to the discovery of our continent, might stand upon the threshold of a new policy.

In Havana new intrenchments had been thrown up and more artillery mounted. Confident or boastful people of that capital were asserting that an army of 50,000 men would be needed to reduce a place so well fortified. Posted on the corners of houses all over the town, one might see ironical notices offering women's garments for sale to "the men who are abandoning the island of Cuba." And the arrival of a squadron from Spain—Cervera's squadron, or Camara's squadron, or both, if both should be required—was so confidently expected that the Havaneese kept signals ready day and night to guide it safely into the harbour.

But Admiral Cervera was by his course to draw our men to Mausers and to Cuban fevers in the south-east, instead of to Mausers and to fevers in the north-west of the same island. On the 19th of May it was rumoured that

some of the Spanish warships had arrived at Santiago de Cuba. The *Terror* had been left behind at Fort de France, Martinique, whence she eventually proceeded to San Juan, Porto Rico. The other six might have separated. It was still a vague suggestion.

Señor Leon y Castillo's refusal to enter the Sagasta Cabinet divided attention the world over with Mr. Chamberlain's Birmingham speech, and gave rise to wild conjecture. That the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was arranging for the sale or gift of the Philippine Islands to France as a means of saving them from falling into the hands of the United States, was a theory which gained wide acceptance, and a rise in Spanish fairs led the *St. James Gazette* to observe that certain influential capitalists might have advance news of the forthcoming Franco-Spanish alliance. An Anglo-American alliance meantime got itself talked about as a possibility appealing to people especially after they have dined well. Americans and Englishmen met to celebrate the seventy-ninth birthday of Queen Victoria on the 24th of May. In New York and at Tampa, Florida, the assemblages were especially enthusiastic; the talk was of Anglo-Saxon union, with bumpers and with cheers, with references to a tacit alliance already existing between the United States and England, with a liberal amount of sentiment, but sustained by not a little serious conviction of a growing identity of interests; and finally with a little wit, as when a surgeon in the British army, responding to a toast, pointed to the two flags that were displayed together, and said, "their colours never run."

Turning now to Spain, we find the people of the Peninsula, engrossed in immediate needs and immediate pleasures, strangely unawakened to the real meaning of the present phases of the conflict. The great question related not to the conduct of the war, but to the supply of bread

and its price. Events of the war, as they lacked dramatic features just then, interested the people of Madrid, for example, less than the next bull-fight or the drawing of the national lottery ; and as they did not fully realise what the incidents attending the loss of their colonies would prove to be, nor ever stopped to measure the consequences, Castilians or Andalusians might even say in a light-hearted fashion that the loss of Cuba and Porto Rico and the Philippines would be a cause for national rejoicing. " For what benefit have we as a people received from these colonies ? " some of them were asking. " Have not the people been always overwhelmed with taxation on account of our over-sea possessions, while only the ruined nobles and adventurers who have gone there to retrieve their fortunes with the support of the government have grown opulent and arrogant ? "

So much for the people. In the Spanish Senate on May 23d, the suggestion was made that Spain should immediately sanction privateering and entirely destroy America's maritime trade ; and the excuse alleged for this threat of privateering was found in reports " confirmed " at Madrid that American warships, flying the Spanish flag, had entered Guantanamo Bay. The American warships referred to were the converted trans-Atlantic liner *St. Louis* and the tug *Wompatuck* ; and the Guantanamo incident dwindles to very small proportions under closer scrutiny. These two vessels, receiving orders from Admiral Sampson, went to Santiago and cut one of the cables there within range of the guns of the fortifications. On the following day, May 19th, the *St. Louis* and *Wompatuck* entered the bay of Guantanamo, but there they did not succeed in cutting the cable. A Spanish gunboat in the harbour and Spanish infantry in a blockhouse near the beach opened fire on the *Wompatuck*, and Captain Good-

rich of the *St. Louis* signalled that the tug should cease operations and retire.

Admiral Dewey in a despatch to the Navy Department, dated at Manila, May 20th, via Hong Kong, May 24th,¹ referred to Aguinaldo's arrival as follows: "Aguinaldo, rebel commander-in-chief, brought down by *McCulloch*, organising forces near Cavité, and may render assistance that would be valuable." There is a delightful caution in the wording of the despatch. It is not that Aguinaldo is to render valuable assistance to our forces. It is that he *may* render assistance that *would be* valuable.

On the 26th of May, the battleship *Oregon* arrived at Key West in excellent condition. She had left Bremerton, Puget Sound, where she had been in dry dock, on March 6th, and arriving, in San Francisco on March 9th, coaled there and left on the morning of March 19th for a run of 4000 miles to Callao, reaching the latter port on April 4th. Leaving Callao April 7th, the *Oregon* proceeded southward with strong seas and a heavy current against her, passed through the Straits of Magellan, where a gale of extraordinary severity was encountered, and arrived at Punta Arenas on April 17th. At Punta Arenas the *Oregon* was joined by the gunboat *Marietta*. Rio de Janeiro was reached on the last day of the month. Late in the evening of May 8th, the *Oregon* steamed into the harbour of Bahia, and while lying there received orders from Washington with advices regarding Cervera's fleet.

The voyage northward from that point was full of interest, the disposition of the men on board this good ship being probably very well expressed in the words which Captain Clark addressed to them, when he said at general

¹The cable from Manila was cut by Dewey's orders after the battle of May 1st. Direct communication was resumed on August 21st.

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muster : " It is our duty in time of war to avoid so superior a force, but if we do meet them we shall impair their fighting efficiency."

After this voyage of eighty-one days, in which the *Oregon* had steamed 17,499 miles, her engines were in perfect order ; she had merely to take on a supply of coal, and then was ready to put to sea again and fight. Captain Clark left the *Marietta* between Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, the gunboat proceeding northward in company with the *Buffalo*, formerly the *Nitheroy*, a cruiser bought from the Brazilian Government.

By this time (May 26th) the belief that the Spanish fleet commanded by Cervera was hemmed in, or, in the phrase of the day, " bottled up," at Santiago de Cuba by Commodore Schley's squadron was converting itself into a positive assurance ; and yet even now it lacked somewhat of ascertained fact. The most incredulous persons were the Spanish Admiral's good friends and ardent admirers, his compatriots. " Admiral Cervera's fleet bottled up in Santiago de Cuba ? No, you can't make me believe that. He is too good a strategist—too old a sailor, to be caught in such a trap." In these words, or in such words as these, the Admiral's friends were stating their belief that he either never entered that narrow-mouthed harbour, or had already escaped from it.

Conflicting rumours stimulated Commodore Schley to discover the elusive enemy on the southern coast of Cuba, which the commander of the Flying Squadron had from the first believed to be Cervera's objective. To this end, while apparently withdrawing from the neighbourhood of Santiago, he actually held his compact little fleet well within striking distance and detached the *St. Paul* to keep watch and to hold herself ready to bring swift news from the centre of interest.

The six formidable Spanish vessels had already found their last harbour. The important fact, therefore, is that the vessels of the Flying Squadron stood ready from the first to prevent their escape. Nevertheless, for his plan which looked not to that which had happened, but to that which might have happened, and for his design to lure an enemy already entrapped, Commodore Schley deserves credit. In the distribution of honours that students of the history of this period will finally agree to make as between the two American commanders, Schley and Sampson, perhaps the former will receive his due reward in the public acknowledgment that he found and held the quarry. The achievement of the latter will be discussed when we reach the events of July 3d.

On Sunday, May 29th, Schley approached the harbour entrance until several of the ships were plainly seen. "I told you I should find them," said he. "They will be a long time getting home."

But not *all* of the Spanish fleet had been identified, and some curious speculations were still to arise out of this remnant of uncertainty.

CHAPTER VII

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

I

IN our first chapter we saw that the location of Santiago de Cuba on the map of the island was disclosed by a vivid splash of American blood, when officers and crew of the *Virginus* were shot by order of the authorities (November, 1873).¹ Long ago forgiven, the tragic episode has been also well-nigh forgotten, and if the place had still to be cleansed of the taint of that crime there have been deeds of heroic endeavour, of self-sacrifice, of desperate valour, in the ranks of the Spanish garrison as well as in the American lines, to make a vicarious redemption. The name of Santiago de Cuba is to be associated with splendid things as well as with shameful things from this time forward.

The story of the campaign insists upon being told without delay. We cannot even sketch in our background first. We can at best indicate it with two or three suggestive lines, and this without description of the city, which is regarded by the Cubans of the central and western provinces as a rather dull, hot, unprogressive place. The effective background for our present use is this: Santiago was the first town in the New World to

¹ Señor Sagasta's responsibility for this crime of the local authorities at Santiago has been reasserted of late, but it should be mentioned as a matter in dispute.

receive the name of Spain's patron saint—St. James the Elder, brother of St. John the Apostle. The little city of the same name in the mother country, Santiago in Galicia, shared with Rome and Jerusalem the distinction of being a resort for pilgrims, and its shrine was even the most frequented and celebrated in Christendom, especially in the fifteenth century. It seems almost a pity to mention more recent dates. We should barely say in passing that the Cuban Santiago, which has its cathedral, too, and its archbishop, was founded twenty-two years after Columbus made his first voyage of discovery, and that half a century before the earliest English settlers reached Virginia it had been seized by the French and ransomed for not less than \$80,000. So it was an important town from the outset, always inclined to be wealthy, capital of the island for a while, the port from which Cortez sailed on an expedition that had as its result the conquest of Mexico.

And perhaps it may interest some of our readers to hear that natives of the province seldom speak of "Santiago de Cuba": among them the town is called simply "Cuba."

II

Three days before Commodore Schley caught sight of some of the vessels of the Spanish fleet in Santiago harbour, an order issued at Tampa by Major-General Shafter completed the formation of all regular and volunteer troops massed in Florida into corps, divisions, and brigades, and on May 29th the Fifth Army Corps, commanded by General Shafter himself, received the order to embark. It seemed as though a combined attack of the army and navy would be immediately made at Santiago, but a fortnight passed before the transports started from Port Tampa.

Meantime Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding

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the United States Army, accompanied by his personal and official staff, paid a visit to Tampa for purposes of inspection. Meantime, also, a very important part of the program looking to the co-operation of the Cuban insurgents in the eastern districts was being carried out. Three hundred and eighty Cuban volunteers, with supplies, arms, and ammunition for Garcia's ragged followers, were landed on the southern coast in the province of Santiago, from the steamer *Florida*, which returned to Key West on the last day of the month. On the same day other work of preparation was begun at the mouth of Santiago harbour, where the Spaniards had been constructing a number of new masked batteries. The *Iowa*, the *New Orleans*, and the *Massachusetts* were ordered by Schley to draw the fire of these batteries in order to ascertain their location and to test their strength ; and so the first of a series of duels between the warships and the land defences, contests always showing the capital marksmanship of our gunners, and yet always inconclusive, was fought six weeks and five days before our flag was raised over the civil government building in the Plaza de Armas. The first shot was fired by the *Massachusetts* at 1.50 o'clock, the last by the *New Orleans* at 2.25, our vessels receiving no injury whatever from the enemy.

The duels between the shore batteries and warships were continued under Admiral Sampson, who returned from Porto Rico, where he had subjected the defences of San Juan to a similar test, and who on June 1st, relieving Commodore Schley, assumed command of the united squadrons, which comprised about sixteen warships of various classes, all brought to the highest degree of efficiency.

Two days later, on Friday, June 3d, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson made his gallant attempt to close

the entrance of Santiago harbour by sinking the collier *Merrimac* in the narrow channel. The story of this exploit is best told in the words of Admiral Sampson's official report, and, of course, in Lieutenant Hobson's own words. Admiral Sampson's report is as follows :

" UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP 'NEW YORK,'
" OFF SANTIAGO, June 3, 1898.

" Permit me to call your special attention to Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson. As stated in a special telegram, before coming here I decided to make the harbour entrance secure against the possibility of egress by Spanish ships by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship, he manifested the most lively interest in the problem. After several days' consideration he presented a solution which he considered would insure the immediate sinking of the ship when she reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we prepared for execution when we reached Santiago. The plan contemplated a crew of only seven men, and Mr. Hobson, who begged that it might be intrusted to him. The anchor chains were arranged on deck for both the anchors, forward and aft, the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost automatically.

" As soon as I reached Santiago, and had the collier to work upon, the details were completed and diligently prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon and tide served best the first night after our arrival. Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of four o'clock in the morning arrived, and the preparation was scarcely completed. After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.

" This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We waited impatiently after the

Sinking the "Merrimac"

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firing by the Spaniards had ceased. When they did not reappear from the harbour at six o'clock I feared that they had all perished. A steam launch, which had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the men, appeared at this time coming out under a persistent fire of the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful inspection of the harbour from this ship showed that the *Merrimac* had been sunk in the channel.

"This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out under a flag of truce with a letter from the Admiral extolling the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner. I cannot myself too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr. Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up the *Albatross*.

"There were hundreds of volunteers, who were anxious to participate; there were 150 from the *Iowa*, nearly as many from this ship, and large numbers from all the other ships, officers and men alike.

"W. T. SAMPSON."

Lieutenant Hobson's comments, which are now to be given, are taken from his address delivered in the Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, on the 4th of August. He was speaking of the American sailor, and said that recently he had occasion to see "Jacky where his endurance, his bravery, and his loyalty were sorely tried;" and he added:

"I feel that certain features of the recent incident in which Jack played his part, and played it well, should be referred to in a public manner. I feel it is my duty to refer to it here. It is known to everybody that when the call was made for volunteers to go in on the *Merrimac*, men fell over one another in their haste to be accepted. On the *New York* alone 140 men volunteered before the order could be passed that no more volunteers were needed. When a few out of this number had been assigned to stations on

the *Merrimac*, all, in obedience to orders, lay flat on their faces. Two were stationed by the anchor gear, others by the torpedoes arranged along the side, two in the engine-room. It was agreed by each one that he should not even look over his shoulder, no matter what happened to the ship, to any of his companions, or to himself. If wounded, he should place himself in a sitting or a kneeling posture, or whatever posture was necessary, so that when the time for his duty came he could do it to the best advantage. And so they lay, each man at his post, and under what difficulties you may understand when I tell you that, out of the seven torpedoes placed along the side, five had been shot away by the enemy's fire before the order was given for the *Merrimac's* crew to gather at the rendezvous on the quarter-deck. Projectiles were coming more as a continuous stream than as separate shots. But, through the whole storm, Jacky lay there ready to do his duty as he had been instructed to do it. There was not only the plunging fire from the forts on both sides, but a terrific horizontal fire from the fleet in the harbour, and it seemed as if the next projectile would wipe all the sailors out of life at once. If ever a feeling of 'each man for himself,' a feeling of 'get away from this,' 'get out of this anyway, anyhow,' was to be justified, it was justified then. Not a man so much as turned his head.

"Then, later, when we were on the catamaran and the enemy's picket-boats came crawling up out of the darkness with their lanterns, the impulse was just as strong to slip off the raft and swim for the shore, or for the entrance of the harbour. The simple order was given, 'No man move until further orders.' And not a man moved or stirred for nearly an hour.

"On that same afternoon, when the party was in prison, and through the kindness of the Admiral the men's clothing was permitted to be brought to them from the fleet, one of the men, as spokesman for the rest, was allowed to come over to my cell with a package for me. He said: 'We would do it over again to-night, sir.'

"The next day, when it seemed uncertain whether or not a remnant of the Inquisition was to be revived, when the enemy did not know whether it was his fault or ours

that a ship had been sunk, and rather inclined to the belief that he had sunk an American battleship and that we were the only survivors out of several hundred, the men were taken before the Spanish authorities and serious and impertinent questions put to them. Remember, they did not know what it might cost them to refuse to answer. Spanish soldiers of the guard standing before them, made significant gestures with their hands, thus [Mr. Hobson passed his hand edgewise across his throat]. Our seamen laughed in their faces. Then a Spanish major questioned Charette, because he spoke French, and asked him this question :

“ ‘ What was your object in coming in here ? ’ and so long as I live I shall never forget the way Charette threw back his shoulders, proudly lifted his head, and looked him in the eye as he said :

“ ‘ In the United States Navy, sir, it is not the custom for the seamen to know, or to desire to know, the object of an action of his superior officer. ’

“ Take this simple incident, and, after all, in comparison with the whole war, a very simple incident, the sinking of the *Merrimac*, and make your own deductions as to the quality of manhood in the United States Navy. You will have then a more or less complete, but certainly not an overestimated idea of Jacky. ”

As the foregoing statements show, practically the entire companies of the ships volunteered for the dangerous service. The following six were chosen : Osborn Deignan, George F. Phillips, Francis Kelly, George Charette, Daniel Montague, and J. C. Murphy ; and to these must be added Randolph Clausen, who was at work on the *Merrimac* and declined to leave her. Torpedoes were fastened outside the hull on the port side about ten feet below the water-line. They were placed against the bulkheads and vital spots, and connected with the bridge, and by a wire under the ship's keel with each other, so that they could readily be exploded. Soon after three o'clock

the *Merrimac* steamed away from the fleet, Lieutenant Hobson and his crew of seven taking her first towards the western shore of the harbour entrance. The launch of the *New York*, in command of Naval Cadet Powell, followed closely until the *Merrimac*, changing her course, headed straight for the point off which, in accordance with the design, she was to be sunk. The words of Admiral Cervera, in which he expressed, through his chief of staff, his opinion of these men and of their exploit, are memorable. "Daring like theirs," he said, "makes a bitterest enemy proud that his fellow-men can be such heroes."

Admiral Sampson's statement that "a careful inspection of the harbour from this ship showed that the *Merrimac* had been sunk in the channel," does not necessarily imply that the barrier was impassable in his opinion. This impression prevailed, however, for some time. The truth was that the ship at the last moment became unmanageable, and could not be swung across the channel.¹ The achievement of Hobson and his men fell just short of the miraculous, but it lacked nothing of the heroic. All of the eight, escaping with their lives, were taken aboard the *Reina Mercedes*, and as prisoners of war were confined at first in Morro Castle, and afterwards in the city. It so happened that they were locked in the Morro during a bombardment of the Spanish coast defences and fleet by ten of our vessels on June 6th, when about 1500 projectiles were fired; and much anxiety and indignation were expressed in this country in view of this circumstance, but Mr. Ramsden, British consul at Santiago, explained in a despatch that they were removed as soon as lodgings could be prepared in the barracks—actually on June 7th. They were released on July 6th in exchange for prisoners captured by our forces.

¹ Appendix, "Why the *Merrimac* did not Close the Channel."

III

The fleet was extending its activity to points on the Cuban coast just east of the harbour of Santiago. On June 6th, after the bombardment referred to in the last paragraph, the defences at Aguadores were shelled, while it was reported that at Daiquiri, just beyond Aguadores, marines were landed and formed a junction with the insurgents, after driving back the Spanish military forces that were guarding the place. This is the Daiquiri (in many of the reports from the front mis-called *Baiquiri*) at which the army of invasion was landed on June 22d.

And now we come to one of the strangest rumours of the war—a rumour regarding the appearance of Spanish warships off the northern coast of Cuba. It was taken seriously, and gave pause to the Washington authorities. The announcement was made on June 10th that a strong convoy for our troopships had been assembled at Port Tampa, Florida, as “it had been decided to run no risks.” The suggestion was admitted that even one of Cervera’s cruisers might still be at large. Not until June 13th, when a despatch from Admiral Sampson stated that Lieutenant Victor Blue in a careful reconnoissance around Santiago Bay had seen and counted the imprisoned ships, was the mystery finally dissipated. That Lieutenant Blue counted them both forwards and backwards the despatch did not expressly assert, but he travelled seventy miles or more around their stately prison walls, the shores of Santiago Bay, alone, save that Peril was his intimate and constant companion, and he could look down upon them from every hilltop. So, while making other observations for the use of our fleet and army as to the natural features of the bay and as to the Spanish strength,

and the disposition of the forces on guard near the old city, he saw that only the *Terror* was missing.¹

The condition of our army at Tampa at this time occasioned serious apprehensions that it was not ready for invasion. That "the camp at Tampa was a disgraceful evidence either of political jobbery or of gross incompetence," was openly asserted in some of the most influential journals. The Secretary of War, in reply to his critics, said that "when war was declared we were unprepared, yet obstacles almost insurmountable have been overcome. I do not believe that history records an instance where so much has been done in a military campaign of this magnitude in the brief time that has elapsed since hostilities began." And again, "There is an abundance of supplies at the disposal of the government," he asserted. "Everything needed for the army is either on the ground or in the process of transit. Within a week or a fortnight, a fortnight at the most, the required supplies and equipments will be delivered to the troops. In two weeks from this

¹ Less than two weeks before, Lieutenant Blue had scored a brilliant success in another part of Cuba, making his way through the Spanish lines on a secret mission to General Gomez. After being received in the insurgents' camp with cordiality, he planted the American flag on the mainland of Cuba (probably for the first time, although smaller outlying islands, or "cayos," had been thus honoured on several occasions), and when returning to his ship, the *Suwanee*, with his armed boat's crew, captured two schooner-yachts which the enemy used to patrol the shallow waters near Cayo Frances and report the movements of our ships. The entire heliograph-signal outfit that the Spaniards had at Cayo Frances passed into the hands of our men through the capture of these vessels.

Both of these recent exploits—that at Cayo Frances and that at Santiago—have brilliant features, but, so great is the fascination of mystery, the public is likely to receive its most vivid impression of the young officer from his counting of Cervera's ships.

time every man in the army will be fully equipped for war.”

Warnings in regard to the “colossal task” we had undertaken in the invasion of Cuba were not slow in reaching us from the highest authorities on military and naval matters in European countries. It was quite evident to them that an attack on Spain’s formidable forces was not to be thought of before October, and it was taken for granted that our army of invasion would number at least 125,000 men.

Reinforcements were sorely needed then by a force of 600 marines from the transport *Panther*, striving with admirable courage to hold their ground at Camp McCalla on the eastern shore of Guantanamo Bay, province of Santiago de Cuba. They had been landed on June 10th under the protection of the guns of the *Oregon*, *Marblehead*, *Dolphin*, *Yankee*, *Yosemite*, *Porter*, and *Vixen*; and they were called upon to play their part in an undertaking to make the outer harbour of Guantanamo a secure place for the use of our vessels when coaling, or as a rendezvous and a refuge in stormy weather. The task proved to be so difficult that our marines, to save themselves from extermination, were challenged to a display of courage and endurance which must be regarded as a memorable feature of the war. A small, flat-topped hill had been selected for encampment, receiving the name McCalla in honour of the *Marblehead’s* commander. The landing was effected in an hour without accident.

At half-past five o’clock on Saturday afternoon, June 11th, an insurgent scout brought word to the camp that a force of Spanish infantry was at hand. Almost immediately afterwards our outposts were fired upon. Hurried measures for the defence of the position were all that the circumstances allowed. The Spaniards, superior in num-

bers, were hidden in thickets that stretched away on three sides from the unfortified hill, and many of them had leaves and branches wrapped around their bodies so that they could scarcely be distinguished from the undergrowth. Our marines, with their entrenchments scarcely begun, offered an easy mark ; but this first attack proved to be rather in the nature of a skirmish. The firing lasted about an hour. Marines from the *Marblehead* were sent ashore. Men who had been bathing near the beach below the hill ran naked into camp. Before night fell the sentries came in. Two of our men had been killed in the bush. The bodies, when recovered, appeared to have been mutilated. In the course of the night we lost two more, Sergeant Smith and Dr. John Blair Gibbs, the former killed in the woods and his body, according to the erroneous reports at the time, "terribly mutilated,"¹ the latter meeting his death while on duty in the camp.

Renewed and repeated a dozen times before daybreak, the Spanish attacks were most threatening about one o'clock in the morning, when it seemed that the camp was completely surrounded. The little force of Americans held the ground coolly, and their volleys seemed to be de-

¹ A full report from the surgeon who, as medical officer attached to the *Solace* with Admiral Sampson's fleet, spoke with authority of the nature of the wounds received in the four days' fight between our marines at Camp McCalla and the Spaniards, forwarded to Surgeon-General Van Rypen of the navy, June 22d, included a definite statement that the corpses were not mutilated. Severe wounds by Mauser rifle-balls were supposed to have had another cause ; and this error found its way both into reports from Camp McCalla and into a despatch from Admiral Sampson. But Mr. R. H. Davis in his description of the fight at Las Guásimas (*Scribner's Magazine*) suggests that buzzards preying upon the bodies of the soldiers immediately after they had fallen produced the effects which led to this misjudgment.

livered with good judgment, for they sufficed to hold the enemy in check. From its station in the bay the *Marblehead's* search-light was trained on the thickets. This, with the flash of the Mauser rifles, served to guide the aim of our men. The night seemed uncommonly dark and long.

At six o'clock on Sunday morning field-pieces in the camp opened fire and drove a body of Spanish infantry from cover. The *Texas* arrived and landed forty marines, with two Colt automatic guns. Meanwhile the *Marblehead* was shelling the thickly wooded hillside on the south, where the Spaniards were supposed to be concealed. The guns from the *Texas* were hauled up the path and mounted on earthworks that now, hurriedly completed, promised a certain degree of security to the men remaining in camp, while one company of Colonel Huntington's command, deployed in skirmish line, moved forward to discover and to dislodge the enemy. At this juncture the Spaniards proved that their forces in the neighbourhood were also to have the support of artillery, one of their guns opening fire unexpectedly across a bar that juts out into the bay northwest of Camp McCalla. It was silenced by the *Texas*.

The efforts of the skirmishing party to engage the Spaniards on even terms, and the firing of guns from the *Marblehead* and from the camp, were well-nigh continuous; but the Spanish guerrilla attacks, shifted from point to point, were not less persistent, irritating, and at last intolerable. All the baggage was carried to the beach below. Trenches were dug around the crown of the hill. Bluejackets from the *Texas* and *Marblehead*, and sixty Cuban insurgents, lent their assistance. The marines who had been the first to fall were buried on the side of the hill, Chaplain Jones of the *Texas* officiating.

“There was time for very little ceremony,” a correspondent writes. “As many marines as could be spared from the work on the trenches, 400 out of the entire 610 perhaps, grouped themselves about the graves and uncovered. . . . The strong voice of the chaplain had just started the first lines of the Episcopal burial service, when from that same old second ridge of hills there came a volley of musketry, which brought every marine to attention in a trice. There was no scene. Most of the men fell into line and marched to the trenches immediately. The others sank down on the grass, where they had their rifles cocked and ready, one eye on the enemy, the other on the open graves. At the sound of the second volley, Chaplain Jones shifted his position slightly, so that the mound of newly turned earth came between him and the enemy, but his voice never faltered for an instant; and although the bullets pattered hot and fast around him, he read the service calmly and reverently to the end.”

Throughout the evening and the night an exhausting attack was maintained; guns from the *Panther* and *Abarenda*, as well as the *Marblehead*, throwing shells into the chaparral wherever a hostile sign flashed out. Men on guard fell asleep, with eyes wide open and gun in hand.

In the first hour of the day (this is now Monday, June 13th) Sergeant-Major Good was killed. Between 1 and 1.30 A.M. the attack increased in violence. A little later a scouting party which was led by Lieutenant Neville, and which included a few Cubans, had a brush with ambushed Spaniards. One of our men was killed and three wounded. At 4 A.M. the Spaniards tried to rush the camp, but were repulsed with shrapnel from the field-pieces. The Spanish losses had been greater than ours; so also had been their reinforcements.

An aggressive policy adopted by the commander of the

The Marines at Guantanamo 151

marines on Tuesday, June 14th, greatly improved the situation. Four scouting parties were sent out from camp in the morning, and were actively engaged with the enemy until ten o'clock at night. The marines and their Cuban allies fought their way through the dense undergrowth, driving the Spaniards before them, wounding or killing a large number, perhaps two hundred, taking eighteen prisoners, destroying a Spanish blockhouse, water-tank, and heliograph station.

It is imperatively necessary, in order that credit may not be withheld where it is due, to call attention at this point to the assistance rendered by the Cubans. The species of guerrilla warfare we are describing was as familiar to the Spaniards as it was strange and exhausting to our men. The difficulties of a campaign in Cuba with all the beating of thickets for a concealed enemy that it involves were thus realised at the very outset. The peril was of the gravest nature. Men less determined, or less bravely led, would have been withdrawn, and the Spaniards would have received all the encouragement that an initial success can give. It is not necessary to believe that the better fighting on Tuesday and the succeeding days was due solely to Cuban co-operation, or to the suggestions that they were able to offer with their knowledge of the difficult country and the peculiar methods of the enemy. But the facts that stand out quite plainly are, first, that they fought cleverly and fiercely beside our men ; second, that the enemy was driven from cover with considerable loss ; third, that the position of our marines became tolerably secure.

A little handful was doing it all. But the long-promised expedition was at last to move, and we must interrupt the story of Camp McCalla in order to realise that at Port Tampa, Florida, on this Monday and this Tuesday,

June 13th and 14th, the first military expedition was starting for Key West and Santiago de Cuba.

Major-General Shafter, who commanded, tells the writer that the Administration had been assured through a despatch from Admiral Sampson that with ten thousand men Santiago could be captured "in forty-eight hours." Accordingly, General Shafter received orders to sail without delay, and was required to take not less than the stipulated ten thousand. Of the troops he had intended to include in his command, one division, composed of volunteers under Brigadier-General Snyder, was left behind; but he was joined by Brigadier-General Bates, who had arrived on transports from Mobile, Alabama, with the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and one squadron of the Second Cavalry, with their horses. These members of the Second Cavalry, by the way, were the only mounted troops in the command.

The expedition included the following organizations:

1. The Fifth Army Corps.
2. The battalion of engineers.
3. The detachment of the Signal Corps.
4. Twelve squadrons of cavalry, all of which were dismounted, because of lack of transportation for the animals, and because it was thought that mounted cavalry could not operate efficiently in the neighbourhood of Santiago.
5. Four batteries of light artillery.
6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, with eight siege guns and eight field mortars.
7. General Bates's brigade.

Additions to the force, in compliance with instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, made the number of officers 815, and the number of the enlisted men 16,072. That was the full capacity of the steamers available at the moment.

From Key West to Santiago the fleet of transports was convoyed by the *Indiana* and thirteen other warships.¹

Returning now to the theatre of war at Santiago and Guantanamo, we find at the former place the *Vesuvius* testing upon the Spanish forts and warships its ability to harm and to terrify, throwing shells loaded with gun-cotton. The force used for the discharge of the guns being compressed air, a sound resembling a cough was emitted when the projectile left the gun, but, of course, there was a tremendous roar when it fell. "The *Vesuvius* threw earthquakes," said the Spaniards.

In Guantanamo Bay on June 15th, the *Texas*, *Suwanee*, and *Marblehead* shelled a fort situated midway between the outer and inner harbours. Similar practice was allowed the gunners of Admiral Sampson's fleet, who made targets of the forts at the entrance of Santiago harbour on the 16th.

Steady improvement in the situation of our marines at Guantanamo continued up to the end of the week. The camp had been strengthened with more trenches; the Spanish attacks had been less vigorous. Camp McCalla, or Fort McCalla, appeared to have an exceptionally healthy location. The support of our vessels was constant

¹ "One reason why our army was lacking in some respects in equipment was that a telegram was received from Admiral Sampson stating that if the army reached there immediately they could take the city at once, but if there was delay the fortifications of the Spaniards would be so perfected that there might be great difficulty in taking it. On receiving this dispatch from Admiral Sampson the War Department directed the army to move at once, and, as all connected with the army will recall, the orders were received after dark, and the army was in motion; had travelled nine miles, and was on the ships at daylight. When the expedition sailed for Cuba it went there escorted by a large fleet of warships."—Major-General JOSEPH WHEELER.

and effective, the *Texas*, *Oregon*, *Marblehead*, *St. Paul*, *Dolphin*, and *Suwanee* shelling the forts and town, and using their guns to prevent the enemy from massing at any point on or near the outer bay, which might therefore be regarded as now practically in our possession.

IV

The fleet of warships and the transports carrying the army of invasion commanded by General Shafter arrived off Santiago de Cuba at noon on Monday, June 20th, ranged in a line that stretched out over eight miles. With the battleship *Indiana* on the extreme right, the entire fleet advanced from the southeast, wheeling into single file to pass the flagship with salutes, and then withdrawing to a distance of about twelve miles from Sampson's squadron, where it was hove-to by advice of the Admiral.

But the headquarters transport *Segurança* remained ; Sampson went aboard ; there was an understanding reached and an arrangement made as to the first step ; then the first step was taken.

The *Segurança* proceeded westward almost immediately to Aserraderos, which lies on the coast about eighteen miles west of the city of Santiago. At Aserraderos General Calixto Garcia, Jesus Rabi, other subordinate officers, and perhaps 4000 Cuban soldiers had arrived in accordance with an agreement entered into with our government, and with the plans for co-operation that had been discussed when Lieutenant Rowan visited the old General at Bayamo, May 1st, as related in the fourth chapter. A conference, in which Sampson, Shafter, Garcia, Rabi, and others participated, was held under the palm-leaf roof of an open hut at Aserraderos in the afternoon, and the two American commanders returned to the fleet in the evening.

At this interview all the possible points of attack had been for the last time considered and discussed ; Shafter had outlined his plan of campaign ; Garcia had offered the services of his troops ; the time and place and manner of the landing had been determined.

It is an unfortunate consequence of rapid narration, when so many important events call for attention and only a few words can be devoted to each, that the persons mentioned cannot be realised as actors to be seen and heard with the aid of a little description on the author's part and much imagination on the reader's. They seem to be names and nothing more. They are names on a program that lacks its performance. Let us at least devote a paragraph or two to the striking Cuban figures at that conference.

Garcia, veteran promoter of revolutions, a native of Holguin, was among the first to take the field in the Ten Years' War. On the 13th of October, 1868, three days after the Yara proclamation, Donato del Marmol and he, with 150 men, by rapid marches from town to town, spread the revolutionary sentiment and endeavoured to organise it in Santa Rita and Baire and Jiguani. This first campaign Garcia made with the rank of brigadier, in the command of Maximo Gomez. He had the title of Major-General at the time when the Plaza Fuerte of his own Holguin fell into his power. He took part in many of those indistinguishable little battles—Baguano, Cupeyal, Zarzal, Santa Maria—it is impossible to remember them all, nor would their names convey a single definite idea to many readers. But one occurrence is worth recalling. On September 3, 1873, all but a score of his followers had been sent to Zarzal in search of provisions, and in their absence he was set upon by a column of Spaniards in San Antonio del Baja. Garcia offered such resistance as he

could with his handful of men, but finally saw the game was up, and as he did not care to be taken alive, discharged his revolver at his forehead. The self-inflicted wound was treated at Manzanillo ; thence he was sent as a prisoner to Spain, and kept in confinement until the peace of Zanjón was concluded, and a telegram had passed from Campos to Cánovas del Castillo. As soon as he was at liberty García went to Paris first (of course, for Paris is the Spaniard's heaven on earth), and then to New York ; then back to Madrid once more, but *pensando siempre en su ideal*, never forgetting his destiny as a liberator—until October, 1895, when he came back to New York to organise an expedition for Cuba.

The other Cuban whose name has just been mentioned as a participant in the conference at Aserraderos, is the central figure in many a camp-fire story. It is said that when José Maceo fell at the Loma del Gato, Jesus Rabi leaned down from his horse as he galloped by, and, lifting the body from the ground with one hand, laid it across his saddle-bow ; and as a further tribute to his physical strength, the story goes that when heifers were brought into camp for slaughter, he would sometimes kill them with a blow with his bare fist on the neck.

Such fables are not very interesting or very serviceable, except as an introduction to better stories. One of his fellow campaigners says that Rabi is a very temperate and humane person. In the warm climates marked abstemiousness in eating and drinking is commonly associated with phenomenal strength, as well as with elevation of character. Rabi had just sat down to his supper one evening at eight o'clock, when a number of deserters from the Spanish army were brought to his tent.

“ Why have you left your friends and come to us ? ”
Rabi asked.

They were ready with a pitiful tale of wrongs endured, of pay in arrears, of lack of good food.

“Eh?” said Rabi; “you are hungry? Hungry now?”

They admitted without reserve that they were.

“Here is food,” said Rabi; and he made them surround the table from which he himself arose without having broken his fast.

One of his aides reminded him that there was no more food in camp, no more food to be obtained.

“Oh, I can eat to-morrow or the day after,” Rabi said; “that’s a small matter. The important thing is, if your enemy is hungry and thirsty, to give him food and drink.”

He may not have had in mind an authoritative statement somewhat similar in form to his own expression. His mind and his motives must always remain somewhat of a riddle, for he is half Indian, a descendant from the aboriginal islanders whom Columbus and Bernal Diaz del Castillo, or some other stout old explorer, may have questioned about gold-mines.

On one occasion, when Rabi was encamped near Bayamo, a deserter from the Spanish garrison of that town presented himself. Now, this deserter had the rank of sergeant. He was a man of prepossessing appearance; he had skill in ingratiating himself. In brief, the insurgents received him cheerfully, and their chief, taking a decided fancy to this prisoner, kept him near his person. The man was an amateur assassin, as it turned out, and his purpose was discovered and thwarted in the same instant of time. For when Rabi was asleep in his tent, with no one near but the sergeant, the latter drew his revolver and attempted to shoot the sleeper, but failed because the weapon had not been properly cleaned. Rabi’s alert

Indian senses warned him in time to prevent a second attempt. He seized the man ; but then, instead of killing him, made him stand before the insurgents drawn up in line (and a Falstaff's ragged regiment they were), while his sergeant's stripes were ripped from the traitor's coat-sleeve. Then he sent him back to the garrison at Bayamo with a letter to the Spanish commander in which he wrote that he had "dishonoured the man for not keeping his revolver in good condition."

When the present war broke out Rabi and another rather famous leader, a gigantic negro called Guillermon, took up arms together in Santiago de Cuba on the 24th of February, 1895.

And the working out of the plans discussed at Aser-raderos ?

Direct cable communication had now been established between the United States and Guantanamo Bay, where our marines and warships were in control of land and water. Two memorable despatches sent from Playa del Este, a station on the coast midway between Santiago and Guantanamo, reached Washington on Wednesday, June 22d. The first, addressed to the Secretary of War, was received in the afternoon, and read :

" OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, June 22d.

" Landing at Daiquiri this afternoon successful. Very little, if any, resistance.

" SHAFTEK."

The second, to the Secretary of the Navy, came in the evening, and was as follows :

" PLAYA DEL ESTE, June 22, 1898—6.50 P.M.

" Landing army progressing favourably at Daiquiri. There was very little resistance. The *New Orleans*, De-

troit, Castine, Wasp, and Suwanee shelled vicinity before landing. Made a demonstration at Cabañas to engage attention of the enemy. The *Texas* engaged west battery for some hours. She had one man killed. Ten submarine mines have been recovered from the channel of Guantánamo.

“SAMPSON.”

Daiquiri is less than sixteen miles in a direct line from the city of Santiago de Cuba. The landing, begun there on the second day after the arrival of the expedition, was not a laborious affair occupying a week, as Continental strategists had foretold. No: the soldiers were a holiday crowd at a summer resort, skylarking on the beach. Search-lights on the warships prolonged the holiday; and presently it seemed all finished—at least, the men were ashore. And so in the despatches we read that it was made with a rapidity that at the time seemed rather marvellous.¹ The fact came out later that it was not a complete landing, for it did not include the large guns which were supposed to be indispensable. An eagerness to press forward with or without siege-guns possessed officers and men alike—as though they had only to “catch the enemy with their hands”; and, by a law of compensation that sometimes prevails in warfare, this spirit which proved so costly proved also resistless.

On the same day the forwarding of reinforcements to Shafter began, General Duffield and four battalions of his brigade leaving Camp Alger for Santiago.

The first serious engagement occurred on June 24th.

¹ The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d, and by the evening of the 24th was practically completed: this in spite of the fact that one of the barges intended for use in disembarking had been lost off the north coast of Cuba. Lighters sent by the Quartermaster's Department had also been lost at sea. Kent's division was disembarked at Siboney, nearer Santiago.

The enemy, driven from the strong position at Daiquiri and withdrawing in the direction of Santiago, attempted on Friday to check our advance at a point near Sevilla that has received the name Las Guásimas (the guásima being a variety of tree that will always have tragic associations for Americans—almost as though one should say, “The Battle of the Upas”).

The First United States Volunteer Cavalry (“Rough Riders”) and the First and Tenth United States Regular Cavalry lost heavily in this engagement, and finally carried the Spanish position by a brilliant charge. Of our dismounted cavalry sixteen were killed, among these Captain A. K. Capron and Sergeant Hamilton Fish, and fifty-two were wounded. General Shafter’s despatches to the War Department include the following sentences: “In pushing out to occupy a good position near Sevilla to wait and entrench until supplies and artillery could be landed, the Fourteenth (should read First) and Tenth Cavalry, and Wood’s regiment had a skirmish. The enemy was driven from his position and General Wheeler reports he now occupies the ground. . . . The Spaniards occupied a very strong and entrenched position on a high hill. The firing lasted about an hour, and the enemy was driven from his position, which is now occupied by our troops about a mile and a half from Sevilla. The enemy has retired toward Santiago de Cuba.” In a most difficult situation our dismounted cavalry gave proof of superb fighting quality. Estimates of the strength of the Spanish forces that barred the way vary considerably, but there were certainly 2000, and possibly 4000. The American troops numbered somewhat less than 1000. The obvious difficulty of the undertaking lent credibility to the report which was current for days after the engagement that our men had walked into an ambush, and that

the officers were culpably negligent in not having investigated the line of advance. The Spaniards were in ambush, that is true ; but when news of their intention and position was brought by scouts, General Wheeler ordered the attack, and, Young's brigade advancing upon them by one path, the dismounted " Rough Riders " under Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt took another route to the same point—a mere narrow trail that led upwards between and over hillsides covered with brush and guásimas. This brush, this jungle, this chaparral—whatever word seems densest—hid the enemy. From three sides at once a heavy fire at short range was opened upon our men. Fierce and yet accurate firing by the " Rough Riders " (this extraordinary regiment of cowboys, college athletes, New York policemen, artists, actors, Indians, " clubmen," dead shots in the main, directed by a colonel who at that particular moment could suggest, " Don't swear, shoot ! " and again, " Don't swear, or you 'll catch no fish ! ") proved to be at least sufficient to hold their terribly exposed position until a junction of Wood's and Young's columns could be effected ; and then a dash carried the thickets and the hill and a ruined building, formerly an *aguardiente* distillery, from which the Spaniards were driven pell-mell.

And so General Shafter, from his headquarters on the *Segurança*, was able to say in his despatch that " General Wheeler "—who commanded on shore—" reports he now occupies the ground."

After the engagement the dismounted cavalry, volunteers and regulars, rested and buried their dead at the crest of the hill so gallantly won. Sevilla, abandoned by the enemy, was occupied by General Chaffee's command, and our outposts were still further advanced. General Wheeler wrote to General Shafter : " I have just seen

two negro boys who left Santiago this morning (Saturday). They report that the soldiers and citizens are very short of food. The soldiers and officers have seized all the food in the shops. They are killing horses for food, and in the hospitals are subsisting on bread made of rice flour. Three Spanish generals took part in the fight at Sevilla [Las Guásimas] yesterday. Five wagon-loads of wounded were carried into Santiago, and many other wounded got there on horses or afoot. We can see Morro Castle and the flag very distinctly from our position. The Cubans confirm the reports as to the fine character of the fortifications around the city. Seven lines of barbed wire are stretched around the trenches. The Spaniards have recently dug deep trenches around the entire city, connecting a series of small forts."

The town could be plainly seen less than seven miles away from the point Young had reached. Wheeler's brigade halted in the neighbourhood of San Juan, within two miles of Santiago, on June 26th. Already about 3000 Cubans, led by Garcia, had been brought in our transports from Aserraderos, and thus transferred to the scene of operations east of the city. As in the case of the insurgent allies already on the ground, these were found to be by turns a serviceable or an embarrassing element in our forces. There were not by any means three thousand Jesus Rabis.

Outlaws and bandits—have we not had such characters in the disturbed periods of English history?—yes, and have we not made heroes of them after a century or two had turned the crude colours of their flaunting vices into mellow tints?

Within the trochas that surround Santiago on three sides, the Spanish soldiers under General Linares expected our attack. Our Cuban allies, not always bent on dis-

playing virtues at critical moments, played their parts, some among the woods west of Santiago, to intercept reinforcements for the beleaguered town ; some blocking the way between Santiago and Caimanera (Guantanamo Bay) on the east ; but gathering all too quickly at any point where supplies of food and clothing were to be found, and to be appropriated with or without permission. In the harbour lay Cervera's fleet ; just beyond its entrance, Sampson's warships were guarding against a possible evasion—now that the sunken *Merrimac* was admitted to be not a complete obstruction in the channel. On land there was no marked disparity in the opposing forces, and it was thought that reinforcements for either, or both, might arrive before the blow was struck. The *Yale*, with a force of volunteers, was due to reach the coast and land her men on Monday, while a column of Spaniards from Manzanillo, perhaps 5000 or more, were attempting the rescue of Linares. It seemed that there would be delay on our side while the paths from the coast were being widened into roads over which cannon could be hauled up to points commanding a city that wore an ugly flounce of trenches and barbed wire upon its outskirts. Only a few Gatling, Hotchkiss, and field guns had reached the front. As an offset to the *Vesuvius*, " earthquake thrower," night after night coughing at the defences near the harbour's mouth, the sensational report went abroad that every road and path leading to Santiago had been mined with dynamite.

V

The Red Cross Society shares with the Czar of Russia the honours of heroic peace sentiments in this summer which was mainly given over to warfare and to political readjustments occasioned by the war. The Red Cross

vessel *State of Texas* reached Guantanamo Bay on June 26th, and there Red Cross tents were erected. News that a battle had been fought, and that there were sick and wounded troops at Siboney, came to the Red Cross officers almost immediately. Miss Barton directed that the *State of Texas* should proceed at once to Siboney, which was reached on the evening of June 27th. Unselfish, sometimes heroic, efforts to relieve distress and to care for the suffering during the weeks which followed would make a story of extraordinary interest and of the highest importance in the history of civilisation. A combination of good judgment with generosity in providing means for the alleviation of the distress incident to war—hospitalship, provisions, medicines, surgeons, nurses—with skill and devoted self-sacrifice on the part of the officers and agents of this society whose duties took them to the front, lift the achievements of the Red Cross into the first rank of those great influences making for peace and good-will among men.¹

When the *State of Texas* reached Camp McCalla our marines, in undisputed control of the outer bay, were asking permission to attack the garrison at Caimanera on the western shore of the landlocked portion of the harbour.

The situation at Santiago was marked by steady advance on our side ; on the Spanish side by the withdrawal to positions of great strength commanding the approaches to the city. General Shafter, who had established his headquarters in the field, was taking his measures with a view to the approach of reinforcements for General Linares, numbering as it was thought at the time 8000 men, with

¹ A detailed account of the Red Cross work in Cuba will be found in the report of Dr. A. Monae Lesser, executive surgeon of the American National Red Cross, made public August 21st.

pack trains and droves of animals for the relief of Santiago. The Spanish force which actually slipped into the city through Garcia's lines was much smaller, as we shall see.

As though to preserve the balance of the hostile forces, important reinforcements for Shafter were reported to be leaving Tampa at the same time. Loss of the lighters which were intended to serve in unloading the transports was a great misfortune. Provisions and the larger cannon¹ could be landed only with the greatest difficulty, and after a delay that might well have proved fatal. Add to this the impassable state of the roads leading to Santiago from the coast, and the peril confronting our lines extended about the city may be understood, and may be stated in a single sentence. As it seemed impossible to take abundant supplies to the front, it was evident that the attack would have to be made either without the siege-guns, or, after a fatal interval, when the deadly influences of the climate and exposure without suitable food and medicine had sapped the vital forces of our troops.

By the 30th of June our lines, thin but sinewy, had extended northward to the neighbourhood of Caney, a town four miles north-east of Santiago.

Our men were still eager to "catch the enemy with their hands." And that is what happened. The outlying defences were captured—the very spirit of resistance was broken—as though by sheer strength: not as the result of any commander's deliberate plan, but by the reckless daring of the troops.

On the heights that overlook Santiago are Caney and San Juan, the former north-east, the latter south-east of the city. The retention of both places was regarded as

¹ Some, at least, of the siege-guns were ultimately returned to America in the transport that had taken them to Santiago, without having been breeched.

indispensable to the Spanish defence ; the capture of both seemed the next step in our plan of attack. So strongly were they held by entrenched forces that both were pronounced impregnable to any ordinary assault. Both were carried by assault on July 1st, as the final outcome of long and fierce contests.

“ We could n't get at the fellows we were fighting against,” that was the burden of the story of one of our soldiers who took a small part in the attempt to track invisible death to its lair. “ We were going forward under a scattering fire from the front,” he said, “ and all at once off at the right a rapid-firing gun opened on us. There was no smoke, so we could n't locate the battery exactly, but we could see the bullets playing over the long grass like spray from a hose. They did n't have the range at first and the shower of bullets went swinging back and forth, clipping off the tops of the grass and coming nearer to us with every sweep. You can't imagine the sensations it gave us to watch that death-spray driven by some invisible, relentless force, creeping on and on, reaching out and feeling for us. There was something unnatural about it, and we watched as though we were fascinated by it. I did n't feel as if men had anything to do with it. It was an impersonal, deadly enemy that I could n't fight, and could n't escape. There was n't a living enemy within sight. At last, with one big sweep the shower reached us. Men all around me dropped, and then I felt a sting in my side, and down I went. Somebody ripped out an oath, and I was glad to hear it—it sounded so magnificently human. I believe we were all thankful when that gun found us. It relieved the tension.”

Shells from the enemy found our positions easily enough, of course, for we were holding the points that they had

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just abandoned. The range had been perfectly ascertained. Our most effective artillery was simply human. Our men were fired, or threw themselves, as ammunition, against entrenchments and positions that should have been made untenable by those heavy guns which were still lying in the holds of ships, or on the Cuban shore ten miles away.

As in our account of the battle of Manila on May 1st, so here, where much information which the future historian will regard as indispensable is still lacking, it seems best to give first a condensation of those stories of the fighting which were transmitted at the time, and which made the first impression on the public mind, following this with those official reports which appear to have permanent value and interest.

At six o'clock in the morning of July 1st a light battery of four guns opened fire on Caney from a bluff about one and a half miles distant. The shells, striking fairly, were yet not heavy enough or frequent enough to demolish the fortifications promptly, and drive out the plucky little garrison. At eight o'clock General Lawton's infantry took the problem in hand, working their way up the hillside, the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry (General Chaffee's brigade) leading in the attack; and so, eleven hours after firing had begun, they won the trenches, which looked like slaughter-pens, the fort, and the blockhouses. A number of Spaniards were made prisoners¹; others escaped to Santiago.

¹ Twenty-seven officers and privates were sent to their lines, under escort, a few days later. They were required merely to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. Shafter says: "I thought the result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war."

And meanwhile San Juan, much more strongly held, with an adequate force and with artillery, and more essential to the defence of the city, was meeting the same fate. Here there was also an opposing American battery (Grimes's battery); here also the bitter work was done by men on foot, climbing bare hillsides, and in despite of artillery that had not been silenced. That splendid trio, the "Rough Riders" and the First and Tenth Regulars, showed once more the courage and strength and skill it was no longer necessary to prove after their charge at Las Guásimas.

At San Juan, as at Caney, it was a question of capturing trenches and detached buildings, one after another; in fact, there were five little hills, and each of these crests had to be taken in order to make a secure position on any one of them. The advance was made up a steep clearing, and the enemy, firing only too accurately, did not yield until fairly lifted up and driven out of the trenches by a final rush. A special kind of courage was shown by the Seventy-First New York Volunteers, who had to overcome the most terrible thing, which is Fear itself, on their way to courageous achievement.¹ A junction with Lawton's division was hourly expected, for it was thought that Caney would be quickly abandoned by the enemy, and that Lawton, after gaining that point, would wheel to his left and form up on the right of the

¹Shafter had only three regiments of volunteers—the 2d Massachusetts, 71st New York, and Rough Riders. The battle of Santiago was the only one in the history of the United States really fought by the regulars. Volunteers had outnumbered the regulars ten to one in every important engagement of American soldiers before that time. So, naturally, the public commended the volunteers and at first almost ignored the regulars who won at San Juan and Caney. It was tradition; it was the national habit.

main line. This connection was not made, however, until the arrival of Chaffee's Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry from Caney on July 2d ; and the brigade under General Bates was first to arrive, as will presently be read in Wheeler's report. The fighting hours were long, and the same regiments were used against several "impregnable" positions.

For some of our men there were two and for others there were three charges that day, up hill and against an enemy fighting with a last-trench desperation.

On the same day, at Aguadores, on the coast just east of the Morro, fortifications were shelled by the *New York*, *Suwanee*, and *Gloucester*.

As for the quality of the enemy's work, here is the testimony of an eye-witness who kept close watch upon them from our lines : "The trench fighting of the Spaniards," says Mr. Joseph Edgar Chamberlin,¹ "was in very fact the heart and centre of that day's work, and the heroism of our men appears none the less in the light of the heroism of their antagonists. . . . I shall never cease to see, when the word Caney is spoken, a line of some fifty or sixty light-blue-clad men standing in a trench, the line bent in the middle at right angles by the square turning of the ditch ; at the bending of this line some blue-jacketed young officer standing, always exposed to the belt, and sometimes, as he stood up on the level ground, exposed to the feet ; the men rising at the word of this officer's command for hours and hours delivering volley after volley full in our faces ; standing, as they did so, exposed to the waist confronting 3000 men, grimly and coolly facing death, drawing their dead up out of the trench as they fell to make standing-room for living men, holding thus their trench immovably from morning until evening

¹ In *Scribner's Magazine*, September, 1898.

—this is what Caney will always mean to me first of all, by virtue of an impression as vivid as the light of day and as ineffaceable as the image of death.”

Determined efforts were made to retake San Juan on the next day, and the enemy suffered great loss in the repulse. The two leading Spanish commanders were out of the fight by this time, General Linares having been disabled by a wound, and General Vara del Rey, who commanded the forces at Caney, having been killed. The command thus devolved upon José Toral, next in succession.

Four batteries, advanced to more favourable positions, threw shells into Santiago, and aided the movement of troops under General Lawton to extend our lines north of the city, where Garcia and his Cubans were charged with the duty of intercepting the Spanish reinforcements.¹

It is now our privilege to refer to some of the official documents.

Inspector-General Breckinridge, in his report to the Secretary of War, says :

“ It was seldom, indeed, that the supplies were brought up to the fighting lines in any great excess of the immediate needs, and the entire absence of the usual comforts and conveniences of even the simplest army life during the whole of the expedition, and sometimes of medical essentials, even in the hour of utmost need, was one of its most marked features after landing. Even the shelter-tents and flies were abandoned and all bivouacked without the wall of the common tent. The energy with which every element was driven from first to last will be sufficiently understood when such men as General Shafter and Colonels Humphrey and Watson had the task in hand. The means of expediting the landing

¹ They entered the city during the night between the 2d and 3d of July, in spite of Garcia's efforts. See Appendix, “ Garcia's View of the Santiago Campaign.”

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of stores seemed inadequate, even to the last, and it is understood that lighter after lighter ordered to the Cuban coast was sunk at sea, and the lack of quick communication between the vessels or of any launches was apparently irremediable. The extent to which the transports suffered in their ground-tackle, capstans, small-boats, and other paraphernalia, and the dread their masters had of even a greater loss on such a surf-beaten, rock-bound shore, was constantly shown, and the navy appeared to leave the army at last much to its own devices.

“Nothing like the usual proportion of artillery,” continues the report, “was present on the field to aid the other arms as accessories before the fact, and the comments on and results of this question came best from line officers of other arms. The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more exploited than the gross ignorance of our recruits. The books say that it ought not to be possible to successfully assault the enemy in front unshaken, still more with his fortified infantry under modern conditions. But in this instance dismounted cavalry, as well as its *confrère* of the infantry army, did, without bayonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground and well entrenched, valiant, and unshaken, and the difficulty of the task is indicated by the list of casualties, as compared with the actual numbers that the immediately opposing trenches could hold. And when the fight was over, though successful everywhere, we had no reserves, Bates's independent brigade having been in the assault at Caney, and then by a night march reinforcing [Kent] at San Juan under most urgent calls. It was supposed that the gap between our road and the bay was closed by Garcia's forces, and the demand for the surrender of the Spaniards was made prior to any knowledge of the intention of Cervera to escape with his fleet or of the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements.

“Such a conjunction of evidence may indicate the rapidity of the changes in the situation. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest expectation, and accomplished results beyond what is usually expected of a force so constituted.”

The Inspector-General's report gives this description of the battle of Caney :

“ At early dawn on July 1st the troops of Lawton's division started in to the position previously designated to them to occupy. The one battery of artillery assigned to this division for the day occupied a position overlooking the village of Caney, 2400 yards distant. General Chaffee's brigade took up a position east of the village, ready to carry the town as soon as it should have been bombarded by the artillery. General Ludlow's brigade took up a position to the west of the village, in order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards when they should be driven out and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But with soldierly instinct and admirable effect he closed in upon the defences of the village, and his white sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the hours he hugged the blockhouses on his flank of the well-defended village. Colonel Miles's brigade was held in reserve south of the village.

“ The artillery opened fire about 7 A.M. The battery was entirely beyond the reach of small-arms' fire, and the enemy had no artillery. The battery opened with shrapnel at what appeared to be a column of cavalry moving along the road from Caney toward Santiago ; then fired a few shots at the blockhouses, then a few at hedges where the enemy's infantry seemed to be located, and then fired a few shots into the village. At about eleven o'clock the battery stopped fire. During all this time a continuous fire of musketry, partly firing at will and partly by volleys, was kept up in all parts of the lines. Our lines were drawing closer towards the enemy's works, and the brigade in reserve was brought up on the line. General Bates's independent brigade reached the position in the afternoon and also went into line, all closing in toward the village.

“ Between one and two o'clock the division commander directed the battery of artillery to concentrate its fire upon the stone fort or blockhouse situated upon the highest point in the village on the northern side, as it was the key-point to the village. The practice of the artillery

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against this was very effective, knocking great holes in the fort and rendering it untenable. The infantry of Chaffee's, Bates's, and Miles's brigades then made an assault upon the works and carried it. There were a number of small blockhouses on the other side of the village from which a strong fire was kept up for some time after the stone fort had fallen. Word was sent to the commander of the artillery to bring his battery down so as to take these blockhouses, but by the time the battery had arrived the fire ceased. But there was one blockhouse still occupied by the Spaniards, and at this the battery fired four shots, resulting in the loss of a number of Spaniards. Orders having reached the division commander in the meantime to withdraw his forces as soon as possible and to come into touch with the division at his left, our troops were not moved into the village, but were ordered to bivouac near the main road leading to the city of Santiago."

The battle of San Juan is described as follows :

"The dawn of July 1st found the troops of Wheeler's division bivouacked on the eminence of El Pozo. Kent's division bivouacked near the road back of El Pozo. Grimes's battery went into position about 250 yards west of the ruined buildings of El Pozo soon after sunrise and prepared gun-pits. Grimes's battery opened fire against San Juan a little before 8 A.M. The troops of the cavalry division were scattered about on El Pozo Hill in the rear and around the battery, apparently without order and with no view to their protection from the enemy's fire. This condition rectified itself when the enemy, after five or six shots by our battery, replied with shrapnel fire at correct range and with accurately adjusted fuses, killing two men at the first shot. After some firing soon after 9 A.M. Wheeler's division was put in march toward Santiago. Crossing Aguadores stream, it turned to the right, under General Sumner, who was in command at that time owing to General Wheeler's illness. Scattering shots were fired by the enemy before the arrival of the first troops at the crossing, but his volley-firing did not commence until the

dismounted cavalry went into position, crossing open ground. Kent's division followed Wheeler's, moving across the stream, and advanced along the road in close order under a severe enfilading fire. After advancing some distance, it turned off to the left. Lieutenant Ord (killed in battle) made a reconnoissance from a large tree on the banks of the stream.

"At about one o'clock, after a delay of nearly two hours waiting for the troops to reach their positions, the whole force advanced, charged, and carried the enemy's first line of entrenchments. They were afterward formed on the crest and there threw up entrenchments facing the enemy's second line at a distance of from 500 to 1000 yards. In the charge the Second Brigade of Kent's division advanced upon the First, some of the regiment getting into the first line and reaching the crossing at about the same time as the regiment of the leading brigade. At about one o'clock General Wheeler arrived at the crossing, and, after a brief stay, proceeded on the road toward San Juan with his staff, obtaining a good view of the troops as they were ascending San Juan Hill in the final stage of the battle, and soon thereafter reached the command."

In one paragraph of the report reference is made to the Cuban soldiers as follows :

"In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were used largely as outposts on our front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among the officers of this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered. They seem to have very little organisation or discipline, and they do not, of course, fight in the battle line with our troops. Yet in every skirmish or fight where they were present they seemed to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance in our first landing and in scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe, however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the

constant supervision and direction of one of our own officers, as our movements and views are so different and a misunderstanding or failure so easy."

The critical moment in the campaign, when the uncharacteristic suggestion was made that our army should retreat, is thus referred to by the Inspector-General: "Doubtless, through telegrams and otherwise, there have been sufficient indications of the intense strain in the whole military situation on the field of operations which led to the consultation at the El Pozo house the night of July 2d, and some of the general officers favoured a retrograde movement during the day or two prior to our entrenchments taking shape and the armistice being agreed upon."

A description of the charge up San Juan Hill, of the panic in the Seventy-first, and much interesting detail, will be found in General Kent's report, a part of which follows:

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
"IN THE FIELD, FORT SAN JUAN,
"NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 7, 1898.

"*The Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.*

"SIR: I have the honour to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the battle of July 1st.

"On the afternoon of June 30th, pursuant to orders given me verbally by the corps commander at his headquarters I moved my Second and Third Brigades (Pearson and Wikoff) forward about two miles to a point on the Santiago road near corps headquarters. Here the troops bivouacked, the First Brigade (Hawkins) remaining in its camp of the two preceding days, slightly in rear of corps headquarters.

“ On the following morning (July 1st) at seven o'clock, I rode forward to the hill where Captain Grimes's battery was in position. I here met Lieutenant-Colonel McClermand, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Corps, who pointed out to me a green hill in the distance, which was to be my objective on my left, and either he or Lieutenant Miley of Major-General Shafter's staff gave me directions to keep my right on the main road leading to the city of Santiago. I had previously given the necessary orders for Hawkins's brigade to move early, to be followed in turn by Wikoff and Pearson. Shortly after Grimes's battery opened fire I rode down to the stream and there found General Hawkins at the head of his brigade, at a point about 250 yards from the El Pozo sugar house. Here I gave him his orders.

“ The enemy's artillery was now replying to Grimes's battery. I rode forward with Hawkins about 150 yards, closely followed by the Sixth Infantry, which was leading the First Brigade. At this point I received instructions to allow the cavalry the right of way, but for some unknown reason they moved up very slowly, thus causing a delay in my advance of fully forty minutes. Lieutenant Miley of General Shafter's staff was at this point and understood how the division was delayed, and repeated several times that he understood I was making all the progress possible. General Hawkins went forward, and word came back in a few minutes that it would be possible to observe the enemy's position from the front. I immediately rode forward with my staff. The fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was being distinctly felt at this time. I crossed the main ford of the San Juan River, joined General Hawkins, and, with him, observed the enemy's position from a point some distance in advance of the ford. General Hawkins deemed it possible to turn the enemy's right at Fort San Juan, but later, under the heavy fire, this was found impracticable for the First Brigade, but was accomplished by the Third Brigade coming up later on General Hawkins's left. Having completed the observation with my staff, I proceeded to join the head of my division, just coming under heavy fire. Approaching the First Brigade, I directed them to

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move alongside the cavalry, which was halted. We were already suffering losses caused by the balloon near by attracting fire and disclosing our position.¹

“The enemy’s infantry fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets on our flanks, but also from sharpshooters posted in trees in our rear, and from shrapnel apparently aimed at the balloon. Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of, General Shafter’s staff, met me about this time and informed me that a trail or narrow way had been discovered from the balloon a short distance back leading to the left to a ford lower down the stream. I hastened to the forks made by this road, and soon after the Seventy-first New York regiment and Hawkins’s brigade came up. I turned them into the by-path indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men, and urged them to again go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, and the Second and Third battalions came forward in better order and moved along the road toward the ford.

“One of my staff-officers ran back, waving his hat to hurry forward the Third Brigade, who, upon approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first New York. There were other men of this regiment crouching in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received orders some

¹The war balloon, intended for service in making observations of the enemy’s position, its cable being used as a telegraph and telephone conductor. It was more seen than seeing; served rather to guide the enemy’s fire, and was abandoned.

time before to keep in rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket-rolls, and due to the natural delay in fording a stream. These delays, under such a hot fire, grew exceedingly irksome, and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could toward the river in column of files or twos, paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road, the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff-officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of Wikoff's brigade reached the forks at 12.20 P.M., and hurried to the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first.¹ This heroic brigade (consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth United States Infantry) speedily crossed the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford.

"Meanwhile, I had again sent a staff-officer to hurry forward the Second Brigade, which was bringing up the rear. The Tenth and Second Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were deflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade, while the Twenty-first was directed along the main road to support Hawkins.

"Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the Tenth and Second moved forward in column and good order toward the green knoll already referred to as my objective on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed, passed over the knoll, and ascended the high ridge beyond, driving back the enemy in the direction of his trenches. I observed this movement from the Fort San Juan Hill. Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry, commanding the Second Brigade, and the officers and troops

¹ See also Captain Henry Marcotte's account, *Army and Navy Journal*, September 17, 1898. In conversation with the present writer, General Shafter warmly defended the Seventy-First, saying that their inefficiency *as an organisation* was due to lack of experience, and that *as individuals* they showed the true spirit, many going forward with other commands.

under his command deserve great credit for the soldierly manner in which this movement was executed. . . .

“Prior to this advance of the Second Brigade the Third, connecting with Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult hill, and assisting in capturing the enemy's strong position, Fort San Juan, at 1.30 P.M. This crest was about 125 feet above the general level, and was defended by deep trenches and a loopholed brick fort surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. General Hawkins, some time after I reached the crest, reported that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect, and credit is almost equally due to the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth regiments of infantry. Owing to General Hawkins's representations I forwarded the report sent to corps headquarters about 3 P.M. that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry regiments had captured the hill. The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colours waving over the fort, but unfortunately destroyed them, distributing the fragments among the men, because, as was asserted, 'it was a bad omen,' two or three men having been shot while assisting Private Arthur Agnew, Company H, Thirteenth Infantry, the captor. All fragments which could be recovered are submitted with this report. The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command, whether company, battalion, regimental or brigade commanders, who so admirably directed the formation of their troops, unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest.

“I have already mentioned the circumstances of my Third Brigade's advance across the ford, where, in the brief space of ten minutes it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds. Yet, in spite of these confusing conditions, the formations were effected without hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some instances and by battalion and regiment in others, rushing through the jungle, across the stream waist-deep, and

over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed-wire entanglements. . . .

“The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle-pits, I directed my line to hold their positions and entrench. At ten minutes past 3 P.M. I received almost simultaneously two requests—one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cavalry brigade, and one from General Sumner, asking for assistance for the cavalry on my right, ‘as they were hard pressed.’ I immediately sent to their aid the Thirteenth Infantry, who promptly went on this further mission, despite the heavy losses they had already sustained. . . .

“J. FORD KENT,
“Brigadier-General U. S. V., Commanding.”

In General Wheeler’s report, the most interesting portion is one of the despatches, accompanying and made a part of it, which relates to the proposal to withdraw our line, though it is rather hard to say what part of it could be left out without the sacrifice of value :

“BEFORE SANTIAGO, CUBA, July 7, 1898.

“*To Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps :*

“SIR : After the engagements of June 24th I pushed forward my command through the valley, Lawton’s and Kent’s commands occupying the hills in the vicinity of that place. After two days’ rest Lawton was ordered forward, and on the night of the 30th instructions were given by Major-General Shafter to this officer to attack Caney, while the cavalry division and Kent’s division were ordered to move forward on the regular Santiago roads. The movement commenced on the morning of July 1st. The cavalry division advanced and formed its line with its left near the Santiago road, while Kent’s division formed its line with the right joining the left of the cavalry division.

“Colonel McClernand of General Shafter’s staff directed me to give instructions to General Kent, which I complied with in person, at the same time personally directing General Sumner to move forward. The men were all

compelled to wade the San Juan River to get into line. This was done under very heavy fire of both infantry and artillery. Our balloon, having been sent up right by the main road, was made a mark of by the enemy. It was evident that we were as much under fire in forming the line as we would be by an advance, and I therefore pressed the command forward from the covering under which it was formed. It merged into open space in full view of the enemy, who occupied breastworks and batteries on the crest of the hill which overlooks Santiago, officers and men falling at every step.

"The troops advanced gallantly, soon reached the foot of the hill, and ascended, driving the enemy from their works and occupying them on the crest of the hill. To accomplish this required courage and determination on the part of the officers and men of a high order and the losses were very severe. Too much credit cannot be given to General Sumner and General Kent, and their gallant brigade commanders, Colonel Wood and Colonel Carroll of the cavalry; General Hamilton S. Hawkins, commanding First Brigade, Kent's division, and Colonel Pearson, commanding Second Brigade. Colonel Carroll and Major Wessels were both wounded during the charge, but Major Wessels was enabled to return and resume command. Colonel Wikoff, commanding Kent's Third Brigade, was killed at 12.10; Lieutenant-Colonel Worth took command, and was wounded at 12.15; Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum then took command and was wounded at 12.20, and the command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

"Upon reaching the crest, I ordered breastworks to be constructed, and sent to the rear for shovels, picks, spades, and axes. The enemy's retreat from the ridge was precipitate, but our men were so thoroughly exhausted that it was impossible for them to follow. Their shoes were soaked with water by wading the San Juan River, they had become drenched with rain, and when they reached the crest they were absolutely unable to proceed farther. Notwithstanding this condition, these exhausted men laboured during the night to erect breastworks, furnish details to bury the dead, and carry the wounded back in

improvised litters. I sent word along the line that reinforcements would soon reach us, and that Lawton would join our right, and that General Bates would come up and strengthen our left.

"After reaching the crest of the ridge, General Kent sent the Thirteenth Regulars to assist in strengthening our right. At midnight General Bates reported, and I placed him in a strong position on the left of our line. General Lawton had attempted to join us from Caney, but when very near our lines he was fired upon by the Spaniards and turned back, but joined us next day at noon by a circuitous route.

"During the entire engagement my staff performed their duties with courage, judgment, and ability. Special credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst, Major William D. Beach, Captain Joseph G. Dickman, and Lieutenant M. F. Steele. I desire also to say that Lieutenants James H. Reeves and Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Captain William Astor Chanler, Major B. A. Garlington, Mr. Aurelius Mestre, and Corporal John Lundmark also deserve high commendation for courage and good conduct. Major West, my Quartermaster, deserves special commendation for his energy and good conduct during the campaign, and Major Valery Havard and Mr. Leonard Wilson have also done their full duty. Captain Hardie and First Lieutenant F. J. Koester, with Troop G, Third Cavalry, were detailed with headquarters and conducted themselves handsomely under fire. The superb courage displayed by the officers and men will be especially mentioned in the reports of subordinate commanders. . . .

"General Kent's force on July 1st was about 4000.

"JOSEPH WHEELER,

"Major-General, Volunteers."

Accompanying the report is a copy of the despatches which were sent to General Shafter by General Wheeler, beginning June 25th and ending July 2d. On July 1st, at 8.20 P.M., General Wheeler, writing from San Juan, has the following to say about withdrawing from the position that had been won :

“ I examined the line in front of Wood’s brigade, and gave the men shovels and picks, and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to General Kent to come and get entrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in person, and told him the same thing. They all promise to do their best, but say the earth is very difficult, as a great part of it is rocky.

“ A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn, and take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively discountenanced this, as it would cost us much prestige. The lines are very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear wounded and so many are exhausted, but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and with our line entrenched and Lawton on our right, we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a severe day.

“ If we can get through to-morrow all right, we can make our breastworks very strong the next night. You can hardly realise the exhausted condition of the troops. The Third and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up marching, and halted on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches to-night.

“ I was on the extreme front line. The men were lying down, and reported the Spaniards not more than 300 yards in their front.”

The Commanding General’s report was not ready for publication in full at the time when this book was sent to press, but at the writer’s request General Shafter has kindly supplied material for the following brief statement :

“ During the interview at Aserraderos on June 20th, General Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising about 4000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos and about 500, under General Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it upon him that I could exercise no military control over him except such as he would con-

cede, and as long as he served under me I would furnish him rations and ammunition.

“ Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrain surrounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from former residents of the city, several of whom were on the transports with me. At the Aserraderos interview all the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully weighed, and then, for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, I outlined the plan of campaign, which was as follows :

“ With the assistance of the small boats of the navy, the disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the 22d at Daiquiri. On the 21st, 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1000 men. This force, under General Castillo, was to attack the Spanish force at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. This movement was successfully made. To mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General Garcia to send a small force (about 500 men), under General Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabañas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbour, and where it was reported the enemy had several hundred men entrenched, and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago.

“ I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his warships, with a number of my transports, opposite this town, for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition, I asked the Admiral to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabañas, and also at the forts around the Morro, and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney, and Daiquiri. The troops under General Garcia

remaining at Aserraderos were to be transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney on the 24th. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney.

“ These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment.

“ On the 23d General Lawton's advance reached Siboney and the disembarkation of Kent's division on that date enabled me to establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago and to proceed with disembarkation at both points.

“ The preparations for our attack on the outposts of Santiago were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly climate ; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow waggon road, which the rains might at any time render impassable ; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies, and, lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8000 reinforcements for the enemy, was *en route* from Manzanillo, and might be expected in a few days. Under these conditions I determined to give battle without delay.”

The description of the encounters at the several points in our line is omitted, lest we should fatigue the reader's attention by so much repetition ; and we shall pass on immediately to the General's observations on certain matters that are of especial interest, touching the conduct of his soldiers and the obstacles which he and they encountered :

“ Great credit is due to Brigadier-General H. S. Haw-

kins, who, placing himself between his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle-call to the attack so brilliantly executed. In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the General indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our colours on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and blockhouses, thus gaining a position which sealed the fall of Santiago. In this action on this part of the field most efficient service was rendered by Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, and the Gatling-gun detachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the position gained at the cost of so much blood and toil.

“ I am greatly indebted to General Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from the sick-list to duty during the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of the battle-field, and the information furnished to me at various stages of the battle proved to be most useful. My own health was impaired by over-exertion in the sun and the intense heat of the day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle as I desired, but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of the battle-field extending from Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan Hill. My staff-officers were stationed at various points on the field, rendering frequent reports, and through them, by the means of orderlies and the telephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders.

“ During the afternoon I visited the position of Grimes's battery on the heights of El Pozo, and saw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of San Juan Hill, which I directed

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should be entrenched during the night. My engineer officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and during the night trenches of very considerable strength were constructed.

“ It is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 men on the firing line when Caney and San Juan were captured.

“ A few Cubans assisted in the attack at Caney and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength of our forces. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own; they fought obstinately in strong and entrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men, and the benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the company in recent years in rifle-practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later.

“ In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavoured to shell our troops on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the inequalities of the ground, and the shells did little, if any, harm. Their naval forces also assisted in the trenches, having 1000 on shore, and I am informed they sustained considerable loss; among others Admiral Cervera's chief of staff was killed.

“ I wish to dwell upon the natural obstacles I had to encounter and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast offered no sheltered landing places; the roads were mere bridle-paths; the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly; and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the army. At Daiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was made at a small

wooden wharf which the Spaniards tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At Siboney the landing was made on the beach and at a small wharf erected by the engineers. I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanent wharves. In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1000 men continuously at work on the roads, they were at times impassable for waggons.

“ The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent the passage of waggons, and then the eight pack-trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualling of my army, as well as the 20,000 refugees,¹ who could not, in the interests of humanity, be left to starve while we had rations. Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack-trains.

“ After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1st and 2d, the malarial and other fevers began to rapidly advance throughout the command, and on July 4th the yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though efforts were made to keep this fact from the army it soon became known.

“ The supply of quartermaster and commissary stores during the campaign was abundant, and, notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and transporting the ration, the troops on the firing lines were at all times supplied with its coarser components, namely, of bread, meat, sugar, and coffee.

“ There was no lack of transportation, for at no time up to the surrender could all the waggons I had be used.

“ In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say that they received every attention that it was possible to give them. The medical officers without exception worked

¹ See Section IX. of this chapter.

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night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would have been better if we had had more ambulances, but as many were taken as was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns. The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish to invite attention to the fact that no officer was brought to trial by court-martial and, as far as I know, no enlisted men. This speaks volumes for an army of this size and in a campaign of such duration."

VI

General Shafter felt justified in demanding the surrender of the city and its garrison on July 3d. General Toral rejected the demand, but in consideration of the request of the consuls and civic officers in Santiago, the threat of bombardment was not carried into effect immediately. An armistice was accorded, and from time to time extended, in order, first, that there might be an opportunity for non-combatants to leave the city, and subsequently that the Spanish commander might communicate with Captain-General Blanco at Havana, and the authorities at Madrid, in regard to the terms of surrender. The situation on this 3d of July (first Sunday of the month and destined to be as memorable in its way as the first Sunday in May) is stated in a despatch from General Shafter to Secretary Alger. "My lines completely surround the town," Shafter says, "from the bay on the north of the city to a point on the San Juan River." Another despatch that includes interesting correspondence and the letters relating to the proposal for surrender, to which we have just referred, may be inserted here without comment. Shafter's threat of bombardment, Toral's response, and the letter showing the effect produced by

other considerations, not all of which can yet be strictly analysed, are submitted to the reader as a subject for unhampered speculation :

*“ To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces,
Santiago de Cuba :*

“SIR : I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning.

“ Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,

“ Major-General, U. S. V.”

*“ His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of United
States, near San Juan River :*

“ SIR : I have the honour to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8.30 A.M., and received at 1 P.M., demanding the surrender of this city, or in the contrary case announcing to me that you will bombard this city, and that I advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I shall inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message.

“ Very respectfully,

“ JOSÉ TORAL,

“ Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Corps.”

“ July 3, 1898.

*“ The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de
Cuba :*

“ SIR : In consideration of the request of the consular officers in your city for further delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city, and in the interest of the poor women and children, who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, I have the

The Situation on July 3d 191

honour to announce that I will delay such action solely in their interests until noon of the 5th, provided that during the interim your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own. I am, with great respect,

“Your obedient servant,

“WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,

“Major-General U. S. V.”

An earlier despatch from General Shafter to the Secretary of War had contained the statement : “ We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character, and the defences so strong, that it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force.” The full text of this telegram was not made public, General Shafter's reference to his own illness and his intimation that he might find it necessary to fall back to a stronger position while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements being wisely withheld. An unyielding and aggressive policy prevailed.

So much for the military situation on the 3d of July. As for the naval situation, we must think of those monsters, those Titans, lying imprisoned in the harbour while other Titans just beyond the harbour-mouth lay waiting between sea and sky, and seeming, when you could see them at all, to have caught and blended in their gigantic forms colours of both sky and sea. It had been so for weeks. Restlessness transforming itself into resignation to the fate which seemed to be inevitable, and to an acceptance of a foregone conclusion—into complete despondency—that was the dull tragedy expected from the dark prisoners and by them ; surrender, being merely a recognition of a loss of freedom which had already taken place, was expected also on the line beyond Morro Castle and the Socapa battery, where were the restless, dull-looking

things that sprung from the union of man with the forces of nature.¹

But it was the unexpected that happened. Admiral Cervera was still to be reckoned with, and the crushing blow was destined to fall first, not on the Spanish army, but on the Spanish fleet.

VII

Admiral Cervera, as he himself has stated, received orders twice from Madrid, to leave Santiago harbour and to go to Havana; and so he took aboard his thousand men who had shared the fighting and the losses on San Juan Hill; left his official correspondence in the care of the Archbishop (who hid the papers under a flagstone beneath the altar of the cathedral); and then the man on whom Spain's hopes were built gave the order for his fleet "to dash forth to almost certain destruction."

On the Fourth of July an official report of the engagement that followed came in the form of despatches, dated July 3d:

"The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the destruction of the whole of Cervera's fleet. Not one escaped. It attempted to escape at 9.30 this morning. At two the last ship, the *Cristóbal Colon*, had run ashore sixty miles west of Santiago, and had let down her colours. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya* were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The *Furor* and *Pluton* were destroyed within four miles of the port. Our loss, one killed and two wounded. Enemy's loss probably several hundred from gun-fire, explosions, and drowning. About 1200 prisoners, including Admiral

¹ It is not enough to say that the American forcefulness in naval warfare was due to taking Nature into partnership. The union is not commercial.

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Cervera. The man killed was G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman of the *Brooklyn*.

“ SAMPSON.”

“ At 9.30 to-day the Spanish squadron, seven in all, came out of Santiago in column, and was totally destroyed within an hour, excepting *Cristóbal Colon*, which was chased forty-five miles to westward by the Commander-in-Chief, *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*, surrendering to *Brooklyn*, but was beached to prevent sinking. . . .

“ WATSON.”

Even the errors in these despatches will always be read with interest.

Admiral Sampson's report to the Secretary of the Navy, which was published July 26th, outlined the action from the very moment when the head of the column of Cervera's squadron appeared, to the moment when the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*, overhauling the enemy's fastest vessel, the *Cristóbal Colon*, proved conclusively, by the argument of heavy shells, that escape was impossible. The positions of all the vessels were given and the achievements (or fate) of each. An important paragraph was that in which we find both explanation of Cervera's dash in broad daylight and intimation of Admiral Sampson's plan : “ I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight.” Altogether the document, including as it did the characteristic statements of so many popular heroes, was of uncommon interest as well as of high importance ; and as for the writing—that had a certain distinction, too, for it was the writing of gallant gentlemen.

A portion at least of the cool and clear story should be given once more in this connection :

“ U. S. FLAGSHIP ‘NEW YORK,’

“ FIRST RATE,

“ OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, July 15, 1898.

“ SIR : I have the honour to make the following report upon the battle with and the destruction of the Spanish squadron commanded by Admiral Cervera off Santiago de Cuba on Sunday, July 3, 1898 :

“ The enemy’s vessels came out of the harbour between twenty-five minutes to ten and ten A.M., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at twenty-nine minutes to ten and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.

“ The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows : The flagship *New York* was four miles east of her blockading station, and about seven miles from the harbour entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and to go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago.¹

“ I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel.

“ The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions ; distributed in a semicircle about the harbour entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following order : The *Indiana* about a mile and a half from the shore, the *Oregon*—the *New York’s*

¹ Compare the estimate of the resistance to be expected, as given in Section III. of this chapter. Page 152.

place between these two—the *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn*, the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbour entrance was from two and one-half to four miles—the latter being the limit of day-blockading distance.

“The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles. The *Massachusetts* had left at four A.M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the *Iowa* and *Texas*. The auxiliaries *Gloucester* and *Vixen* lay close to the land and nearer the harbour entrance than the large vessels, the *Gloucester* to the eastward and the *Vixen* to the westward.

“The torpedo boat *Ericsson* was in company with the flagship, and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning *Vizcaya*.

“The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbour, at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: *Infanta María Teresa* (flagship), *Vizcaya*, *Cristóbal Colon*, and the *Almirante Oquendo*. The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbour an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the *Oquendo*, at a distance of about 1200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer *Pluton*, and after her the *Furor*.

“The armoured cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

“The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday ‘quarters for inspection.’ The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, ‘Enemy’s ships escaping,’ and a general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance.

“The *New York* turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, ‘Close in toward harbour entrance and attack vessels,’ and gradually increasing

speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots, and was rapidly closing on the *Cristóbal Colon*. She was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbour entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the *Gloucester*.

“The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbour, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy’s appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire.

“The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase, in which the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* had at the start the advantage of position. The *Brooklyn* maintained this lead. The *Oregon*, steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place.

“The *Iowa* and the *Indiana*, having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the *Vizcaya* was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The *Vixen*, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase.

“The skilful handling and gallant fighting of the *Gloucester* excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed it and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht *Corsair*—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about two miles from the harbour entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships.

“Anticipating the appearance of the *Pluton* and *Furor*, the *Gloucester* was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and was able to close

to short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the *Gloucester* was under the fire of the Socapa battery.

“ Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbour, the careers of the *Furor* and *Pluton* were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The *Furor* was beached, and sunk in the surf; the *Pluton* sank in deep water a few minutes later.

“ The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battleships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and the *Texas*, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the *Gloucester's* battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the *Gloucester* did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the *Infanta María Teresa*.

“ The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards—all steering in the same direction and in formation—removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done.

“ As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but it suffered heavily in passing, and the *Infanta María Teresa* and the *Oquendo* were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the *Infanta María Teresa's* fire-main had been cut by one of our first shots and that she was unable to extinguish fire.

“ With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach—the *Infanta María Teresa* at about fifteen minutes past ten A. M. at Nima Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago harbour entrance, and the *Almirante Oquendo* at about half-past ten A. M. at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

“ The *Vizcaya* was still under the fire of the leading vessels. The *Cristóbal Colon* had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of

the leading American ships. The *Vizcaya* was soon set on fire, and at fifteen minutes after eleven she turned inshore and was beached at Aserraderos, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode.

“When about ten miles west of Santiago the *Indiana* had been signalled to go back to the harbour entrance, and at Aserraderos the *Iowa* was signalled to resume blockading station. The *Iowa*, assisted by the *Ericsson* and the *Hist*, took off the crew of the *Vizcaya*, while the *Harvard* and the *Gloucester* rescued those of the *Infanta María Teresa* and the *Almirante Oquendo*.

“This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

“There remained now of the Spanish ships only the *Cristóbal Colon*—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, the only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the *Vizcaya* went ashore the *Colon* was about six miles ahead of the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*; but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her.

“Behind the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* came the *Texas*, *Vixen*, and *New York*. It was evident from the bridge of the *New York* that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At ten minutes to one the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* opened fire and got her range—the *Oregon*'s heavy shell striking beyond her—and at twenty minutes after one she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colours, and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago.

“Captain Cook, of the *Brooklyn*, went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I

came up in the *New York*, received his report, and placed the *Oregon* in charge of the wreck, to save her if possible ; and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the *Resolute*, which had followed the chase.

“ Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify.

“ The *Cristóbal Colon* was not injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea-valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and, despite all efforts, she sank.

“ When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the *New York* bodily up on the beach—the *New York's* stem being placed against her for this purpose, the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shoal-water and may be saved. Had this not been done, she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

“ I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the *Cristóbal Colon*.

“ It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbour of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade—there being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close up to the shore-line, presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance.

“ At the time of my arrival before the port—June 1st—the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected ; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of dark nights there was opportunity for

the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels.

“ It was ascertained, with fair conclusiveness, that the *Merrimac*, so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3d, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows : To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro, dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere, they threw a search-light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search-light ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did.

“ Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and at a little distance farther out three small picket vessels, usually converted yachts, and when they were available one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbour undetected.

“ After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night-blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the search-light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear.

“ The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The *Massachusetts*, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning. . . .

“ When all the work was done so well, it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the commodore in command of the second division, the captains of ships, their

The "Oregon" and "Brooklyn" 201

officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was in great part broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts.

"The fine speed of the *Oregon* enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the *Cristóbal Colon* did not give up until the *Oregon* had thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battleship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class.

"The *Brooklyn's* westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The *Texas* and the *New York* were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and, had any accident befallen the *Brooklyn* or the *Oregon*, would have speedily overhauled the *Cristóbal Colon*.

"From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an average speed from the time she cleared the harbour mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Torquino of 13.7 knots.

"Neither the *New York* nor the *Brooklyn* stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes, or four miles in the chase.

"Several of the ships were struck, the *Brooklyn* more often than the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the *Iowa*. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the *Brooklyn*.

"It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type; but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire.

This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation.

“ The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbour, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the *Almirante Oquendo*, especially, had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced, and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen.

“ The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding officers are enclosed.

“ A Board appointed by me several days ago has made a critical examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon the chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the Board will be speedily forwarded.

✓ “ Very respectfully,

“ W. T. SAMPSON,

“ Rear-Admiral, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

“ THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

“ Navy Department, Washington, D. C.”

Commodore Schley's version was read with special interest, in view of a controversy which arose, not in the service, but chiefly in the newspapers, touching the claims of the leading commanders for credit in the achievement, and putting the two men, against their will, in the position of rivals, instead of allowing them to remain, where each had felt it was his duty and privilege to be found, as gallant servants of the government working unselfishly for the common cause. Schley's report to Sampson follows :

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"NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON,

"U. S. FLAGSHIP 'BROOKLYN,' ✓

"GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, July 6, 1898.

"SIR : I have the honour to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898 :

"At 9.35 A.M. Admiral Cervera, with the *Infanta María Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, *Cristóbal Colon*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, came out of the harbour of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the *Iowa* that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment.

"This vessel was the furthest west, except the *Vixen*, in the blockading line ; signal was made to the western division as prescribed in your General Orders, and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron and a general engagement, at ranges beginning at 1100 yards and varying to 3000, until the *Vizcaya* was destroyed about 10.50 A.M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.

"About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began, two vessels, thought to be the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*, and since verified as such, took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron, and were forced to run on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbour entrance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo-boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel, or vessels, the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship.

"The *Vizcaya* and *Colon*, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and engaged in a running fight with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* until ten minutes of eleven, when the *Vizcaya* took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port, and, with a heavy list stood inshore and ran aground at Aserraderos, on fire

fore and aft; and there she blew up during the night. Observing that she had struck her colours, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing.

"The *Oregon*, having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the *Brooklyn*, together with the *Texas* and another vessel, which proved to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the *Colon*, which had run close inshore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

"This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and other ships, and soon the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* were within long range of the *Colon*, when the *Oregon* opened fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close to the *Colon*. A moment afterward the *Brooklyn* opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the *Colon*, now in range of the *Brooklyn's* and *Oregon's* guns.

"Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag at a quarter past one P.M., and ran ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago harbour. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as were also the *Texas* and *Vixen*. A little later, after your arrival, the *Cristóbal Colon*, which had struck to the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.

"I would mention for your consideration that the *Brooklyn* occupied the most westward blockading position, with the *Vixen*, and, being more directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun-fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery, at a range of 1500 yards from the ships and about 3000 yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range.

"I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I

deem it a high privilege to commend to you for such action as you may deem proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skilful handling of their respective vessels, of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation, and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order.

"The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the *Indiana* and the *Gloucester*, but as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.

"Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the *Vixen*, acted with conspicuous courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless he was close in to the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel.

"I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag-lieutenant, James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aide, who were constantly at my side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behaviour of my secretary, Lieut. W. B. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the Fourth Division with splendid effect.

"I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the engagement of Lieut.-Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

"The navigator, Lieut. A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieut. T. D. Griffin, Lieut. W. R. Rush, Lieut. Edward Simpson, Lieut. J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.

"The officers of the Medical, Pay, Engineer, and Marine Corps responded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing themselves. The warrant officers, Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G. H.

Warford, and Gunner F. T. Applegate, were everywhere exposed in watching for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.

"I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than that of the *Brooklyn*. During the combat, lasting from thirty-five minutes past nine until fifteen minute past one, much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern, and over the ship.

"The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some 1300 to 1500 prisoners, with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 600 men.

"The casualties on board this ship were G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars showed that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halliards were shot away, and nearly all the signal halliards. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of the action it fell in pieces.

"I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us. . . .

"Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the captains—viz., Captain Eulate, of the *Vizcaya*, and the second in command of the *Colon*, Commander Contreras, I have learned that the Spanish Admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the *Brooklyn*, and the *Vizcaya*¹ to ram her, in hope that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron.

"This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the *Viz-*

¹ Or the *Teresa*. See the lieutenant's story in Section VIII. of this chapter.

caya's action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbour.

"I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark, of the *Oregon*. Her speed was wonderful and her accurate firing splendidly destructive.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore United States Navy,
Commanding Second Squadron,
North Atlantic Fleet.

"To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station."

Captain A. T. Mahan, in a letter which treats authoritatively of the fleet's work and its admiral's plan, says : "The merit of forcing the enemy to action under disadvantageous conditions—and it is one of the highest achievements of military art—belongs to the commander-in-chief. It was the great decisive feature of the campaign from start to finish. Few naval authorities, I imagine, will dispute this statement." The generous language of Commodore, now Rear-Admiral, Schley, whose achievement in finding and holding Cervera's fleet has already been referred to, is another victory, though an easy one, for him. Towards the end of August, he said, restating his superior officer's policy in a couple of crisp sentences, "Our men watched the harbour night and day so closely that a rat could not have slipped out without being seen. The enemy was unable to put a shovel of fresh coal on their fires without the fact being reported." And of his sailors he said : "During moments when a rain of iron hail was pouring all around us the

men laughed ; and when a shot struck near them, they gave a cheer."

And the conquered Cervera, retrieving all his merely personal loss by his courtesy and dignity, also scored a triumph when in his report to Madrid, after confessing that he " never could have believed that the destruction of his fleet could have been so rapid," he spoke of his antagonists in generous eulogy, saying : " They clothed the naked, and stopped their cheers lest they should increase the sorrow of the conquered. Each strove with the other to render as light as possible the hardships of captivity."

The comment of the *Saturday Review* was apt and strong, and, inasmuch as we have quoted that journal on an earlier page, it is but right that we should make another citation from it at this point : " The lesson of all our conflicts with America," it said, " is that the Americans, both soldiers and sailors, shot better than our soldiers and sailors, very markedly better, and therefore won astonishing victories. It looks as if the old lesson holds good to-day. Never have hostile fleets been destroyed with so little hurt to the victors as at Cavité Bay and off Santiago."

VIII

Taking for a moment the Spanish point of view, we can only suggest the incomparable tragedy.

The Spanish sailors' confidence in their Admiral and their reverence for him personally made it impossible for them to believe that any effort commanded by him was foredoomed to failure. The strength of the American squadron was underestimated ; only the *Brooklyn*, they thought, could keep up with them in their dash for liberty. They could outrun the first-class battleships, and, as for

the *Texas*, she was "hoodooed," and would certainly break down in action. After disabling the *Brooklyn*, which they could effect by concentrating their fire upon her, they would gain the open sea.

"Admiral Cervera expected to lose most of his ships," said an officer of the *Pluton*, "but he hoped that the *Cristóbal Colon* would get away. That is why he transferred his flag to the *María Teresa*, so that he might perish with the less fortunate. The two torpedo-boat destroyers were to stay behind the armoured cruisers until the American ships closed in, and then they were to dart out, heading straight for the nearest enemy. That was the plan, but see how it failed! We were shot to pieces before we got within half the torpedo-striking distance of the American ships. We found ourselves riddled and could not strike a blow in return. . . . Our vessel without armour offered no place of refuge. On one of the armour-clads a man feels somewhat safer on the lee side of a turret, or with the conning-tower between him and the enemy, but our men were just as safe on the open deck, safer indeed than below, for the shots soon shattered our steam-pipes and escaping steam scalded to death the stokers and engineers. . . . We had prepared our torpedo-tubes, but before the *Texas*, now the nearest enemy, was within 1500 yards of us—much too far to use a torpedo against her—our steering gear was crippled, half of our crew were killed, and our engines were mortally hurt. We steered for a time by the twin screw. We then tried to get behind the *Oquendo*, not to save our lives, but to save our torpedoes until we could use them. But before we could take the position we intended, the *Pluton* became unmanageable. The *Oquendo* used smoke-producing powder at the beginning of the battle solely to enable the *Pluton* and *Furor* to hide. But the smoke did

not lie on the water. It rose in fleecy clouds that rendered our position all the plainer to the enemy in the clear strip of the blue, clean water below. . . . The biggest shells were fired so as to ricochet along the water. We could see them coming at us by the enormous splashes they made, and they came straight. Finally, a shell from the *Brooklyn*, I think, literally stove the torpedo boat to splinters. It passed through the boiler room, splitting the boiler itself, and letting out steam and scalding water upon the crew, to stab them like sword-blades."

The lieutenant who stood near Admiral Cervera during the fight says there seemed to be a prospect for escape when they came out from the deep shadow of the entrance to Santiago harbour. Only two big American ships were in sight within two miles. Then the *Oregon* seemed to rise up out of the sea, every foot of her sides darting daggers of flame and solid shot. "Where the *Oregon* came from, out of the sea that morning," he said, "I can't imagine even at this hour; and how she travelled so fast is an enigma. I could not have believed that any battleship afloat could chase and corner our *Cristóbal Colon*, a 21-knot cruiser. . . . We expected that the American fire would be concentrated on us, and the Admiral tried to manœuvre so that we could ram the *Brooklyn*. But whenever we headed up towards her she swung around and threatened to cross our path. We never got nearer than 1500 yards. Once when we turned toward her a shell from her forward turret struck us in the bow, ploughing down amidships. Then it exploded. It tore down the bulkheads, destroyed stanchions, crippled two rapid-fire guns, killed fifteen or twenty men, and carried panic everywhere. . . . Cervera ordered one of our gun-crews to concentrate on the *Brooklyn's* steering-gear, trying to make her unmanageable, if we could not sink

her. In vain! . . . One of the *Iowa's* shells struck the 11-inch gun in the forward turret of the cruiser, cutting a furrow as clean as a knife out of the side of the gun. The shell exploded half-way in the turret, making the whole vessel stagger and shake in every plate. When the fumes and smoke had cleared away so that it was possible to enter the turret, other gunners were sent there. The survivors tumbled the bodies which filled the wrecked turret through the ammunition hoist to the lower deck. Even the machinery was clogged by corpses. The place was so slippery from blood and pieces of flesh that from that moment I do not think the gun-crews knew what they were doing. But they kept ramming new projectiles into the guns and firing. The other gun-crews fared just as badly. All our rapid-fire guns aloft soon became silent, because every gunner had been either killed or crippled at his post, and lay on the deck where he fell. A dead body hung over the military top. There were so many wounded that the surgeons ceased trying to dress the wounds. Shells had exploded inside of the ship, setting fire to the woodwork, and even the hospital was turned into a furnace. The first wounded who were sent there had to be abandoned by the surgeons, who fled for their lives from the intolerable heat.

"I do not believe that a man on our ship committed a cowardly act, but many of us were perfectly crazy. The flashes of exploding shells, the shriek and roar of missiles passing over us, and the rattle of the lighter shot on the steel decks, made a din and a blinding glare of light. It was impossible to think of or to hear anything else. After about fifteen minutes I did not hear a single command given. The officers screamed their orders for a while, but soon they could not make themselves heard, and there were few to obey."

And again, as to the fate of the cruiser that, a few months earlier, had come in the character of a very courteously peaceful messenger, and had been received as a very impressive guest, in New York harbour :¹

“When the whole gun-deck of the *Vizcaya* was in flames we knew that her magazines would go up in a few minutes. She was then headed for the shore, where the *Marta Teresa* had already gone. After the *Vizcaya* was close in, probably within 400 yards of the beach, a shell from the largest of the *Texas's* guns, fired from the after turret, as she steamed away in pursuit of the *Cristóbal Colon*, hit the *Vizcaya* a little forward of amidships, just above the armour-belt and below the protected deck. The shot crashed through her side, crossed the gun-deck, glancing off from steel compartment to compartment, until it reached the forward torpedo-tubes, where it struck and exploded one of the *Vizcaya's* torpedoes. Whether the *Texas's* shell also exploded, I do not know. The shock was terrific. The shell is said to have killed eighty men in its path across and over the gun-deck. The final explosion blew out the starboard side of the *Vizcaya*, making her a complete wreck. In the meantime the survivors from the flagship were jumping into the sea to escape from the burning wreck. The steel sides of the ship were almost red-hot from the fire raging within and the impact of the shells without. Admiral Cervera himself threw off all of his clothes but two garments, and finally leaped into the sea, where he was supported by his son. I tried to stay on board as long as he did, but the pitching of the vessel in the heavy surf and the frightful heat of the deck caused me to lose my balance, and I fell. I was barely conscious, but the sea-

¹ See page 36. The details were secured by a correspondent at Portsmouth. From that point, Cervera and his officers were taken to Annapolis, where they arrived on July 16th.

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water revived me, and a boat from the *Ericsson* soon picked me up."

Lieutenant Manguer of the *Vizcaya* spoke of the terrible punishment inflicted by the *Iowa*, "the skipping 13-inch shells from which," he said, "appeared to slide along the surface of the water and hunt for a seam in our armour. Three of these monster projectiles penetrated the hull of the *Vizcaya*, and exploded there before we started for the shore. The carnage inside the ship was something horrible and beyond description. Fires were started up constantly. It seemed to me that the iron bulkheads were ablaze. Our organisation was perfect. We acted promptly, and mastered all the small outbreaks of flame, until the small ammunition magazine was exploded by a shell. From that moment the vessel became a furnace of fire. While we were walking the deck, headed shoreward, we could hear the roar of the flames under our feet above the voice of artillery. The *Vizcaya's* hull bellowed like a blast-furnace. Why, men sprang from the red-hot deck straight into the jaws of sharks!"

IX.

After the story of this disaster had been conveyed to General Toral at Santiago, the demand for surrender was repeated on July 5th. It was again rejected. Opinion had been divided in regard to surrendering the city. The Archbishop with many of the inhabitants and some of the soldiers wishing to yield (before the exodus of non-combatants occurred) while Linares and the higher officers declared they would burn the city to the ground first.

On the 7th of July, Nelson A. Miles, Major-General commanding the United States Army, left Washington for Santiago *via* Charleston. He sailed on the *Yale*, July

9th. The Sixth Massachusetts accompanied him on the *Yale*, and the *Columbia*, sailing at the same time, carried the First Battalion of the Sixth Illinois. The expedition numbered in all 1720 men.

On the same day General Toral, in a note to General Shafter, communicated the result of his consultations with the government at Madrid and General Blanco at Havana. He suggested to him terms of capitulation, offering to evacuate Santiago if Shafter would permit him to depart unmolested, with all his troops, arms, and banners. The reply conveyed to him on July 10th, by President McKinley's direction, was that the United States would accept no terms but unconditional surrender. General Toral recommended that his terms should be accepted, as no others would be satisfactory. Any attempt to conquer the city, he said, would cost the Americans enormously in the matter of lives, for he had been reinforced and now had plenty of ammunition. Resistance would be long, as well as strong, because, by sending out all the poor of Santiago to be fed by the Americans, he had enabled himself to provision the garrison for an indefinite time.

Escario, with 2800 men, had passed in through Garcia's lines to reinforce the garrison, while a score of thousand of the non-combatants had passed out to relieve it.

"The lack of proper hospital facilities in the American lines," a correspondent wrote, "has been accentuated by the arrival of 20,000 refugees from Santiago within the American lines. . . . While thus being able to have more food for his own soldiers, General Linares has forced the Americans to struggle to feed the non-combatants, many of whom are wives and children of Spanish officers and soldiers, now in the trenches defending the city. Touching scenes are to be witnessed daily among the

refugees at Caney. In effect, these 20,000 refugees, mostly women and children, have been thrust out of Santiago to starve or to die of exposure, unless they are succoured by the American army. . . . They have no means of getting further from Santiago than Caney, or of bettering their condition. They cannot return to the city until it is occupied by our army, and we must care for them as best we can. The Red Cross Society to-day (July 8th) opened a relief depot at Caney, and succeeded in temporarily satisfying the hunger of the refugees. There are supplies at Siboney, but there is no means of transporting the food to Caney."

The truce was extended until noon of July 10th. Six batteries of Randolph's Light Artillery were now arriving, but it seemed impossible to convey the guns to the front and to place them in positions overlooking the Spanish lines and the city before another week should pass. The distribution of troops composing our line may be roughly indicated as follows: Directly north of Santiago were Generals Ludlow, McKibbin, Chaffee, and Lawton, with their forces; north-east and east were stationed light batteries, just above the Caney road, and, just below the same road, Hotchkiss, dynamite, and Gatling-guns, with the cavalry division, Wood's and Sumner's commands, and the Best battery. General Wheeler's headquarters were at this point, east of the city. General Kent's division, with Pearson and Hawkins, continued the line southward; and at the extreme left was General Bates's brigade.

A desperate resistance on the part of the Spaniards was expected. They were even reported to be digging trenches in the streets of Santiago, and otherwise preparing for a house-to-house fight.

At half-past eleven o'clock on Sunday morning, July

10th, the Spanish commander was notified that his proposition to surrender, with the conditions which have been mentioned, was rejected. General Toral replied in effect that he could discuss no other terms. In view of this correspondence the truce was extended until four o'clock ; in fact the attack, which was entrusted chiefly to the artillery, did not begin until after five o'clock. Then the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, and *Indiana*, lying off Aguadores, threw shells over the cliffs in an effort to reach the city, which was nearly five miles distant and hidden from view. Signals from shore announced that the shells fell short of the Spanish position. From Shafter's lines the Spanish defences outside the city were fired upon by our field-guns, mortars, Gatling-guns, and the dynamite gun of the "Rough Riders." The enemy's reply proved to be less vigorous than was anticipated. On our side Captain Charles W. Rowell and one private were killed, and eleven wounded. On this day Admiral Cervera, with 54 officers of his destroyed squadron, and 638 other prisoners taken from the ships at Santiago, reached Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On the same day also, throughout the United States, the people responded, more or less publicly, to their President's proclamation which urged them to thank God for the victories He had granted, and to pray that He might send peace.

Fresh troops were now arriving, to share with our little army the problems of a strange climate, a still stranger lack of food, and the resistance of a desperate enemy. The First Illinois and the Eighth Ohio, each with 1350 men, the District of Columbia Infantry, with 915 men, and recruits numbering about 930 for regular regiments in the field, were the most recent arrivals.

General Shafter's force nominally available at the beginning of the week, counting all reinforcements, was

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about 22,500 fighting men. This is based on an estimate of 16,887 officers and men in the original expedition and a little less than 9000 in various expeditions which had gone since then, making in all 25,500. From this, however, must be deducted those who had fallen in the fighting thus far, and also the men confined to the hospital by sickness. This deduction, roughly estimated at 3000, leaves in round numbers, 22,500 men as the nominal fighting force of the American army before Santiago. But it is easy to see that this estimate, actually made and published as above in the United States, was incorrect. The 9000 reinforcements were delayed, or reserved for the Porto Rico campaign, or, at best, came little by little; the fever came all at once: it spread like a prairie fire: it "caught the enemy [our red-blooded troops] in *its* hands." General Shafter informs us that he never had on the fighting line, at any one time, more than 13,000 men.

The bombardment was resumed at six o'clock on Monday morning. Co-operating with the land forces, the fleet found the range by two trial shots from the *New York*, and then 106 shells were thrown, of which number 101 were effective. The distance was 8500 yards. The town of Dos Caminos, north-west of the city, was occupied that day by our troops under General Ludlow and a force of Cubans. Meantime the wounded Spanish general, Linares (who was still responsible to Madrid, though Toral was entrusted with all duties requiring physical activity), had reached the conclusion that surrender was unavoidable—though not solely in view of the bombardment, which was noisy rather than very destructive. His message of July 12th to the minister of war at Madrid lays bare the heart of the situation; and so here in part it may be given:

“To the Minister of War, from the General-in-Chief of the Division of Santiago de Cuba :

“ Although confined to my bed by great weakness, and in pain, the situation of the long-suffering troops here occupies my mind to such an extent that I deem it my duty to address your Excellency, that the state of affairs may be explained. The enemy’s lines are very near the town on account of the nature of the ground ; our lines are in full view from them. Troops weak ; sick in considerable proportion not sent to hospitals, owing to the necessity for keeping them in the intrenchments. Horses and mules without the usual allowance of forage ; in the midst of the wet season, with twenty hours’ daily fall of rain in the trenches, which are simply ditches dug in the ground without any permanent shelter for the men, who have nothing but rice to eat and no means of changing or drying their clothing. Considerable losses ; field officers and company officers killed, wounded, and sick ; the troops therefore deprived of necessary orders in critical moments.

“ Under these circumstances it is impossible to fight our way out, because in attempting to do so our force would lack one third of the men, who could not leave, and we should be weakened besides by casualties caused by the enemy, resulting finally in a veritable disaster, without saving our diminished battalions. In order to get out, protected by the Holguin troops, it would be necessary for them to come and break the enemy’s lines, thus enabling my forces to break through in some other place, both acting in conjunction. For this operation the Holguin division would require eight days, and would have to bring a large amount of rations, which it is impossible to transport.

“ The solution of the question is ominously imposed upon us. Surrender is inevitable, and we can only succeed in prolonging the agony. The sacrifice is useless, and our enemies understand this. From their superior position they look down upon our lines. They tire out our men without exposing themselves, as they did yesterday when they cannonaded us on land, with such an ele-

vation that we were unable to see their batteries ; and from the sea, by the squadron, which had perfect range, and bombarded the town in sections with mathematical precision.

"Santiago de Cuba is not . . . a part of a country defended inch by inch by its own sons without distinction, by the old, the women, and the children The complete exodus of the inhabitants, insular as well as peninsular, includes the occupants of the public offices, with few exceptions. There only remain the clergy, and they to-day started to leave the town, with the Archbishop at their head.

"The defenders here cannot now begin a campaign full of enthusiasm and energy. They came here three years ago struggling against the climate, privations, and fatigue, and now they are placed in these sad circumstances, where they have no food, no physical force, and no means of recuperating. For them the ideal is lacking, because they are defending the city property of those that have abandoned it and of those that now are being fed by the American forces. The honour of arms has its limits, and I appeal to the opinion of the whole nation as to whether these patient troops have not kept it safely many times. . . . If it is necessary that the sacrifice be endured, for reasons of which I am ignorant, or that some one shall assume responsibility for the unfortunate termination which I have anticipated and mentioned in a number of telegrams, I faithfully offer myself on the altar of my country for the sacrifice, and, as for the responsibility, I will retain the command for the purpose of signing the surrender ; for my modest reputation is of little value as compared with the country's interests.

"LINARES."

When this despatch was sent a flag of truce was already flying. Linares's pathetic statement must have reached Madrid at about the hour when, at Washington, Shafter's despatch was being read in the War Department: "Toral is considering propositions for surrendering, now that I have the town surrounded on the north." General Shafter adds, "Lines were completed at five P.M. right down to the

bay. The line is rather thin, but will have it strengthened in the morning by General Henry. . . . Great deal of suffering among the people who have gone out of Santiago. Am doing my best to relieve it, but am not entirely successful."

General Miles had already reached Siboney, and had held a consultation with Admiral Sampson and with General Shafter by telephone. He found a third army near Santiago, which was more formidable than his own army, or Toral's. It comprised the thousands of miserable refugees from the city, and a legion of unseen enemies that lurked in the water and stole upwards from the tainted earth. A score of cases of yellow fever had already been reported at Siboney, and that town was destroyed by fire at the request of the Hospital Corps and by order of General Miles. The necessity of bringing the campaign to a close immediately was so obvious that even an attempt to carry the defences by assault would have been justifiable, if surrender had not seemed imminent. Another fortnight's delay, and that third army would have defeated ours.

On Wednesday there was a conference of the opposing commanders. "Have had an interview of an hour and a half with General Toral," Shafter telegraphed, "and have extended truce until noon to-morrow. . . . Hope for his surrender. If he refuses I will open on him at twelve, noon, to-morrow, with every gun I have." General Miles, reporting to Secretary Alger, cabled: "At a meeting between the lines, at which Generals Shafter and Wheeler, and the Spanish General Toral, were present, the latter claimed that he is unable to act without authority of his government, but has received authority to withdraw, and surrender harbour, forts, munitions of war, and eastern portion of Cuba. He urgently requests until to-

morrow noon to receive an answer from his government regarding offer of our government to send his forces to Spain ; which was granted."

General Miles's account of the negotiations may be followed closely at this point.

He frankly informed the Spaniard that, as he had left Washington only six days before, he knew that it was the determination of the government that this portion of the Spanish army must be captured or destroyed.

He also stated that his reinforcements had already arrived with him, that some of these forces had already disembarked, and the remainder would be disembarked on the west side of the harbour, and that it was useless to contend against the inevitable. General Toral replied that so long as he had rations and ammunition he had to fight in order to maintain the honour of the Spanish army.

In response to that he was informed that he had already maintained the honour of the Spanish army, and that further efforts would be useless and would result in wanton sacrifice of human life. General Toral then said that he was waiting to hear from his government, and was informed by General Miles that he had already taken much time for that purpose, and would be given until daylight of the following morning, it being then three o'clock, to submit his final answer. He begged for longer time, and earnestly desired that he should be allowed until twelve o'clock next day. This was finally granted by General Miles, the meeting dissolved, and the officers separated.

On returning from this conference, General Miles received the following despatch :

" WASHINGTON, July 13, 1898.

" *Major-General Miles :*

" You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms;

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the officers and men after parole to be permitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless, in your judgment, an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson, and pursue such a course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matters should be settled promptly.

“ R. A. ALGER,
“ Secretary of War.”

Twenty-four hours later Miles and Shafter were able to inform the government that Toral's surrender was assured, although the terms were still to be arranged. As marking the penultimate step in these negotiations, the following despatches are of special interest :

“ PLAYA, July 14.

“ *To Adjutant-General at Washington :*

“ Have just returned from interview with General Toral. He agrees to surrender upon the basis of being returned to Spain. This proposition embraces all eastern Cuba from Aserraderos on the south to Sagua on the north, *via* Palma, with practically the Fourth Army Corps. Commissioners meet this afternoon at 2.30 to definitely arrange the terms.

“ W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General.”

“ PLAYA, July 14,
“ BEFORE SANTIAGO.

“ *To Secretary of War at Washington :*

“ General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army, troops and division of Santiago, on the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned to Spain. General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up the conditions of arrangements for carrying out the terms of surrender. This is very gratifying, as General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for their sincerity and fortitude in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles which they encountered. A

portion of the army has been infected with yellow fever, and efforts will be made to separate those who have been infected and those free from it, and to keep those who are still on board ship separated from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately made for carrying out further instructions of the President and yourself.

“ NELSON A. MILES,
“ Major-General of the Army.”

In every country of the civilised world details that were gathered from a comparison of these messages with others flashed from capital to capital (the details seeming meagre in view of the importance of every phase of the situation at Santiago), and were scrutinised and analysed and debated, and construed to make for peace.¹

General Miles, having appointed an interview, rode out between the lines just before noon with General Shafter and others, and met General Toral, who in the meantime had received authorisation to capitulate. Commissioners to represent Spain and the United States were appointed then and there.

The full text of the official document giving the terms of the capitulation follows :

“ Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish Forces occupying the territory which constitutes the Division of Santiago de Cuba and described as follows : All that portion of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing Aserraderos, Dos Palmas, Cautoabajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said troops being in

¹ Spanish four per cent. bonds advanced, July 15th, one point in the dealings of the London market, selling at 38½. This was taken as indicating a belief on the part of London and Paris traders that peace was in sight, and, it may be added, peace on terms not absolutely ruinous to Spain. On May 9th the price for the bonds registered in London was 29½. That was the lowest point. The ruling price at the date of the destruction of the *Maine* was 61.

command of General José Toral : agreed upon by the undersigned Commissioners: Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding the Spanish Forces, on behalf of the Kingdom of Spain, and Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C., appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American Forces, on behalf of the United States :

“ 1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish Forces in this District absolutely and unequivocally cease.

“ 2. That this capitulation includes all the Forces and war material in said territory.

“ 3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said District to the Kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

“ 4. That the officers of the Spanish Army be permitted to retain their side arms, and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.

“ 5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American Navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions now in the harbour of Santiago and its mouth.

“ 6. That the Commander of the Spanish Forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish Forces in above described District to the Commander of the American Forces ; and also a roster of said Forces now in said District.

“ 7. That the Commander of the Spanish Forces in leaving said District is authorised to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish Army now in said District.

“ 8. That all that portion of the Spanish Forces known as Volunteers, Movilizados, and Guerrillas who wish to remain in the Island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the

continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States.

" 9. That the Spanish Forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honours of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon to await their disposition by the United States Government, it being understood that the United States Commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

" 10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative immediately upon its being signed.

" Entered into this sixteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned Commissioners acting under instructions from their respective Commanding Generals and with the approbation of their respective governments :

" JOSEPH WHEELER,	FEDERICO ESCARIO,
" Major-General, U.S. Vols.	
" H. W. LAWTON,	VENTURA FONTAN,
" Major-Genl. U.S. Vols.	
" J. D. MILEY,	ROBT. MASON.
" Lt. 2 Art'y., A.D.C.	
" to Gen. Shafter."	

This surrender included much more than all of that territory, from Aserraderos to Guantanamo, in which our forces had been especially active ; it included the mountainous district, stretching away to the Windward Passage and to the Old Bahama Channel. Though it did not embrace the towns of Holguin and Manzanillo, garrisoned by strong bodies of Spanish regulars, the opinion universally held on July 16th was beyond question that the control of eastern Cuba had passed out of Spanish hands forever, and that this was the beginning of the end. Rumours of peace negotiations grew more persistent, although Judge Day, Secretary of State, denied the published report that overtures of this nature from Spain had been made with the endorsement of the English, Russian,

and Japanese representatives at Washington. President McKinley, in speaking of the fall of Santiago, said, "I hope for early peace now."

In Spain the government put a bandage on the people's eyes, and gagged and manacled the "indomitable Iberian." Throughout the Spanish Peninsula the rights of individuals, as guaranteed by the constitution, were temporarily suspended by a royal decree. The effect of this was to insure the uniform and resolute application of martial law, together with the suppression of the news of the disaster until the government should feel that the crisis had passed.

As for the soldiers thus surrendered, they numbered, according to a respectable estimate, 12,000 in and near Santiago. General Shafter stated that the capitulation included about 12,000 soldiers against whom a shot had not been fired, and that the number of troops to be returned to Spain was about 24,000.

In order to show plainly the important successive steps in these negotiations, it is now only necessary to add, first, that our government adhered to its original demand that the surrender should be unconditional, thus declining the Commissioners' suggestion in regard to the retention of arms by the Spanish troops; and, second, that the Commissioners representing Toral, Linares, and the Spanish government, yielding all other points for which they had stood out, received the promise that Spanish troops (not volunteers or guerrillas) should be sent from the surrendered district to Spain at our expense.

The formal surrender occurred on Sunday, July 17th.

General Shafter and General Toral, with their staffs and escorts, met at a tree outside the walls in the shade of which other conferences had been held. It was then

about nine o'clock in the morning. The Spanish commander, with a brief statement in his own language to the effect that Santiago de Cuba—city and province—had now been delivered into the custody of the United States, offered to give up his sword, but it was returned to him. The two generals then rode through the city, the American taking formal possession, as he narrates in a despatch of this date to Adjutant-General Corbin. "I have the honour," he says, "to announce that the American flag has been this instant (12 o'clock noon) hoisted over the house of the civil government. . . . An immense concourse of people was present, a squadron of cavalry, and a regiment of infantry presenting arms, and a band playing national airs. A light battery fired a salute of twenty-one guns. Perfect order is being maintained by the municipal government. The distress is very great, but there is little sickness in town, and scarcely any yellow fever. A small gunboat and about 200 seamen left by Cervera surrendered to me. Upon coming into this city I discovered a perfect entanglement of defences. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost 5000 lives to take it. Battalions of Spanish troops have been depositing arms since daybreak in the armory over which I have placed a guard. . . ."

A man to be reckoned with, the Archbishop of Santiago, was perhaps the most conspicuous figure among those who were present at a reception held at the governor's palace, where the civil governor and other officers of the city and province met the American officers.

The ceremony of raising and saluting the flag and taking over the city was ended; our officers, changed, in a moment of time, from willing guests of their unwilling entertainers into hosts and governors in Santiago's wrecked houses and unclean streets, still had preparations

to make for the disciplining of Spanish regulars, starving citizens, and ambitious Cubans. Shafter returned to camp. The Ninth Infantry immediately marched in, and a few soldiers at the street corners were enough to police the town.

In the course of the day our troops also took possession of Morro Castle and the batteries at the mouth of the harbour ; mines in the channel were removed or exploded ; the Red Cross steamer *State of Texas*, passing the *Merri-mac* that had been sunk to keep Cervera in, and the *Reina Mercedes*, that had been sunk to keep Sampson out, made her way towards the city ; refugees coming back to their homes found that conquest had re-established order, and that life and property were to be safeguarded even against the lawless, tawny, Robin Hood portion of the victorious army. As between the Spanish and American soldiers there were manifestations of good feeling, but already a note of discontent was heard from the insurgents, who had to play minor parts or be omitted altogether, and who resented Shafter's decision not to displace the Spanish civil officials.

And here our chapter on the Santiago campaign properly ends, for the unfurling of our flag at high noon that day, over a city already delivered up, marked the beginning of a new task.

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER EVENTS IN THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR, BETWEEN MAY 25TH AND JULY 17TH

BUT in giving our attention exclusively to the story of the Santiago campaign, as we have done in the chapter just concluded, we are in danger of failing to realise the spirit of the time, which was one of close attention to happenings in many other parts of the world as well, with a vital, and, as it seemed, almost personal interest in countries, in nations, in individuals, that had possessed hitherto little power to attract attention, and no power whatever to hold it. An amiable opponent of the war said that at least it would confer one benefit: it would teach us our geography.

We cared very much, as the strong rays of interest began to focus upon Santiago, to know also that there were 45,000 men in the volunteer army at Chickamauga (May 27th); we heard, not without interest, but always with a little incredulity, stories of vigorous action on the part of the Cuban insurgents—for example, that on the 28th of May three hundred cavalry and five hundred infantry, commanded by the Cuban General Carillo, had made a successful attack on the town of Remedios in Santa Clara province, and especially close attention was given to every word that came from George Dewey's fleet in the Bay of Manila. Now, while the sequence of events leading up to the capture of Santiago is fresh in our memories, we

may attempt to recall contemporaneous events in other parts of the world, reviewing in a few minutes the leading facts in the seven weeks.

On the 25th of May Admiral Dewey reported : " The blockade is effective. It is impossible for the people of Manila to buy provisions, except rice " ; and he spoke about the illness of Captain Gridley, and said that Commander Lamberton had been appointed captain of the *Olympia* in his place.

In the United States, General Merritt took command of all the troops destined for the Philippines, and on May 30th an order was prepared by the direction of President McKinley adding 8000 men to the Department of the Pacific, thus increasing General Merritt's force to 20,000. The monitor *Monadnock*, which was cruising off Puget Sound, was ordered to San Francisco to be ready for service at Manila.

At the beginning of June, the efforts of the government at Madrid to secure funds for the prosecution of the war attracted wide attention, the Bank of Spain having been intrusted with negotiations for a loan of 1,000,000,000 pesetas. At Washington, the House unanimously passed (June 2d) an urgent Deficiency Bill appropriating \$17,845,000 for war expenditures. On that day the Treasury statement of government income and expenditure for May showed that during the month just ended \$9,093,000 was spent on the Navy, and \$17,093,000 on the Army. During April, \$12,557,000 had been spent by the government on the Navy, and only \$6,223,000 on the Army.

Now, while grave doubts were being expressed as to the ability of bankrupt Spain to raise the loan just referred to, Señor Gamazo, one of the strongest and most popular of the members of the new cabinet, was pointing with confidence to the constancy and patriotism of the Spanish

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people. "They would never," he said, "consent to any course by which the national honour would be compromised. The regard for the country's honour is the strongest feeling in the Spanish peasants' breasts. There is not a Spanish mother among the peasantry who would not send her last remaining son to the war, nor a Spanish peasant who would not sell his last garment to provide resources for it. This spirit of abnegation in the country's cause—fanatic if you will—is a Spanish tradition, an inheritance of the people who, when roused by injustice or aggression, are capable of great things. This was shown at the time of the Napoleonic invasion, when, without a king, without rulers, without resources, they organised themselves into administrative committees, established order in the country, concerted measures for defence, sustained sieges that for constancy and heroic valour will bear comparison with the most famous of antiquity; suffered the most cruel privations, fought battles in which they came out victorious against the most desperate odds, rose again and again uncrushed from defeat, and finally triumphed over the invader who paid dearly for his mistaken opinion of the Spanish character. Spain was for Napoleon the ante-chamber of St. Helena."

What shall we say of the government whose mismanagement would make it necessary to withdraw the remnant of its army of 200,000 soldiers, of this fighting stock, from the island of Cuba just because six vessels had been destroyed and the provincial capital in the south-east corner of the island had been surrendered?

Curiously enough, the American counterpart of Señor Gamazo's picture of the solidarity of a country which the war spirit unites was offered at this very time. On the 1st of June the political disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the last remaining

vestige of the legislation growing out of the Civil War which discriminated against Confederates, were removed by unanimous vote of the House. The consideration and passage of the bill were made the occasion for patriotic demonstrations. The sentiment that war unites the country spread from the capital through every branch of the public service. The rebel yell was to be heard in our ranks at Santiago, caught up, and repeated with the zest of novelty, by men from Massachusetts and New York. It was merely a recognition of a state of things long assured, but it had its use, as have most friendly outpourings.

On the day after Hobson had sunk the *Merrimac* in the neck of Santiago harbour, our interest was attracted to three widely separated points. A letter from Lieutenant Carranza, in Canada, showing the existence of an elaborate spy-system in this country¹ was made public. Lieutenant Carranza, it will be remembered, had been a Spanish naval attaché in Washington. Captain Charles V. Gridley, who commanded the flagship *Olympia* at the battle of Manila, died at Kobé, Japan. The gunboat *Marietta*, which had made a longer trip even than her companion the *Oregon*, dropped anchor at Key West. The *Marietta* left Sitka, Alaska, December 9th, and San Francisco January 16th.

Admiral Dewey was sending word at this time that the insurgents had been actively engaged within the province of Cavité. They had won several victories, and had taken prisoner about 50 officers and 1800 of the Spanish troops. It seemed less outlandish when he added that the arsenal at Cavité had been made ready for occupation by the United States troops upon their arrival.

¹ But we thought our newspapers were supplying all the war news a reasonable foe should require.

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The Philippine insurgents were eager, according to the statement of their chief Aguinaldo, to rush upon Manila forthwith, but Admiral Dewey refused to allow hosts of passionate semi-savages to storm a civilised metropolis. In the three weeks that had elapsed since Aguinaldo's landing (Thursday, May 19th) he had assembled and armed a force of 3000 men, won the whole province of Cavité, and declared himself Dictator of the Philippines. Captain-General Augustin already confessed, in a communication to the Madrid government, his inability to hold the ground against two enemies—the insurgents and Dewey—and said that the insurrection had reached great proportions. At Madrid the depressing news from Manila was producing its full effect. The people, in a temporary panic, urged their government to seek peace. It was assumed that the government also had this disposition, and the report went abroad that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had been authorized to confer with ambassadors of the Powers.

On June 9th and 10th, President McKinley sent these nominations to the Senate : To be Major-General in the Volunteer Army, J. Warren Keifer, of Ohio ; to be Brigadier-Generals, John P. S. Gobin of Pennsylvania, Charles F. Roe of New York, and Thomas L. Rosser of Virginia ; and, on June 13th and 17th respectively, James H. Barkley of Illinois, and Henry V. Boynton of the District of Columbia, for the office of Brigadier-General.¹

On the same day that the marines landed on the shores of Guantanamo Bay (June 10th) the Senate agreed to the War Revenue Bill by a vote of forty-three to twenty-two. The act was signed by the President three days later, and

¹ The President's nominations of Adelbert Ames of Massachusetts and Joseph W. Plume of New Jersey to be Brigadier-Generals, were taken to the Senate on June 20.

Secretary Gage issued a circular "inviting subscriptions from the people of the United States for \$200,000,000 of the bonds of the three per cent. loan authorized by the act of Congress to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures."

Four warships of the German East-Asian squadron, with a total of 1605 men, had arrived in Manila Bay by the 13th of June. This force seemed to be disproportionate in view of the German interests to be protected in the Philippines. Suggestions as to the policy which directed such a concentration began to engage serious attention. Dewey reported that the insurgents, continuing hostilities, had practically surrounded Manila, and that they had taken 2500 Spanish prisoners whom they had treated humanely; that they did not intend to storm the city immediately; that twelve merchant vessels were anchored in the bay with refugees on board under guard of neutral men of war; that the health of the squadron continued excellent; that the German commander-in-chief had just arrived; and that, in addition to the German squadron, one or more British, French, and Japanese warships were in port. Gradually American forces were made ready at San Francisco and despatched in aid of Dewey. The transports *China*, *Colon*, *Zealandia*, and *Senator*, bearing the 4200 men who composed the second relief expedition, sailed for Manila June 15th.

On June 17th a portion of the Cadiz reserve squadron under Admiral Camara left port and sailed eastward. Two days later they were at Cartagena. The idea that this expedition would go to Manila to relieve Augustin seemed rather postposterous, almost from the first. "Perhaps this was but a feint?"—one asked; or might it be a little excursion to test the seaworthiness of the vessels? The *Pelayo* and some of the other ships had the reputa-

tion of being chiefly dangerous to those who sailed upon them ; and yet the excursion proved not to be a brief one, after all.

A report that the insurgents of the Philippines had determined to form a republic was much commented upon at Washington, London, and Madrid. It was not regarded as probable that the inhabitants of the various islands forming the archipelago, who differ widely in race, language, religion, and customs, could establish a stable native government ; but the suggestion was made that this intention or disposition of the insurgents to act independently might give rise to new complications. Already on the 12th of June the insurgents had proclaimed a provisional government at Old Cavité. The islands were then declared independent of Spanish authority, and Aguinaldo was elected president. The fact is, the Filipinos were playing fast and loose with us, requiring American protection, readily making such promises of good behaviour as were necessary to secure it, yet all the time looking for a possible withdrawal of the Americans, to be followed by a recognition of Aguinaldo and his officers as the lawful government. In other words, it was another form of the same problem that confronted us in Cuba. At the end of the war we shall find Aguinaldo issuing a memorial to the Powers, requesting a recognition of the independence of the Philippine Republic, and making no mention of the United States. But at the time we have now reached in our narration he was assuring the United States Consul, Mr. Williams, that the insurgent government which had been formed was only provisional, merely for cohesive purposes, and that it was the desire of the insurgents that the Philippine Islands should become an American colony.

A manifesto in favour of peace issued on June 19th by a

number of influential associations in Catalonia, the industrial province of Spain, included the statement that "it would be better to consent to amputation [loss of colonies] than to continue a war that must be fertile in disasters. Peace alone can prevent the utter annihilation of the Spanish nation."

The landing of Shafter's army corps at Daiquiri, on June 22d, has been described as an uncommonly stirring scene; but on the two previous days, the 20th and 21st of June, an island in the Pacific Ocean, the island of Guam, in the Mariana or Ladrone group, saw an appropriation of strange territory, a violent interruption of quiet, old-fashioned security, that will appeal especially to the lovers of romantic tales. Perhaps it would be better worth while to say that this incident suggests novel romantic elements introduced into real life (that is, the life that is real to us—our own life) through our new relations with Spain.

The cruiser *Charleston* and the three transports of the first relief expedition, on their way to Manila stopped at Port San Luis d'Apra, island of Guam. At half-past eight o'clock on the morning of Monday, June 20th, the *Charleston* fired thirteen shells at the fortifications. There was no response. It seemed a long time to wait before two small boats put out from shore and approached the cruiser. In them were Lieutenant Garcia Guiterrez of the Spanish navy, Captain of the port of San Luis d'Apra, and Surgeon Romero of the Spanish army, the health officer. They came to ask after the health of the warship. The officer of the deck had sent for Captain Glass, who now came to the gangway and asked the Spaniards to come on board the *Charleston*. They replied that they had merely come to see about the *Charleston's* health, and

the nature of her business in San Luis d'Apra. Captain Glass repeated his invitation and in such fashion that they felt they had better accept it: so they went up the cruiser's gangway and followed Captain Glass down into his cabin. When they were seated there Lieutenant Guterrez, the port captain, said: "You will pardon our not immediately replying to your salute, Captain, but we are not accustomed to receiving salutes here, and are not supplied with proper guns for returning them. However, we shall be glad to do our best to return your salute as soon as possible."

When the two Spaniards learned the real purpose of the *Charleston's* visit they were astounded. This was the first intimation they had received of the fact that war had been declared between the United States and Spain. They had not even known that the relations between the two countries were strained so as to approach the danger point.¹

The forts had been disused for years. A big palm-tree grew fairly in front of one of the gun ports.

The navigator of the *Charleston*, Lieutenant Braunersreuther, in command of a force of marines, went ashore to notify the governor and to demand his surrender. It appeared that two companies of soldiers were stationed at Agaña, four miles away. Accordingly the governor was directed to write an order which would be sent to them by a messenger.

¹ Compare this circumstance: When Brigadier-General Randall, who had been stationed at Fort St. Michael, Alaska, arrived in Washington, July 24th, he said he had but recently learned of the Spanish war.

The particulars of the story of the capture of Guam are taken, with a few changes in the form of statement, from O. K. D.'s letter in the *New York Sun*, August 8th.

The governor sighed profoundly and went into his office to write the order. He was overwhelmed by the calamity that had fallen upon his island, for he had not dreamed that he would be molested, even if the United States should go to war with Spain. He was so far out of the way, he thought, that he would be absolutely safe. Yet here was a great force sent for his capture, and he was forced to surrender without even the poor satisfaction of firing a single shot in resistance. He had no inkling that this assault on him was merely a side issue. There had not been the slightest thing to indicate to him that the expedition was bound for Manila. As far as he knew or could know it had been designed simply for him, and he was, as he wrote in his note of surrender, without the possibility of defence. So he sat down and wrote the order to the commandant of his troops to march them down from Agaña and have them at Peti with all their equipment that afternoon by four o'clock. When he had finished he mournfully held the order out for Lieutenant Braunersreuther to see. It was satisfactory, and the lieutenant sealed it up. A messenger was found, who was soon galloping along the road to Agaña with the order. Then Lieutenant Braunersreuther said :

“ Now you may write to your wife.”

“ How much time shall I have ? ” asked the governor, in a quivering voice.

“ All you want,” replied Lieutenant Braunersreuther.

The governor turned to his desk and began to write. In the meantime his staff-officers had been busy over their own messages to their families. The governor wrote steadily for half an hour, and Lieutenant Braunersreuther waited. At last the governor finished. He had filled three large sheets, almost the size of foolscap. He gathered them up and offered them to his captor. Lieut-

tenant Braunersreuther shook his head and waved them away.

"That is a private letter," he said, "and I have nothing to do with it."

The governor put his head down in his crossed arms on the desk in front of him and cried like a child. When at length he regained control of himself, the letter was sealed up and a messenger found to deliver it to the Señora Marina in Agaña.

By this time the other officers had succeeded in sending their messages, and were now required to get into the whaleboat and put out for the *Charleston*. The governor and his staff were all in uniform, but none wore side arms.

They went sorrowfully down the wharf to the boathouse and stepped into the *Charleston's* boats.

On Tuesday afternoon, June 21st, a flag taken from the *Charleston* was raised above the old fort Santa Cruz, five thousand miles west of California, and saluted by the guns of the cruiser. The governor, José Marina, with his staff and soldiers, were carried to Manila, a proceeding which, as the correspondent writes, left the island of Guam in a curious situation. The Spanish flags had been surrendered and the Stars and Stripes raised and saluted, but no representative of the United States was left to rule in place of this pacific representative of the lion and the castle.

On the 23d of June the monitor *Monadnock* and the collier *Nero* sailed from San Francisco to reinforce Dewey.

Reinforcement for Augustin seemed also to be well on its way, for despatches from Madrid, Gibraltar, London, and Algiers, asserted that Admiral Camara's squadron, which comprised the best of the warships from Cadiz, convoying troopships, was proceeding eastward through the Mediterranean Sea towards the Suez Canal. In the

Chamber of Deputies at Madrid Prime Minister Sagasta declared that this squadron was bound for the Philippines.

The situation at Manila is shown in a despatch from Dewey, dated at Cavité, June 23d. "Five German, three British, one French, and one Japanese men-of-war in port," he telegraphed. "Insurgents constantly closing in on city. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived by my permission . . . established himself at Cavité outside the arsenal under the protection of our guns and organised his army. The progress of Aguinaldo has been wonderful. He has invariably conducted the war humanely. My relations with him are cordial, but my conferences have been only of a personal nature."

(Between this item and the next item following, we have to think of the West Indies, as well as the East, and remember the fight at Las Guásimas, June 24th.)

The Cortes was dissolved by a decree of the Queen Regent on the 24th of June, and martial law was proclaimed in the capital.

Three days later announcements were published from Madrid and from Washington which have an obvious relation to each other. Admiral Camara had received orders, it was asserted, to proceed through the Suez Canal with the warships under his command, despite the fact that the United States Consul at Port Said had protested against permitting the Spanish fleet to refill its bunkers with coal there. An official bulletin of the Navy Department at Washington announced that "Commodore Watson sails to-day in the cruiser *Newark* to join Admiral Sampson at Santiago, where he will take under his command an armoured squadron with cruisers and proceed at once to the Spanish coast." And as though to render it impossible for any inattentive person to miss the full signifi-

cance of the threat, another official bulletin, subsequently posted, added the information that "This squadron will sail for the coast of Spain immediately"; and the Bureau of Navigation gave the following particulars to the press: "Commodore J. A. Howell is assigned to the command of the first squadron of the North Atlantic Fleet. Commodore W. S. Schley is assigned to the command of the second squadron of the North Atlantic Fleet. Commodore John C. Watson is assigned to the command of the Eastern Squadron. The Eastern Squadron will be composed of the following vessels: Flagship *Newark*, battleship *Iowa*, battleship *Oregon*, cruiser *Yosemite*, cruiser *Yankee*, cruiser *Dixie*, and the colliers *Scindia*, *Abarenda*, and *Alexander*."

The third expedition to the Philippines, commanded by General Arthur McArthur, who made the *Indiana* his flagship, sailed from San Francisco June 27th. The other vessels starting on the same day were, the *City of Para*, the *Ohio*, and the *Morgan City*. The *Valencia* was delayed, and sailed later in the week.

General Merritt sailed Wednesday on the *Newport*.

Now we should refer to an effort to extend the field of the operations of the Cuban blockade; and this in part because we shall see that some of the principal objects which a blockade is designed to accomplish had not been effected. The coast line was long, the harbours many, our naval force inadequate. Supplies of food, of arms, of ammunition, and of money, reached the army of occupation rather easily. From Cape Francés, the south-eastern point in the province of Pinar del Rio, to Cape Cruz, the southwestern point in the province of Santiago de Cuba, every port but one had been practically an open door. Now, on June 28th, notice was served that these doors had been

closed. President McKinley's proclamation of that date declared that "In addition to the blockade of the ports specified in my proclamation of April 22d, 1898, the United States of America has instituted and will maintain an effective blockade of all of the ports on the south coast of Cuba from Cape Francés to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of the port of San Juan in the island of Porto Rico." The reference in the last clause was to the blockade of San Juan by the *St. Paul*, in command of Captain Sigsbee, which had been in effect for a week. The blockading of a port of the importance of the capital of Porto Rico seemed a good deal of an undertaking for a single vessel of the *St. Paul's* class, but it is not to be denied that Captain Sigsbee had proved his efficiency in that command in a striking manner. On the 22d of June, while off San Juan, he was attacked by the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror*. The *Terror* made a dash which was awaited by the *St. Paul*, and while still at long range the destroyer was struck by three shells which so disabled her that she dropped back under cover of the fortifications with difficulty and was towed into the harbour in a sinking condition.¹

¹This vessel, survivor in Spanish hands of Cervera's original seven, lay in the harbour of St. John when the American Commissioners arrived; and the story told then (September 6) by one of her crew gives a new version of her famous encounter with the *St. Paul*.

"There were articles in the papers for several days," he says, "announcing the intention of the brave Spanish commander to go out and sink the blockading vessel. On the day when she started on this errand regimental bands from the Plaza played inspiring airs and a great crowd of citizens hurraed. And so she cast off and passed around Morro Castle, the crowd accompanying her as well as it could along the shore. Then the *Terror* made straight for the *St. Paul* under full speed—and she was supposed to be

On July 4th, the day after the destruction of Cervera's fleet at Santiago, Dewey was telegraphing to Secretary Long that the United States troops had been landed and comfortably housed at Cavité.

Two days later Camara's squadron was recalled to protect the Spanish coast ; and so Watson's fleet, which had scarcely existed, had yet completely fulfilled its destiny.

President McKinley signed the Hawaiian annexation resolution on the 7th of July,¹ and on the 8th Congress adjourned.

We must now refer to Germany's "mailed hand" in the East, and to the so-called "Subig Bay Affair."

The Subig Bay Affair may be characterised as merely one of the many incidents in which the hostility of the German fleet in Philippine waters found expression ; or, if hostility seem too strong a word, let a phrase such as "lack of courtesy" or "ignorance of good manners" take its place. It happens that this particular incident came to the knowledge of the American public, and aroused indignation ; but if it had been described in its proper connection as an episode in a continued story of insolence it would not have seemed so conspicuous. That continued story, however, has been withheld by the man who felt himself strong enough to command the situation

able to make thirty-five miles an hour. She was hit at a distance of about three miles by a six-pounder once, and again by a five-inch shell. The latter crippled her, killing four (among these the chief engineer) and wounding seventeen. Then the *Terror* returned to the harbour ; but the bands still played, for it was claimed that instead of finding one boat she had engaged the American fleet. Those who returned alive were heroes."

¹The impression prevailed among the natives that annexation was only a temporary thing, made necessary by the war and likely to pass with it. See Appendix, "The Hawaiian Islands,"

—not the least of George Dewey's admirable achievements. The Admiral's own discreet statement will serve at present. He said that Aguinaldo had informed him that his troops had taken all of Subig Bay except Isla Grande, which he was prevented from taking by the German man-of-war *Irene*. "On July 7th the *Raleigh* and *Concord* went there," Dewey says. "They took the island and about 1300 men with arms and ammunition. No resistance. The *Irene* retired from the Bay on their arrival." The German admiral opened up a correspondence with Dewey, and turned the matter into a technicality—which is one way of apologising.

The problem confronting our small force in the East Indies was working itself out in a very simple manner. The small force was becoming larger. The second military expedition from San Francisco arrived at Cavité on the 17th of July. General Anderson had 6000 troops under his command. In less than a month from that time it was to be shown that, although the force was small in view of a great undertaking, it was large enough.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF SANTIAGO—PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPEDITIONS TO PORTO RICO—LANDING AT PUERTO DE GUANICA, PORTO RICO—BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

THE "new task" referred to at the end of Chapter VII was in its nature so complex that not all of its developments can yet be foreseen. But, roughly speaking, the problem divided itself into three branches: the first relating to the government of the surrendered city and territory, the second to the control of the insurgent forces, the third to the repatriation of the Spanish and American soldiers.

A letter from President McKinley to the Secretary of War contained directions to be forwarded to the "military occupant" at Santiago, with a full and exceedingly important statement of the general principles to be observed. Some of its specially significant passages follow: "We come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. . . . The judges and other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American commander-in-chief. The native constabulary

will, so far as may be practicable, be preserved. . . . While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind if unfortunately the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. . . . All public funds and securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such government, may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real property of the state he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the state, may be appropriated to his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all school-houses, are, so far as possible, to be protected ; and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments or archives, or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. . . . While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savour of confiscation. As the result of military occupation, the

taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of the government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army. Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for, when possible, in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given. All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation."

General Chambers McKibbin was intrusted with the immediate execution of this programme after the surrender of the city on July 17th ; then the office devolved upon General Leonard Wood, formerly colonel commanding the " Rough Riders," General McKibbin resuming command of his brigade on July 20th.¹

The Cuban General Garcia, withdrawing his troops from the neighbourhood of Santiago, tendered to that rather undefined body which he regarded as his Government his resignation as commander of the insurgent forces in Eastern Cuba. In explanation of this action he sent to General Shafter a letter which was a resentful statement of grievances. Neither he nor his officers, he complained, had been invited to be present at the ceremonies on the

¹ When the army of invasion was withdrawn, General Lawton remained until October in command of a garrison of immunes.

occasion of taking over the city ; the Spanish authorities had been left in power, and the most unfavourable views of the conduct and motives of his army were entertained and expressed by the Americans. He had therefore decided to withdraw his forces to the interior.

The opposition to the policy of continuing the Spanish civil officers in power was not limited to the armed insurgents. A petition to President McKinley, which by the 23d of July had been signed by 2000 inhabitants of Santiago, expressed the hope that "the present state of affairs in Santiago, where the Spanish have still in their hands the administration of our interests, fate, and property, will be short, and that the city will be turned over to the Cubans."

Already there had been evidence of renewed activity on the part of the blockading vessels off the southern coast of Cuba between the capes mentioned in President McKinley's proclamation of June 28th. The little auxiliary gunboat *Eagle*, formerly the yacht *Almy*, destroyed the Spanish steamship *Santo Domingo* near Cape Francés on July 12th—the Spaniard being a vessel of 5400 tons, well armed and laden with cattle and grain for Havana. Again, on July 18th, a few of our smaller vessels bombarded Manzanillo, the most important harbour in the south-western portion of Santiago Province. Three steamers of the Mendez line were set on fire, and several gunboats that were in the harbour were stranded.

On July 20th the United States transport *Seneca*, with sick and wounded soldiers who had suffered greatly from lack of proper accommodations, medical attendance, and supplies, arriving at New York harbour, was detained at quarantine. The *Seneca* had left Siboney, Cuba, on July 14th, the precursor in a distressing sequence of over-

crowded transports, whose arrival from time to time during the weeks that followed, smote the heart as though our army had blundered into a series of disasters. Each example of mismanagement was like a defeat at the hands of the enemy, or even less tolerable than such reverses would have been; and from this period a menacing question began to take shape: who *is* the enemy that has done this thing?

In accordance with its promise to provide for transportation to Spain of the officers and men surrendered by General Toral, the government had advertised for bids, and on July 20th, the contract was awarded to the *Compañía Transatlántica Española*, that company agreeing to deliver five ships at Santiago before July 29th in condition to receive the prisoners, two more ships before August 6th, and the remainder of the vessels necessary to transport the entire number of prisoners by August 10th.

The number of Spanish troops in Santiago Province, surrendering as they received notice of the fall of the city, proved to be somewhat larger than General Toral had reported. On July 24th, Shafter said of those at Palma and San Luis that they all apparently were greatly delighted at the prospect of returning home, for they were on the verge of starvation. General Shafter continued: "And I have to send them rations to-morrow. If the number of troops keep up as they have, there will be about 24,000 to ship away. Nearly 12,000 are here—3000 from San Luis, 6000 from Guantanamo, and over 2000 at Sagua and Baracoa."¹

The third army that we have spoken of, the army of Privation and Disease, was now proving that it was not merely mightier and more terrible than either of the other

¹ As indicated in § 8 of the Terms of Capitulation, this did not include volunteers, guerrillas, etc. After surrender 1000 died, and aboard the ships bound for Spain 1000 more.

two armies, but than both together. General Shafter's report on the sanitary condition in Santiago on July 27th showed that there were in his small army 4122 sick, and 3193 cases of fever. The condition of the Spanish regulars at Santiago was, as we shall see, going from bad to worse ; and the surrender of Guantanamo revealed conditions there which were much more distressing than those at Santiago had been before our forces, with coercion in one hand, and relief, or the promise of relief, in the other, took over the provincial capital. The Guantanamo troops were literally starving, and there were 2000 sick. For eight days they had no food. On mounting guard the soldiers were obliged to sit, being too weak to stand ; and before the news of capitulation arrived, it had been impossible to proceed with defensive preparations, the men falling from exhaustion as they worked at the trenches.

It is a relief to turn for a moment to more cheerful themes that are to be noted here as part of the war news of the day.

Among President McKinley's visitors on the 22d of July was Lieutenant Hobson, who had come to Washington in obedience to a letter of instructions from Admiral Sampson, to explain the position and condition of the Spanish cruiser *Cristóbal Colon*, and to urge that steps should be immediately taken so that this fine ship might be saved to the United States navy. Of the other vessels that composed Cervera's fleet, Hobson reported that none could be saved, with the possible exception of the *Marta Teresa*.¹

The popularity of the war loan of \$200,000,000 was shown in a statement at Washington, on July 25th, when

¹ The *Marta Teresa* was raised, and was towed to Guantanamo harbour on September 24th.

the first shipments of the bonds were being made, that there were about 300,000 persons to whom the bonds would be allotted, and only those persons offering to take the bonds in small amounts (up to \$4500) would receive them.

At Manila, towards the end of July, the situation had several new elements of interest.

Aguinaldo, as President of the Council appointed by himself, was authorised (also by himself) to wear a gold collar with a triangular gold pendant, on which a sun and stars were engraved, and to carry a gold whistle and a stick with a gold tassel.

The disembarkation of the troops of the second expedition had been effected at a point two miles from the city ; the attacks of the Filipinos had increased in vigour, and the statement was made that Aguinaldo had been so much encouraged by his successes that he was now trying to create conditions in the islands which would necessitate the recognition of their independence by America, as well as by other powers. So far as Germany was concerned, our administration felt that the situation had improved, and that the observance of a strict neutrality by that nation was assured—a good deal of significance being attached to the German ambassador's friendly call at the White House on July 22d.

The *City of Rio de Janeiro* sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines on July 23d, carrying Brigadier-General H. G. Otis, Volunteer Companies A, C, D, E, F, G, L, and M, of the First South Dakota Volunteers, 104 recruits for the Utah Light Artillery, and staff-officers and clerks—in all 50 officers, 840 enlisted men, and 10 civilians. The transport *St. Paul* took its complement of soldiers from Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota on July 28th. So we see that reinforcements were being forwarded

to Manila at short intervals ; but they were not in such numbers as to satisfy even well-informed people, who thought that a much larger force would be required for immediate service in the Philippines than in either Cuba or Porto Rico. Brigadier-General Charles King said : " It is my personal opinion that every man of the expeditionary force will be wanted in the Philippines, and will go there. Even should Manila be taken from the Spanish, and the war settled in the Orient as far as Spain is concerned, with the forces now there or already ordered to depart, it is still not to be doubted that General Merritt will be glad to have 50,000 men before he is through with Aguinaldo."

In order to test the sentiment of the public in regard to Porto Rico, a statement of our government's policy in that relation was made on July 21st, and was widely published throughout the country. " Porto Rico will be kept by the United States," so this official or semi-official announcement ran ; " that is settled, and has been the plan from the first. Once taken, it will never be released. It will pass forever into the hands of the United States, and there has never been any other thought. Its possession will go towards making up the heavy expense of war to the United States. Our flag once run up there will float over the island permanently."

On the same day General Miles was making final preparations for sailing with the main body of the military expedition to Porto Rico from Guantanamo Bay. " We have the *Massachusetts*, *Dixie*, *Gloucester*, *Cincinnati*, *Annapolis*, *Leyden*, and *Wasp*, with the *Yale* and *Columbia*," he telegraphed. " We expect to sail at three o'clock " ; and he sent the following summary of the troops starting under his immediate command : " Four light batteries of

the Third and Fourth Artillery; Lomia's Battery B, Fifth Artillery; Sixth Illinois; Sixth Massachusetts; 275 recruits for Fifth Corps; 60 men of Signal Corps, and Seventh Hospital Corps—3415 men all told." The four light batteries referred to were C and F of the Third Artillery, and B and F of the Fourth.

While the commanding general, on board the U. S. S. *Yale*, was proceeding along the northern coast of Hayti, other strong detachments of the same expedition were also under way. The vessels carrying General Wilson's division (First of the First Army Corps) and General Ernst's brigade had sailed from Charleston, and General Schwan's brigade was leaving Port Tampa to join the invading force off the coast of Porto Rico.

As one of the measures of preparation for the campaign which shows the most careful planning, we should not omit the mention of the capture of Nipe, a port on the northern coast of Santiago Province, lying between the surrendered territory and Holguin, where the Spanish forces remaining in the western part of the province had their headquarters. It was at first intended that Nipe should be made the rendezvous for the several military detachments en route to Porto Rico; in any case it was thought it might be well to have it as a base of supplies for the army and navy, and a harbour of refuge for warships and transports. The expedition to Nipe was promptly and entirely successful, and the Spanish cruiser *Jorge Juan*, defending the place, was destroyed without loss to our side (July 22d).

Five troops of cavalry at Camp Alger, Virginia, were ordered to Newport News on July 23d, for embarkation on transports waiting there. These were Troops A and C of New York Cavalry, the Governor's Troop, Pennsylvania, and the Philadelphia City Troop. From Tampa

sailed that day the transports *Arcadia*, *Whitney*, *Miller*, *Clotilda*, and *Cherokee*, with General Schwan's headquarters and two light batteries of the Seventh Artillery, one troop of the Second Cavalry, two companies of the Eleventh Infantry, the Nineteenth Infantry, and two sections of the general pack-train. The *Mohawk*, leaving somewhat later, carried ten companies of the Eleventh Infantry, and 600 pack-animals, the brigade ambulance train, and Red Cross ambulances.

It was said at this time that about 35,000 men in all were to be sent to Porto Rico from the several points of embarkation. No sooner had the Schwan expedition departed than preparation for another was made at Tampa, and the three Southern regiments at that point—First Florida, Second Georgia, and Fifth Maryland—were ordered to embark as soon as possible. At Newport News about 5500 men were ready to go on board by July 25th; and on the 28th, Major-General Brooke, commanding this detachment, also sailed. The rendezvous was the island itself, and not Nipe or another Cuban harbour.

A landing at Puerto de Guanica, near Ponce, on the southern coast of the island, was made by the detachment under General Miles on Monday, July 25th. A different point had been indicated in the despatches, and the selection of Guanica as a place of landing was a surprise to friends at home as well as to the enemy. No doubt this change of plan will connect itself in the minds of our readers with the careful investigations made for the government in the neighbourhood of Ponce in May.¹

The landing was prefaced by a skirmish between Spanish troops and the crew of the *Gloucester's* launch, in which a number of the Spaniards fell. "Circumstances were such," General Miles said in a despatch to the

¹ See Chapter IV.

Secretary of War, " that I deemed it advisable to take the harbour of Guanica first, fifteen miles west of Ponce, which was successfully accomplished between daylight and eleven o'clock. The Spaniards were surprised. The *Gloucester*, Commander Wainwright, first entered the harbour ; met with slight resistance, fired a few shots. All the transports are now in the harbour, and infantry and artillery rapidly going ashore. This is a well-protected harbour ; water sufficiently deep for all transports ; the heavy vessels can anchor within a few hundred feet of shore. The Spanish flag was lowered, and the American flag raised, at eleven o'clock to-day. Captain Higginson, with his fleet, has rendered able and earnest assistance. Troops in good health and best spirits. No casualties."

Rumours of negotiations for peace gained in authority from day to day, though still, of course (their principal source being Madrid), *quot relatores, tot sententiæ* : there were as many opinions as there were correspondents. For in Spain you may have any answer that you expect. The Spaniard's emphasis is not upon matter, but upon manner, and he defines the agreeable man as the man who agrees. So, to correspondents expecting peace, there was promise of it at Madrid, while those who feared that their livelihood would be more precarious in a " piping time " had the invincible Spanish peasant still waved in their faces, so to speak, even as he used to be waved in Roman faces before Horace's day.

Certainty took the place of rumour on the 26th of July. The French ambassador at Washington, M. Jules Cambon, on behalf of the government of Spain and at the request of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, conveyed to President McKinley at the White House that afternoon a

message designed to open the door to other diplomatic messages that would be welcomed. It was like that—not too express or formal—but it was quite enough for a beginning.

The next day London traders sent the price of Spanish fours up to 39 $\frac{1}{8}$, and only twenty-four hours more elapsed before the Madrid newspapers broke into protest against the continuance of hostilities by the United States “after Spain had sued for peace.” According to a despatch in a London newspaper Prime Minister Sagasta said : “ We resolved upon peace many days ago and made known our resolution to the United States. I regard as null and void and as destitute of good faith everything the Americans have done since. I am ready to formally protest to the Powers.” The fact is, there had been no overtures for peace of which the State Department at Washington had been officially informed before the visit of M. Cambon on Tuesday afternoon. The suggestion then made by the French ambassador was not of such a nature that it could be regarded as a warrant for stopping the war. Rather, it was evident that peace must wait upon the acceptance of conditions which had not yet been proposed or even formulated ; and it was not at all plain that a truce too easily obtained would advance the much-desired conclusion.

CHAPTER X

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN—AT SANTIAGO—AT MANILA— NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE CONTINUING—THE PROTOCOL SIGNED—FALL OF MANILA

I

IN Porto Rico actual experiences seem to borrow a character from fiction, or, to express it differently, seem to gain a certain racy and zestful quality which, as we do not find it elsewhere in real life, we rather look for in the fine and artful studies of life that constitute the most delightful part of literature. So when Captain Whitney returned from his secret mission last June there was of course a little story on the tip of his significant tongue, as we have said in Chapter IV.

More recently, several persons have brought nuggets and fragments of ore from what appears to be a literary mine situated in the same delectable island, and have laid them on the writing-table, so to speak, as though tempting the literary workman to take ship immediately, with the promise of a new literary Klondike held out to those who have been industriously trying to raise their little annual revenues by planting and cultivating and harvesting the New Englander, the Southern negro, the Western cowboy, and such familiar types. One starts naturally with the Spaniard as the "Son of the Goth," proud, cruel, courteous: that is a secure possession, and so we need not

doubt the substantial element in the character we may intend to acquire with our pen-point ; but now see what play of comedy, from prettiness to buffoonery, there is, to make the character rich and various.

On July 27th a few American warships entered the port of Ponce, and these things happened :

The *Wasp* steamed up close to the shore with all her guns bearing on the port. Still there were no shots. Lieutenant Ward then sent Ensign Rowland Curtin with four men ashore bearing a flag of truce. As the boat approached the people crowded down to the water's edge, their hands filled with cigars, tobacco, cigarettes, bananas, and other articles which they threw at the Americans. As the ensign stepped out of the boat upon the beach the people crowded around him, those nearest to him forcing their gifts upon him, while others, farther away, threw their offerings to the sailors. Then they gave three cheers. Ensign Curtin introduced himself and said that he had come to demand the surrender of the port and the city. The people declaring that they were glad to see him, he then asked if the civil or military authorities were present.

“ Oh, yes ; the civil authorities were on hand, but the military must be consulted, and they were in the town.”

Well, there was a telephone from the Custom House, and the little ensign telephoned his demand (with a threat of bombardment) to the garrison three miles distant. Then the Spanish soldiers at once made a raid upon the men's furnishing stores in Ponce. They seized small articles of clothing, wadded them together, and put this defensive material under their uniforms—but not in front. They helped each other and worked with frenzied haste to get themselves armoured against bullets from the rear which they already seemed to feel in imagination.

The police also took the fever and jammed carriage cushions and pillows between their bodies and their outer garments. Then they waited patiently for the word to start for the hills.

After the surrender had been arranged and the flag raised over the Custom House, Lieutenant Murdoch and Surgeon Heiskell entered a carriage and drove to the city, where people were dancing with joy and crying : “ *Vivan los Americanos !* ” The windows of the houses were all filled with spectators and crowds were gathered on the roofs ; the shops were open through the night, and whenever the officers stopped people gathered around them. Red-shirted firemen cleared the way to the shops so that the guests of the town might go in if they chose, while the shopkeepers offered their whole stock to the officers and declared they would take no pay.

This account is merely a condensation from a despatch in the *New York Sun*, and a later issue of the same paper, which plumes itself upon its accuracy, tells how General Stone captured the inland village of Adjuntas, which lies among the hills twenty miles north of Ponce.

A dozen men with a captain of the Signal Corps were sent on ahead, the General following in a carriage with only one orderly to lead his horse. Now, towards night they came to an humble cottage near Adjuntas, and in the low doorway stood a woman and a girl of fifteen. And as the invaders were dashing by, “ the girl raised both her hands and motioned for the carriage to stop. The drivers hauled the horses back upon their haunches and out from the doorway tripped the blushing young maiden.

“ In each of her small brown hands she held great bouquets of roses, red and white, and fragrant. ‘ *Vivan los Americanos !* ’ she piped, as she held one bouquet out to the forward carriage, and, repeating her salutation, she

tossed her other prize to the travellers in the rear, and then fled to the home of her fathers.

“This was but a hint of what was to follow. Groups of women gathered at the wider spaces of the roadway, each with flowers picked from the fields with her own hand, and crying ‘*Vivan los Americanos!*’ ‘*Viva Puerto Rico libre!*’ pelted the passers-by with their tokens of loyalty. The nearer the approach to the village proper, the thicker became the hail of floral offerings. From the housetops, the balconies, the windows, the trees even, poured this rain of flowers.

“The horses shied and went tearing faster and faster, while the *cocheros* howled profanely and gleefully. By this time a perfect mob was trailing in the rear, and when General Stone drew up at the public square the entire town surrounded him, cheering, dancing, and still raining their roses. And, elbowing his way through the throng, came Teodoro Figueroa, the *alcalde* of Adjuntas. With the smile of a dapper dancing-master, and the sweeping bow of a great patriot, Señor Figueroa raised aloft an American flag which, he announced, had been made by the women of the town. They begged the American General to do them the honour to allow it to be raised, a request he granted with great zest and alacrity. The ceremony took place amid more cheers at the Town Hall, and here, too, General Stone made a brief speech and read General Miles’s proclamation as to our purposes in Porto Rico. This appeared to please everyone immensely, and they ‘*vivad*’ until the General had sought the privacy of a house and the few soldiers had scattered.”

But a soldier from Wisconsin, having come so far, might think himself entitled to a little fighting. One of the volunteers who stood on guard in front of the Fire Department building in Ponce, realised that there had been

rather too much of sweetness when a score of young women and young men began to throw flowers and wave red, white, and blue bandanas at him. The private from Wisconsin swore a little before he remarked : " Say, look here ! I ain't Sara Bernhardt."

These things were published as news—as part of the most important news—towards the end of July ; side by side with General Shafter's reports of the fever's victory at Santiago.

It would be a mistake to suppose that correspondents went to the island with prepossessions (that they had been reading Antonio de Trueba's stories of old Spain, for instance) and so wrote quaintness into their own narrations. It is probably much nearer the truth to say that the charm is in Porto Rico, to be enjoyed by anyone who has sense and sympathy, and that these writers have only thrown on the table a few specimens picked up at the surface of a rich mine. It is not by any means the same quality of Hispaniolism that we know so well in the life of the Spanish Peninsula, where a social talent is compensation for the lack of practical and mechanical ability, and, in the light air, especially of Andalusia, the people make a practice of being intensely alive.

No, it is not the same thing : in fact, there can be nothing in Spanish America quite like the life in Southern Spain : but in Porto Rico we have at least a provincial Don Quixote with a provincial Sancho at his side—and (most effective of contrasts) face to face with Uncle Sam.

II

The digression is not without its purpose ; for a little campaign was beginning under conditions that no history or novel or play has made familiar. But we must pay

the usual penalty of digression : we must come back to the good straight road at the point where we turned aside.

On Wednesday afternoon, July 27th, Commander Davis, with the *Dixie*, *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Gloucester*, left the port of Guanica to blockade Ponce and capture lighters for the use of the army ; and here we may give certain details that may seem more important than those already mentioned. At least it is essential to add these details to the description of Ponce's amiable capitulation in order to connect this episode with those which are to follow.

Shortly after midnight the port and city surrendered, the Spanish commander stipulating that the garrison was to be allowed to retire, that the civil government should remain in force, that the police and the fire brigade should be maintained without arms, and that the captain of the port should not be made a prisoner. Early on Thursday morning General Miles and General Wilson, with the *Massachusetts*, *Cincinnati*, and transports, arrived from Guanica, and the captured lighters were used in landing the troops. A disposition has been shown in some quarters to suggest a rivalry as between the army and navy for the principal share in the honours of the occasion ; but this seems to be quite unnecessary, for the fact is simply that the city surrendered to the navy, and was occupied by the army.

It is not too much to say that General Miles himself promptly caught, from his new surroundings, something of the zest that appears in the literary style of less pre-occupied and much less distinguished writers. His account of the same occurrences was sent while General Wilson, with Ernst's brigade, was disembarking. " Spanish troops are retreating from the southern part of Porto Rico," wrote the commanding general. " Ponce and its

port, having a population of 50,000, are now under the American flag. The populace received the troops and saluted the flag with wild enthusiasm. . . . This is a prosperous and beautiful country. The army will soon be in a mountain region ; weather delightful ; troops in best of health and spirits ; anticipate no insurmountable obstacle in the future. Results thus far have been accomplished without the loss of a single life."

In explanation of the last sentence, we should say that four Americans had been wounded in an engagement on the skirmish line the day after the landing at Guanica. The Spanish losses during the week were not exactly known, but it was hoped and believed that they were very slight.

And, referring to the behaviour of the garrison, who numbered only about 350, and were, as we have seen, utterly without support from the citizens, General Miles added, "The Spanish retreat was precipitate, they leaving rifles and ammunition in barracks, and forty or fifty sick in hospital. The people are enjoying a holiday in honour of our arrival."

And to the Puertorriqueños, thus "enjoying a holiday," General Miles issued the following proclamation :

" To the Inhabitants of Porto Rico :

" In the prosecution of the war against the Kingdom of Spain by the people of the United States, in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military forces have come to occupy the islands of Porto Rico. They come bearing the banners of freedom, inspired by noble purposes, to seek the enemies of our government and of yours, and to destroy or capture all in armed resistance.

" They bring you the fostering arms of a free people, whose greatest power is justice and humanity to all living within their fold. Hence they release you from your

former political relations, and it is hoped this will be followed by the cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States.

“The chief object of the American military forces will be to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and give the people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occupation.

“They have not come to make war on the people of the country, who for centuries have been oppressed. But, on the contrary, they bring protection not only to yourselves, but to your property. They have come to promote your prosperity, and bestow the immunities and blessings of our own enlightened and liberal institutions and government. It is not their purpose to interfere with the existing laws and customs, which are wholesome and beneficial to the people, so long as they conform to the rules of the military administration, order, and justice. This is not a war of devastation and dissolution, but one to give all within the control of the military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilisation.”

By the last day of the month the Spanish volunteers had begun to surrender themselves with arms and ammunition. A few of the people on the southern coast were disposed to maintain their allegiance to Spain, but these encountered rather rough usage at the hands of the majority; in fact, on July 31st General Miles said that “four fifths” of the people were overjoyed at the arrival of our army, and 2000 from one place had volunteered to serve with it. The Puertorriqueños were furnishing supplies and means of transportation, and the Custom House at Ponce had already yielded \$14,000. There were so many requests for flags to be given to the different municipalities that it became necessary to send to the authorities at Washington for a large supply of these visible proofs of a new allegiance.

It seemed that our forces in the island were already

sufficient for concluding the work so pleasantly begun. General Wilson was acting as military governor of the Ponce district while General Miles conducted the campaign. The total number of men for the latter, in the various detachments, including those that awaited transports at Tampa and Newport News, was about 30,000. A good deal of scandalised comment was excited, therefore, by the proposal to send 20,000 additional troops under the command of Major-General Wade. A despatch from Adjutant-General Corbin on August 1st showed that this measure had been decided upon, and that eighteen regiments of volunteer troops would be designated for service in Porto Rico under General Wade—these regiments being selected on a basis such that each State heretofore unrepresented at the front should now have representation. Fortunately, events were to outrun the preparations for the despatch of this unnecessary force.

On August 3d a landing of American troops under General Brooke was made at Arroyo, on the south-eastern coast, as an ancillary movement in the proposed march to San Juan. General Miles's very deliberate advance in overwhelming force, with flanking columns on the east, and, as we shall presently see, on the west of the great military road, was designed to make resistance seem useless, and so to prevent a sacrifice of lives—American or Spanish. Moreover, instead of chopping down the tree, it seemed as well to take it as it stood, with all its fruit still growing. The southern coast, except the city of Guayama, being securely held, landing parties were now taking possession of the eastern coast, at Cape San Juan and other points. And it was evident that the commanding general would thus be enabled, if serious resistance should be offered on the military road from Ponce to the capital, to despatch cavalry and artil-

lery from one of the eastern ports, to catch the enemy between two superior forces, and in the end to make even a strong position untenable.

But in view of the peace negotiations there was much uncertainty in regard to the degree of resistance to be expected, and it was understood that Captain-General Macias had instructions from Madrid not to waste the lives of his soldiers (a circumstance which possibly proved an additional incentive to the Captain-General to declare that he could drive off the Americans again—"as he did Sampson!").

On Friday, August 5th, in a forward movement from Arroyo, a portion of General Brooke's command captured Guayama. The Fourth Ohio and Third Illinois, after a slight skirmish with the enemy, whose strength was estimated at about 500, in and about the town, received the surrender of the 16,000 inhabitants, which may well be characterised as unconditional.

A flag of truce had been shown and some of our officers and soldiers rode through Guayama's streets. At first "all of the houses were closed, and the place looked like a deserted town. Not a person was in sight. But by the time the officers rode up to the public building the houses began to open. Everywhere heads were poked out of doors and quickly withdrawn. They were poked out again in a moment, and again withdrawn, but this time the withdrawal was much slower. The third time the heads stayed out, and were followed by shoulders, and then bodies. Someone yelled in a stentorian voice, '*Vivan los Americanos!*' Then, as if by magic, the people came out and rushed towards the officers, shouting the same words. Some prostrated themselves in the road and grabbed the Americans around the knees, while others threw their arms around the necks of the soldiers and

kissed them, all the time shouting, '*Vivan los Americanos!*' Their enthusiasm seemed unbounded, and the scene at the surrender of Ponce was eclipsed."

And now the plan of campaign comes out with perfect distinctness. On Sunday, August 7th, a portion of General Brooke's command advanced from Guayama toward Cayey, the nearest point on the military road that connects Ponce with San Juan, while General Wilson had drawn nearer to the same point, proceeding along the military road from Ponce to Coamo. Simultaneous advances were made in the western half of the island by General Schwan, who started for Mayaguez on the west coast, and by General Henry, whose goal was Arecibo, a town on the north coast due west of the capital. It was evident that the effect of these movements would be to drive all of the Spanish forces in the island back upon San Juan. There they could be hemmed in by our land forces, while vessels of our navy lying off the harbour would be ready to bombard the place, if it did not promptly surrender.

On Monday afternoon a skirmish occurred a few miles beyond Guayama and five of the Fourth Ohio Volunteers were wounded. At an early hour on Tuesday morning 800 Spaniards lost heavily in attempting to retake the lighthouse at Cape San Juan. Forty of our sailors held it, and were supported by the guns of the *Leyden*, *Amphitrite*, and *Cincinnati*. Another action on Tuesday morning was that in which the town of Coamo was captured. Seven of our men were wounded in this affair; on the Spanish side the commander, two captains, and nine privates were killed, 35 wounded, and 180 made prisoners.

The first American soldier killed by the enemy in Porto Rico fell in an engagement near Hormigueros, on August 10th, when about 1200 Spaniards attempted to check the advance of General Schwan's command as it was advanc-

ing upon Mayaguez. The advance was continued after the enemy had lost heavily.

III

Returning to Santiago for a moment, we find Shafter sending an explanation of Garcia's withdrawal to Secretary Alger: "The trouble with General Garcia was that he expected to be placed in command at this place—in other words, that we would turn the city over to him. I explained to him fully that we were at war with Spain, and that the question of Cuban independence could not be considered by me. Another grievance was that, finding that several thousand men marched in without opposition from General Garcia, I extended my own lines in front of him and closed up the gap, as I saw that I had to depend on my own men for any effective investment of the place."

It would be a mistake to suppose that the Cubans retired in order to enjoy the delights of complete inactivity. When the gunboat *Nashville* entered the harbour of Jibara on the northern coast of Cuba, July 29th, a force of Cubans was found to be in possession of that town, which lay outside of the portion of the province of Santiago surrendered by General Toral. Jibara's garrison had retreated to Holguin.

From Santiago, bringing home sick and wounded soldiers, had come the *Seneca*, as we have mentioned, and more recently the *Concho*. And there was the same distressful story to be told over again. On both vessels suffering was augmented by a lack of proper accommodations, medicine, and supplies. Now, on August 3d, the Secretary of War made an official statement concerning these "unfortunate occurrences." He offered an explanation of the "unforeseen circumstances" that had

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hampered the authorities at Santiago, who had "done the best they could." The superlative of good seemed to have a somewhat different meaning when one said that the soldiers from Santiago got their wounds when doing the best *they* could.

On the same day General Shafter's officers in Santiago were taking matters into their own hands in the effort to secure proper consideration for the health of their commands. A cable message from Secretary Alger had been read in the presence of the commanding and medical officers of the Fifth Army Corps, ordering Shafter, at the recommendation of Surgeon-General Sternberg, to move the army into the interior, where the conditions were more favourable. The officers, protesting against a decision which they thought would have the most serious consequences, united in the following round-robin, addressed to General Shafter :

" We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern sea-coast of the United States ; that it can be done without danger to the people of the United States ; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic ; that there are only a few sporadic cases ; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.

" We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move into the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season, without

losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

“ This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, and who understand the situation absolutely.

“ J. FORD KENT, Major-General Volunteers, Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

“ J. C. BATES, Major-General Volunteers, Commanding Provisional Division.

“ ADNA R. CHAFFEE, Major-General, Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

“ SAMUEL S. SUMNER, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry.

“ WILLIAM LUDLOW, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

“ ADELBERT AMES, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

“ LEONARD WOOD, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding the City of Santiago.

“ THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Colonel, Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.”

In addition to this round-robin, a letter from Roosevelt gave his view of the situation more impetuously. “ All of us are certain,” he wrote to Shafter, “ as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the conditions of the army, to be sent home. If we are kept here, it will in all human probability mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.”

On August 4th the Secretary of War ordered the troops to be relieved from further duty at Santiago, as fast as transports could be provided and the transfer of Spanish prisoners would admit of a reduction of the garrison.

Volunteer regiments of immunes were sent to do garrison duty at the city where the third army was now unquestionably supreme. The Spanish prisoners (victims like our own troops of calentura, Santiago fever, and the other common enemies of man) were expecting to take their departure by the ships of the Spanish Trans-Atlantic Company. A War Department Bulletin announced on August 4th, that " transports would sail for New York as fast as the men could be comfortably embarked," and as a sort of riddle that may yet stimulate legitimate curiosity, the additional suggestion was made in the bulletin that " the rest at Montauk Point, Long Island, will prepare these seasoned troops for the campaign against Havana, in which they will probably take part."

The two human armies that had been enemies at Santiago had been hungry together, and had had the same fevers. Now they were to part company. On August 8th, General Shafter telegraphed, "*Miami, Matteawan, and Vigilancia*, sailed this morning, having on board First Volunteer Cavalry (' Rough Riders '), First Regular Cavalry, Battery H, Fourth Artillery, Thirteenth Infantry, and Sixth Infantry." These Americans were to be sent to Long Island ; a shipload of Spaniards was to be sent to Galicia. The Spanish Trans-Atlantic Liner *Alicante* had arrived at Santiago and was taking on board a thousand of the surrendered soldiers. The sick Spaniards were brought from the hospitals on stretchers, in waggons, and upon the backs of their comrades, who were often scarcely stronger than the men they bore. The docks were lined with officers and soldiers who supported or carried their wives and daughters. The American waggons and ambulances brought " cart-loads of miserable, colourless skeletons. The steam lighters were literally covered with the stretchers and litters. The embarkation

was partly effected in the midst of a drenching rain, but absolute order was maintained, and dignified soldierly silence.*

IV

The commander-in-chief of the military expedition to the Philippines, General Merritt, arrived at Manila on July 25th ; and he had made all haste because the last news to reach him before sailing had been that Camara's fleet was on its way through the Suez Canal. He immediately advised the administration that all troops assigned to him would probably be needed. It was represented to him that the insurgent leader, "dictator of the Philippines," fearing the loss of his own prestige which would follow annexation, openly opposed the Americans, while the rank and file of the Filipinos made no secret of their intention to kill every Spaniard who should fall into their hands. It seemed to him, therefore, that a strong force would be needed whether the garrison of Manila surrendered or not, and whatever the terms of peace might be ; for no terms that Spain could make would bind Aguinaldo. Accordingly we find that on August 2d he had requested the War Department to increase his command to 50,000 men. The troops already with him at Manila, those on the way, and those destined to form the next expedition from San Francisco, numbered, all told, about 20,000 ; it appeared, therefore, that Aguinaldo's successes, or his arrogance, or both together, had more than doubled the difficulties of the situation.¹ The

¹ "In less than an hour after the *Newport* dropped anchor the Provisional Governor of the Philippines had begun to take stock of his province. He took luncheon with Admiral Dewey, and benefited by the vast amount of information collected by the active naval commander. Then he saw General Anderson and

events of the next fortnight were to set the problem in a new light, but it would be misleading if we were to revise these statements in view of changes not then foreseen.

And General Merritt was not alone in his mistrust of the Philippine insurgents. From Manila to Rome, from the papal authorities to the apostolic legation at Washington, from the apostolic legation to the departments of our government, whose arms reach half way round the earth—by this course the news came that Aguinaldo's motley following (his men of Luzon, men from Batanga, men from Babuyan) threatened to kill the bishop and clergy of the Roman Catholic Church at Cavité. The interposition of our government was requested, and suitable instructions were sent to the commanders of our military and naval forces.

There had been a sharp engagement between the Spaniards and a portion of the American forces in the trenches south of Malate on the last day of July. General Greene's outposts had been advanced to continue the line from the Camino Real to the beach. Their position, commanding the approach to the city, had been held against a night attack by the Spanish, and rather creditably held, although the Tenth Pennsylvania had needlessly exposed themselves to the enemy's fire, and our losses on this occasion (thirteen killed and forty-seven wounded), together with the fact that it had been necessary to call for reinforcements, encouraged a spirit of resistance in the Spanish garrison. The attack had been repeated the following night, and again the enemy had been driven off.

heard all about what had been done by the land forces. General Greene was away on a reconnoissance of his own that afternoon, but early the next morning General Merritt saw him and learned what he had found out."—*Correspondence from Manila.*

V

The negotiations for peace in progress at Washington, while aggressive movements still continued in Porto Rico and the Philippines, gave especial prominence to the East Indian archipelago, with all the world more or less expectant of our government's decision in regard to Manila, Luzon, and the thousand and one—the uncounted, unexplored, members of the group. The French ambassador, M. Cambon, representing Spain in these negotiations, spent several hours at the White House July 30th, and received a reply to the Spanish overtures. Two days later the Spanish cabinet met to consider and to answer this note, and an outline of our terms of peace was given in an official statement dated August 2d.

“ In order to remove any misapprehension in regard to the negotiations as to peace between the United States and Spain,” the President and Secretary Day explained, “ it is deemed proper to say that the terms offered by the United States to Spain in the note handed to the French ambassador on Saturday last are in substance as follows :

“ The President does not now put forward any claim for pecuniary indemnity, but requires the relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty over, or title to, the island of Cuba, as well as the immediate evacuation by Spain of the island ; the cession to the United States and immediate evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies ; and the like cession of an island in the Ladrões. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbour of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

“ If these terms are accepted by Spain in their entirety, it is stated that commissioners will be named by the United States to meet commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace on the basis above indicated.”

Details of the American note relating to conditions of peace were discussed by President McKinley, M. Cambon, and Secretary Day, at a conference held at the White House on the afternoon of August 3d. Three days later a decision was reached by the Spanish government, with the approval of the Queen Regent, and after consultation with the most important of the party leaders whose opposition was feared, to accept peace on the terms proposed.

Moralising on the significance of the event, its causes, and the misconduct of distinguished culprits, began, as might have been expected, even while the event itself was somewhat in doubt. For example, Señor Sagasta's organ, the *Correo*, observed that Spain had expended \$374,000-000 and 100,000 lives during three years in the futile attempt to keep its colonial empire intact. In the matter of lives, these figures were appalling enough ; so far as money was concerned, however, they seemed far from heroic. A current (though, it was hoped, a too liberal) estimate of the cost of the four months' war to us was nearly a billion dollars.¹

As we have seen, these reports of an early agreement had not yet checked military operations. In the words of the Secretary of War, " we were proceeding on a war basis, as if there were no negotiations for peace " (August 6th). Spain's note, replying to Mr. McKinley's statement of the terms of peace was sent to Paris for transmission to Washington on the 7th. Though its precise terms were not then made known to the general public, its acceptance of the four preliminary conditions of peace was admitted ; there was no doubt, either, that this Spanish reply suggested the expediency of a suspension of hostilities to make the negotiations easier. The Spanish government

¹ A later estimate from Madrid: The cost of the Cuban and Philippine campaigns will exceed 3,000,000,000 pesetas.

cautiously reserved the utmost possible power of discussing details, in the hope of being able eventually to make better terms.

The important communication was received at the French embassy on August 8th, and on the 9th Secretary Day made the statement : " We [*i. e.*, Mr. McKinley, M. Cambon, and himself] have agreed upon a protocol embodying the proposed terms for the negotiation of a treaty of peace, including the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico, and it is expected that this protocol will be executed."

As we draw near to the end of the week we see action, or the promise of action, or restlessness under action deferred, in all those bodies of armed men that the administration at Washington had sent out. We realise that they are the *forces*. At Manila a sufficient army had at last been gathered ; it was no longer necessary for George Dewey to wait, as all through the early summer he had been waiting—holding his own and our own. In Porto Rico, from the base on the southern coast, branches of force pushed upward on the east and on the west and northward through the centre of the island, like a great war-plant growing as fast as men could march. In the camps at home tens of thousands of units of force were demanding and plotting to be released into action. In Cuba action was imminent at a dozen points—a blockading fleet lying just beyond the range of Havana's guns ; ports on the south coast and on the north coast seeming almost to invite immediate attack from the restless grey vessels.

But M. Cambon received authority to sign the protocol on behalf of Spain at one o'clock on Friday afternoon, August 12th. At 4.23 his signature and that of the Secretary of State were affixed in the cabinet room of the White House.

The provisions of the document were these :

First : Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

Second : Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the Ladrões to be selected by the United States, shall be ceded to the latter.

Third : The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbour of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

Fourth : Cuba, Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies shall be immediately evacuated, and commissioners, to be appointed within ten days, shall, within thirty days from the signing of the protocol, meet at Havana and San Juan, respectively, to arrange and execute the details of the evacuation.

Fifth : The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioners are to meet at Paris not later than the first of October.

Sixth : On signing the protocol, hostilities will be suspended, and notice to that effect will be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

The words of the French ambassador, in reply to Mr. McKinley's expression of thanks for the "exercise by France of her good offices to secure a termination of the war," merit especial attention, for a certain hostile purpose, coupled with unfriendly secret suggestions of intervention during the earlier stages of the war, had been subjects for well-grounded resentment. Now, the rather difficult position that the government at Paris had occupied throughout was happily expressed, and perhaps not without a suggestion of apology as well as explanation.

“ It will ever be the honour of my career,” M. Cambon said, “ to have collaborated with the President of the United States in the work of restoring peace between two countries, both of which are friends of France.”

Immediately after the execution of the protocol the following proclamation was signed :

“ WHEREAS, by a protocol concluded and signed August 12th, 1898, by William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively representing for this purpose the government of the United States and the government of Spain, the governments of the United States and Spain have formally agreed upon the terms on which negotiations for the establishment of peace between the two countries shall be undertaken ; and

“ WHEREAS it is in said protocol agreed that upon conclusion and signature hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and that notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces ;

“ Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do, in accordance with the stipulations of the protocol, declare and proclaim, on the part of the United States, a suspension of hostilities, and do hereby command that orders be immediately given, through the proper channels, to the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain from all acts inconsistent with this proclamation.

“ In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“ Done at the city of Washington, this 12th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

“ WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“ By the President :

“ WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State.”

And then, to all his commanders in the Atlantic and Pacific, the President's order went out that hostilities should be suspended. To the commander at Porto Rico this message :

“ *Major-General Miles, Ponce, Porto Rico :*

“ The President directs that all military operations against the enemy be suspended. Peace negotiations are nearing completion, a protocol having just been signed by representatives of the two countries. You will inform the commander of the Spanish forces in Porto Rico of these instructions. Further orders will follow. Acknowledge receipt.

“ By order of the Secretary of War.

“ H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.”

Instructions in similar terms were conveyed to Merritt in the Philippines, and Shafter at Santiago, while to the naval commanders more particular directions were given. The message to Admiral Sampson was as follows :

“ Suspend all hostilities. Blockade of Cuba and Porto Rico raised. Howell ordered to assemble vessels at Key West. Proceed with the *New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, and Massachusetts*, to Tompkinsville (New York harbour). Place the monitors in a safe harbour in Porto Rico. Watson transfer his flag to *Newark*, and remain at Guantanamo. Assemble all cruisers in safe harbours. Order marines north in *Resolute*.”

Commodore Howell, commanding the northern Cuban blockading squadron, was notified to withdraw vessels from blockade. To Admiral Dewey the text of the proclamation was cabled, together with a notification that the protocol had been signed, and with instructions to “ suspend all hostilities and blockade.”

The first expression from Madrid was naturally one of relief, for while the war had seemed swiftly decisive to the world at large, to Spain it had meant a long series of disasters, growing without interruption through four distressful months. Some of the Spanish newspapers expressed sorrow and bitter resentment in view of the terms of the protocol, but this dissent was no more than might have been anticipated ; indeed, it was less, both in volume and in violence, than had generally been expected. There was not a political man in Spain strong enough to dare suggest a continuation of war. It remained for the Spanish executive to secure the indispensable authorisation of the Cortes for signing articles of peace which involved the renunciation of sovereignty over the colonies and the cession of a part of the nation's territory.

VI

At break of day on the last day of authorised warfare three vessels of the blockading fleet off Havana drew within range of the batteries and were fired upon. One shell struck the *San Francisco*.

The very hour before the protocol was signed a bombardment of Manzanillo, province of Santiago de Cuba, was begun by the *Newark*, *Suwanee*, *Osceola*, *Hist*, and *Alvarado*. It was reported at Washington, and efforts were made to send news to Manzanillo in regard to the cessation of hostilities. Early on Saturday morning, Captain Goodrich of the *Newark* received the necessary information ; but already a score of persons had been killed or wounded, and many houses destroyed.

In Porto Rico, General Wilson had sent artillery to dislodge a Spanish force near Aibonito. One of our men was killed in an inconclusive skirmish that took place there.

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Along General Wilson's line on the military road to San Juan slight engagements also occurred.¹

News of peace stopped a battle at Pablo Vasquez not a moment too soon.

General Brooke had thrown out strong columns to the north-west of Guayama, with the design of forcing his way to a 'junction with General Wilson at Cayey or Aibonito.

The enemy was discovered entrenched in a splendid defensive position on the top of a hill. Light Battery B of Pennsylvania had been ordered to begin the engagement. The guns of the first section had been brought up, and a gun had been unlimbered ; a shell had been placed in the chamber ; a Pennsylvanian stood ready to fire.

¹The military road that winds among the mountains, and leads over them to join north with south—St. John with Ponce and (by a branch from Cayey) with Guayama—is broad and hard, and substantial withal. One is reminded that the Spaniard got his early instruction in the very important matter of road-making from that past-master, the Roman. It was not built to fade out from the hillside and to be ploughed over eventually, like a New England highway. Day after day, forever, it may seem to be replying *mañana* to every destructive suggestion of the elements. And surely we should hope it will always be there, to lead many people to a wonderful point of view, near Cayey, where one stops if one is coming from the north, or turns if one is coming from the south, and looks down and out over intensely green plain and hill to the grey sea—to Guayama's two harbours, Arroyo and Jobos, beyond fields of sugar-cane like rich grass ; beyond forests of hard-wood trees, among which palms bend like a vine to make their way upward to light and air above their sturdy companions, and then lift still higher a spear that, the natives say, is a natural lightning-rod ; beyond groves where thousands of parrots in a flock are like a hovering green cloud. And perhaps you may stop or turn near Cayey, for the view, when it happens to be all hidden in mist ; but in a moment the cloud lifts, not like a drop-curtain, but rather with such a disclosure as certain faces make in a smile of recognition.

Suddenly there was a warning cry. Two men on horseback dashed into view, frantically waving their arms. The men at the guns waited. A message from General Miles had been received by General Brooke, directing that all hostile military operations should be stopped. The Pennsylvanians, officers and men, howled with disgust, and, when ordered to return to camp, wheeled the guns about sullenly and went, grumbling, to the rear.

It is not too much to say that the principal battle of the war might have occurred here (certainly the principal battle of the Porto Rico campaign) if the message of peace had arrived a few minutes later, when the fight had once gained headway. About one thousand Spaniards, with their Mausers and modern artillery, were posted with the utmost skill. The road winds about so that our advance would have been made for six miles up hill and all the way in range. Our artillery was in a position to shell the first intrenchments easily, but not to reach still stronger intrenchments beyond the crest of the mountain, where the main body of the enemy waited—practically concealed. Our officers did not even know of the existence of the latter force. One whose word should outweigh almost any other opinion—if indeed there were not a virtual agreement of experts in this matter—Colonel Goethals of the Engineer Corps, on General Brooke's staff, said (when he visited the Pablo Vasquez fortifications on a peaceful errand in September) that we could not have captured the position within a week, if at all, with the force that was so eager to make the attack on August 13. "I'd like to have had one hundred men there [in the Spanish trenches], and I could have staved off any army"—such was his comment. A flanking movement, under General Hains, had begun about one hour before the

central movement. There seems to be no doubt that Hains and his party would have had on their hands an undertaking like that which confronted Kent's division at the San Juan hills before Santiago, but with the addition of a surprise at Pablo Vasquez.

VII

At Manila, in the incessant rain and tropical heat, the work of preparing for the capture and occupation of the city had been completed. Dewey had thought it wise to wait until the 10- and 12-inch guns of the *Monterey* should be available for use against the heavy guns of the shore batteries or foreign warships.

The *Monterey* arrived on August 4th.

The regulars of the Eighteenth Infantry had been moved close to trenches occupied by the insurgents. Other trenches that the insurgents had held in front of Malate were now occupied by the Astor Battery, whose guns were thus in position less than a thousand yards from the enemy; and the Astors were supported by two companies of the Third Artillery, as infantry, and a battalion of infantry was held in reserve, ready to move to their reinforcement at a moment's notice. We refer particularly to the preparations at this point, because it was from this point outward and forward that the attack was made on the 13th. The self-assurance of the insurgent leaders, which had been encouraged by General Anderson's forbearance, had yielded to General Merritt's masterful spirit. Either willingly or reluctantly, they were to serve in the attainment of the common end—that had been made clear to them; and where their reluctance had been too marked, they had been brushed aside. Animals and vehicles for transportation, which had been withheld,

were seized and paid for at a fair price. Even Aguinaldo's prisoners were fed by General Merritt's order.

"There are few of the poor devils [Spanish prisoners] left in Cavité," a correspondent writes under date of July 29th; "less than a hundred all told. When there were thousands of them, and the American troops had just landed, they were fairly well fed. Their ration was almost all rice, but there was enough of that to keep them in pretty good condition, and it was what they were accustomed to having. But the thousands have been moved out, and this little crowd that is left is having a hard time of it. The men have sold the buttons off their uniforms, and the distinguishing marks from their hats, and some of them have sold even their medals given them by the boy King for valour and loyalty. The little they got for these trinkets went but a short way in providing food, and fruit was all it bought; no meat. Yesterday the commissary happened to go by the old convent where they are kept and the sight of the thin, wax-like faces peering through the bars of the old cloister windows stopped him. He pushed the Filipino guard aside and went in. Dozens of Spaniards surrounded him, all begging for money or food. They offered what poor trinkets they had to sell—anything for food. The Commissary reported to the General, and this morning went with two natives with a handcart full of canned roast-beef and hardtack.

"There was a great clamour in the prison when the little squad headed by the Commissary and his clerk went through the big gate. The poor devils, emaciated, unkempt, ghastly white, straggled out and surrounded him, so eager that they could hardly wait for the boxes to be broken open. Their officer was with them, and he bustled about with his little cane and his book in which their names were written, ready to call the roll and see

that each man got his share. The silver head was gone from the stick, and he was barefooted like the rest. Not a brass button was left on him or a distinguishing mark of his rank. He was bareheaded. The men were formed in double line across the yard, and at the start the line was straight, but gradually, as the Commissary's Filipinos broke open the hardtack boxes, the ends of the line drew in until the half-starved wretches formed a semi-circle about the handcart and the food. Then the issue began.

“The officer wanted to call his roll, but the men had not fallen in in order, and it developed at once that there would be a chance for repeating ; one man was at one end of the line and the next at the other. So the Commissary ordered his own men to march along the line, one with an armful of hardtack boxes, and the other issuing one box to each man. As each man got his ration he side-stepped to the right and the next fell into his place. Before the third had drawn his ration the first two were eating theirs.

“Then the beef was served, and this time the officer got along all right with his roll-call at the start, but finished in a grand mix-up in less than a minute. There was one can for four men. The first four men called fell out of line, stepped up to the hand-cart, and got their beef. Then, instead of reforming, they moved off to one side a little and began to open the can. The second squad joined them, and in no time there was a tangle. Some ran back to the line to try to repeat, and others left the line to try to get their share ahead of the rest. The Commissary stopped the roll-call on the spot and reformed the line. Then he made those who had drawn beef fall out, and the rest he separated into squads as they stood in line, and gave each squad a can. They thanked him with shouts, and were scattering to their separate nooks and corners

for the feast, when he stood upon the steps by the big gate and made them a speech in Spanish. It was not Castilian, but they understood and shouted assent.

“ ‘Mañana,’ he said ‘ todos blanca ropa.’ He rubbed his own spotless white jacket and pointed to their shabby, dirty jackets. ‘ No blanca ropa,’ he went on, ‘ no chow. Blanca ropa, chow ! ’ ”¹

Captain-General Augustin had been relieved of responsibility for the fate of the city and islands, and General Jaudenes was in command. On the 7th of August Admiral Dewey and General Merritt addressed to General Jaudenes a notification to remove non-combatants from the city within forty-eight hours. On the same day a reply was received, expressing thanks for the humane sentiment, and stating that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the non-combatants then within the walled town. At the expiration of the time mentioned in the first note a second joint note was sent “ inviting attention to the suffering in store for the sick and non-combatants, in case it became our duty to reduce the defences ; also setting forth the hopeless condition of the Spanish forces, surrounded on all sides—a fleet in front, and no prospect of reinforcements—and demanding surrender as due to every consideration of humanity.” Promptly the Spanish reply came, admitting the situation, but stating that the council of defence declared that the request for surrender could not be granted. Jaudenes offered, however, to consult his government, if granted the time necessary for communication with Madrid, *via* Hong Kong. This proposal, involving a delay of a week or ten days, was not accepted.

¹ “ To-morrow, all clean clothes. No clean clothes, nothing to eat. Clean clothes, plenty to eat.”

The cablegram from Washington, directing military operations to be suspended, had, of course, not yet been received. The message sent on the 12th of August reached Manila on the afternoon of the 16th.

“The necessity,” says General Merritt, “was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season.”

And so, on August 13th, the southerly defences were shelled by our fleet, while the trenches were stormed by our soldiers. Augustin, carried in a launch to the German cruiser *Kaiserin Augusta*, took passage on that vessel to Hong Kong. “A division of the squadron,” Admiral Dewey says, “shelled the forts and entrenchments at Malate on the south side of the city, driving back the enemy, our army advancing from that side at the same time. About 7000 prisoners were taken.¹ The squadron had no casualties; no vessels were injured.” The bombardment lasted less than an hour, and, when the ships were ordered to stop firing, a fierce fight was proceeding in the trenches. The Spaniards were driven back to their second line of defence, and fifteen minutes later they retreated into the walled city, where resistance was hopeless. Soon afterwards a white flag was raised, and then the Belgian Consul boarded the *Olympia*, Admiral Dewey’s flagship, and returned with Lieutenant Brumby and others to General Jaudenes, who agreed to surrender. Toward the middle of the afternoon General Merritt went to the palace, where the Spaniards formed in line and laid down their arms.

¹ That number of regulars. In addition, about 4000 volunteers, etc. The American loss was fifty wounded or killed in the assault.

The insurgents, of course, had a sad time of it, though they showed less sensitiveness than Garcia and his Cubans at Santiago. General Merritt's despatch to the War Department has it that they were "kept out: no disorder or pillage." But Aguinaldo did not, like Garcia, decide therefore to withdraw his forces to the interior. He had prepared his "passionate semi-savages"¹ for a simultaneous advance upon the capital with the Americans; and when he was ordered to "keep out," as Filipinos would not be permitted to enter the city, he replied: "Too late." There was, as a matter of fact, a "general advance of the insurgents, which gave the Americans trouble, as they were unsuccessful in excluding the Filipinos entirely, and several bands of them entered the city. The Americans held these in the suburbs, however, and disarmed some of the insurgent companies."

The cup and the insurgent lip, at Santiago and at Manila!

General Merritt has highly commended the behaviour of the troops, and has made full acknowledgment of the co-operation of the navy. The Astor Battery especially distinguished itself by its bravery; for when a body of Spaniards had offered a stubborn resistance at one point, where they were hidden in houses and behind a barricade, although two guns of this battery had been advanced to within seventy-five yards of the barricade, our men, like those at Santiago, were seized with a desire to "catch the enemy with their hands," and charged the Spaniards with pistols.

¹ Admiral Dewey's characterisation is not to be lightly contested; but those who have studied Filipinos less at the cannon's mouth speak of them as docile and tractable. There are more than two sides to this shield, however; for the millions on these islands are blended or pure examples of many antagonistic races.

The articles of capitulation are of especial interest in view of the dispute which arose at the time in many remote parts of the world which concerned themselves with the fate of the archipelago. Did the surrender include the entire group, or merely the island, or the city? The answer was found, of course, as soon as the text had been cabled, in the words italicised at the beginning of the paragraph numbered one.

The full text follows :

“ The undersigned, having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the surrender of the city and defences of Manila and its suburbs, and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with agreement entered into the previous day by Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., American Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines, and his Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines, have agreed upon the following :

“ 1. *The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate, with the city and defences, with all honours of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to the control of the aforesaid United States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their homes, which shall be respected, as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.*

“ 2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property. All public horses, and public property of all kinds, shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

“ 3. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organisations, and full lists of public property and stores shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

The War with Spain

“ 4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington. Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them. The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or when the American army evacuates.

“ 5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid, as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. All the funds of the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

“ 6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honour of the American army.

“ F. V. GREENE, Brigadier-General of Volunteers,
U.S.A.

“ B. P. LAMBERTON, Captain U.S.N.

“ CHARLES A. WHITTIER, Lieutenant-Colonel and
Inspector-General.

“ V. E. H. CROWDER, Lieutenant-Colonel and
Judge-Advocate.

“ NICHOLAS DE LA PENA, Oidor-General de
Ejército

“ CARLOS REYES, Coronel de Ingenieros.


“ JOSÉ MARÍA OLAQUEN, Jefe de Estado Mayor.

“ MERRITT, Major-General.”

CONTINUATION TO OCTOBER

(Appendix and Notes)

COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF THE WAR, NATIONAL EXPANSION, ETC.—SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO AUGUST 13TH—WHY THE "MERRIMAC" DID NOT CLOSE THE CHANNEL—CÁNOVAS—THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS—GARCIA'S VIEW OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN



COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF THE WAR AND NATIONAL EXPANSION

WITH the signing of the protocol for its theme, the most important feature of European comment was " the universal recognition of the fact that henceforth there is a great potentiality which must be reckoned with in considering every question involving the rights and interests of nations." Thus the *Pall Mall Gazette* said :

" America will henceforth have an undisputed place among the powers which make the history of the civilised and uncivilised world. Her day of self-contained isolation is gone forever. She may advance a little faster or a little less fast to meet her manifest destiny, but there can be no American citizen to-day who does not feel that the old order of things has changed since America stood at the parting of the ways four months ago, and that she stands to-day upon the threshold of a new life."

The London *Times*, " hoping it was not a violation of neutrality to express the satisfaction felt by a great majority of Englishmen at the success of the United States," added :

" Historians will wrangle for a long time respecting the propriety of the methods by which the war was brought about, but once begun it was eminently desirable for the interests of the world, and even, perhaps, ultimately to the interests of Spain herself, that it should result in the success of the Americans. The factor in the situation which

is of the greatest immediate importance to ourselves is the fate of the Philippines. . . . The United States were bound to put themselves in the best possible position for defending the common interests of themselves and Great Britain in China, and Providence in the nick of time has given them the Philippines."

Among all the rough-and-ready explanations of Spanish defeat, here is one (from the New York *Evening Post*) that shows much knowledge and more thought:

"What then the Spaniards demand socially is mental stimulation, amusement, the play of wit always, and at all costs. And how much the plainly marked preference of their women for the men who can shine in these directions may have contributed to bring about that condition of *insouciance* towards the practical realities of life which has latterly been shown up in such extraordinary clearness, might be a question of much interest."

And the fate of Spain inspired a sympathy among the more generous people of every country which found expression in such sentences as these: "August 12, 1898, will be a memorable day in the history of the world: it is the day which witnessed the death of one famous empire and the birth of another, destined, perhaps, to more enduring fame"; and writers who discussed the decadence of Spain in connection with the contention that France and Italy have become stationary, were willing to incur the slight personal risk of predicting the ultimate disappearance of the Latin race as a factor in the human comedy.

At home, the sense of responsibility, expelled for a moment by an illimitable prospect that opened up before us, came back the next moment; and it seemed that the best result of this great opportunity would be the improvement in our system that was shown to be imperatively required

in view of such an extension of it as was proposed. Even the enemies of expansion quite unconsciously expressed this view when they said : " If the United States is to go into the colony business at all it must abolish the spoils system."

Students of history knew that national expansion was an impulse that must be expected, at some period in the nation's life—of every nation's life :¹ a quite irresistible and unreasoning manifestation when it comes. They knew that the talk among the people about " fulfilling destiny" was not the rubbish that some of the most respectable critics would have us believe; that it intimated the truth, unless the experience of our nation is to be wholly different from that of other nations. The books taught, and the students of old books held, that expansion is a godlike period, when the nation does not reason—when its misgivings are forgotten, and it obeys an impulse from within to achieve mightily, to live fully : in brief, just what the people were saying, an impulse to " fulfil its destiny." The gods, who still exist for purposes of illustration, did not need to reason, because they could act; and the gods also were obedient to fate.

Students of political economy, many of whom opposed the government's policy in the main, found compensating advantages in certain incidental measures. For example, the War Revenue Bill was a long step towards the substitution of direct taxation in place of the inequitable duties on imports. That it is destined to overthrow the protective tariff system has been confidently predicted by the free-traders ; and an annual surplus, instead of an annual deficit, has been promised to the administration that shall extend its scope. And so an influential school

¹This was barely noted in the story of Spain given in Chapter I.

of political economists has found in this bill, and in the bankruptcy legislation that fell within the same period, not the least important of the results of the war.

To a class which fortunately is much larger than that which pursues any special branch of study—the kind-hearted people who wanted to be assured that so much suffering was to be offset by friendly ministrations—it gave intense satisfaction to read¹ that “The city of Santiago, long known as a breeder of pestilence and one of the dirtiest and most unhealthy places in Cuba, is now in a condition of cleanliness that New York might almost have envied a few years ago. Under the system introduced by General Wood, who, it may be remembered, is a physician, Santiago is divided into five sections, each one under the general supervision of a medical man, who has under him inspectors of sewers, streets, houses, and dispensaries, and a number of street cleaners. Five hundred cubic yards of refuse are burned daily, disinfectants are distributed wherever they are needed, and a heavy fine is imposed for uncleanliness, or for any failure to report unhealthful conditions and deaths. The results are shown in a decrease in the death-rate within a month from an average of seventy to one of twenty a day.”

The most impressive comment was uttered by Czar Nicholas II., who, on August 27th, suggested universal disarmament. His proposal to the governments represented at St. Petersburg, that they should heed a protest of the public conscience and consider the folly and the cost of war, was made in view of the threatening situation in Eastern Asia, the dangers of which were increased by the “impetuosity of the new American chauvinism.”

And, finally, the most delightful comment is perhaps

¹ In the *Medical Record*.

that which will be found in the *Fieramosca*, (Florence, September 18th) :

“ Quel ‘ giovane sciovinismo americano ’ pertanto, contro al quale lanciano le loro frecce il diario di Colonia e tanti altri suoi confratelli, ha negli stessi Stati Uniti parecchi e valorosi avversari ; onde è sperabile che ‘ il pericolo trans-oceanico ’ non faccia alle potenze continentali d’ Europa perdere la calma e la misura a segno da rendere inevitabile quell’ alleanza anglo-americana. . . . ”

SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO AUGUST 13TH

On August 14th, four transports from Santiago reached Montauk Point, Long Island. One of these had on board Colonel Roosevelt and six troops of "Rough Riders," and General Joseph Wheeler with four troops of the Third Cavalry.

The members of the commissions to adjust details of the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico by the Spanish troops were appointed by President McKinley on August 16th. Their names follow : For Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C. Butler. For Porto Rico, Major-General John R. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, Brigadier-General William Washington Gordon. The "immediate" evacuation of the island was construed to mean that all of the Spanish troops should leave Porto Rico by the 18th of October, and Cuba by the end of November.

On August 16th Ambassador Hay at London accepted the office of Secretary of State, to replace Secretary Day, who had been designated as one of the members of the Peace Commission.

At Manila, August 17th, General Merritt issued the following proclamation :

" To the People of the Philippines :

" I. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21 of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction by an American fleet of

the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city, Manila, and its defences, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States.

“ 2. The commander of the United States forces now in possession has instructions from his government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

“ 3. The government established among you by the United States army is a government of military occupation ; and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

“ 4. A Provost Marshal-General will be appointed for the city of Manila and its outlying districts. This territory will be divided into sub-districts and there will be assigned to each a Deputy Provost Marshal. The duties of the Provost Marshal-General and his deputies will be set forth in detail in future orders. In a general way they are charged with the duty of making arrests of military as well as civil offenders, sending such of the former class as are triable by courts-martial to their proper commands, with statements of their offences and names of witnesses, and detaining in custody all other offenders for trial by military commission, provost courts or native criminal courts, in accordance with law and the instructions hereafter to be issued.

“ 5. The port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open, while our military

occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

“6. All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all educational institutions, libraries, scientific collections, and museums, are, so far as possible, to be protected ; and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or property, of historical monuments, archives or works of science is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. Severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation.

“The custodians of all properties of the character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character and location and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the co-operation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection.

“7. The commanding general, in announcing the establishment of military government and in entering upon his duties as Military Governor, in pursuance of his appointment as such by the Government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States, they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

“WESLEY MERRITT,
“Major-General U. S. Army, Commanding.”

General Merritt appointed General Greene as Fiscal Agent ; General McArthur, Military Commandant of the walled city and Provost Marshal-General ; Colonel Smith, of the First California, Deputy Provost Marshal for the districts north of the Pasig River ; and Colonel Ovenshine,

of the Twenty-third United States Infantry, for the district south of the Pasig ; Colonel Owen Summers, of the Second Oregon, Deputy Provost Marshal for the walled city ; Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, Collector of Customs, and Major Bennett, Collector of Internal Revenue. Captain Henry Glass, of the *Charleston*, was made Captain of the Port.

On the same day the Adjutant-General at Washington cabled to Merritt : "The President directs that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents."

On August 20th occurred a naval parade in New York harbour. The cruisers and battleships *New York*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*, passed in review.

A general order issued on August 22d, in relation to the volunteers, prescribed that a thorough physical examination should be made of officers and enlisted men immediately prior to their muster-out. The records are to be preserved, with a view to pension claims arising from war service.

General Garcia's resignation as commander of the Cuban forces in the eastern department of the island was accepted by the "insurgent government," August 22d.

A despatch from Manila, August 23d, stated that General Merritt had relinquished to General Otis the immediate command of American forces at that point. The attitude of the insurgents toward the Americans showed marked improvement.

The greatest fear of the insurgents at this time was of lapsing again under Spanish misrule. At a conference between them and the American commanders, on August 24th, they declared themselves willing to co-operate with the Americans and to surrender their arms promptly, if assured of American or British protection. Otherwise

they refused to disarm. A serious street fight, which occurred on the same day, was without political significance. One member of the Utah Artillery, Battery B, was killed, and one mortally wounded, and four troopers of the Fourth Cavalry were wounded. The natives attacked the soldiers through a misunderstanding. Their loss was four killed and several wounded.

The mustering out of volunteers began August 24th, when orders issued at Washington that restored to civil life sixteen organisations.

On the same day Secretary Alger visited Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, where the distressing conditions were due in part, at least, to official mismanagement. In the evening, after having inspected the camp, he said that he was agreeably surprised with the whole situation.

On the 25th of August General Miles was directed to send home from Porto Rico all troops not actually needed for service ; General Merritt cabled that the *Rio de Janeiro* and *Pennsylvania* had arrived out ; General Shafter formally relinquished the command at Santiago to General Lawton, boarded the steamer *Mexico* with the members of his staff, and sailed for Montauk. The Spanish troops brought from Santiago de Cuba on the *Alicante* were landed at La Coruña, Spain, August 25th. Their condition was pitiable—eight deaths occurring on the day of arrival. The government hired all the places in La Coruña which were available for their accommodation—a disused sardine-factory, the bull-ring, etc.—and promised to send the soldiers to their homes, after paying for their services in the lost colony during the previous nine months. Private subscriptions in aid of the sick were also received.

Preparations for the embarkation of our troops were being made at Ponce, Porto Rico. General Miles had occasion on the 27th of August to assert his authority in

the island. The Mayor of Aguado had been imprisoned by the Spaniards, and later removed to San Juan, where, it was thought, there was danger of his being put to death on the charge of aiding the Americans. Miles telegraphed to Captain-General Macias, forbidding him to proceed with the execution of any sentence of capital punishment against the mayor, or to punish other political offenders.

An appeal for the removal of the ashes of Columbus from Havana to Spain was made by the *Diario de la Marina* on August 27th.

Secretary Alger, in an interview on the conduct of the War Department, declared (August 28th) that there would be no investigation of any branch of the service, and that no investigation was necessary. "Out of the 250,000 men in camp in different localities in the United States and elsewhere," he said, "there have been possibly 1200 deaths from sickness. This is hardly more than a city of this number of inhabitants would have in the same period, and perhaps not as many if the city was subject to an epidemic of typhoid or yellow fever." It was asserted that food, clothing, and medicines had been everywhere provided in abundance; the officers, however, at the points of distribution had sometimes failed to make their requisitions in good season, not realising the immense amount that would be needed. He added, "The Quartermaster-General is now distributing 400 tons of food a day to soldiers scattered over the earth from Porto Rico to Manila." The necessity of a searching examination of the conduct of the various military departments was being urged in communications from all parts of the country.

The condition of the Spanish troops in Guantanamo at this time was so wretched that not more than two thirds of them were expected to reach Spain alive.

On the 29th of August, New York extended to those members of the Seventy-first Regiment who returned and marched from the Battery to their armoury in Thirty-fourth Street a greeting that has perhaps never been surpassed as a display of the city's enthusiasm and patriotism.

The transport *China* left Manila on August 30th, having on board Major-General Merritt and his staff. In his absence, General Otis was Acting-Governor of Manila. General Merritt went to Paris, in order to inform the Peace Commissioners in regard to the conditions at Manila. In Cuba, on the same day, Garcia was relieved by his government from the command of the Cuban troops in the eastern part of the island.

Aguinaldo issued a memorial, addressed to the foreign Powers. He asked for recognition of the Philippine Republic, or, failing that, for proclamations of neutrality, granting to the Filipinos belligerent rights. The memorial (August 30th) contained no reference to the United States.

Rear-Admiral Schley and General Gordon of the Porto Rico military commission, together with representatives of every branch of the post-office service, several army paymasters and surgeons, and twenty-two trained nurses, sailed from Brooklyn for San Juan and Ponce on the last day of August.

By direction of the President, orders were issued to the commandants of the Naval Academy, Annapolis, and of the navy-yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to release the Spanish prisoners in their charge. The Spanish government had cabled Admiral Cervera \$50,000, to be expended in providing for the transportation of the sailors and officers under his command who had been held prisoners of war. This release of the Spanish prisoners occurred on the 31st, at about the hour when, in Madrid, Señor

Silvela, Conservative leader, had a conference with Sagasta. Silvela declined to accept a place on the Spanish Peace Commission, saying that it was the duty of the Liberals to make peace.

The plans of the Red Cross Society for carrying throughout Cuba the relief work which was begun at Siboney and continued at Santiago were thwarted by the action of the authorities at Havana, who demanded excessive duties, or insisted that the supplies should be given to them for distribution. The *Comal*, laden with 1600 tons of supplies, sent under the direction of the Secretary of War, but as an aid to the Red Cross relief work, sailed away from Havana harbour, on September 1st, after unavailing efforts had been made to change the hard conditions imposed by the colonial government.

Just one week later Secretary Alger requested the President to appoint a commission to investigate the conduct of the War Department since the commencement of hostilities. Mr. McKinley decided to appoint a commission of nine members to conduct an inquiry as to *certain phases* of the conduct of the war ; but so much difficulty was encountered in the effort to secure the services of substantial men that the list of investigators was not completed until September 24th.

On September 9th President McKinley was able to announce the complete list of the Peace Commission, as follows : William R. Day of Ohio, Cushman K. Davis of Minnesota, William P. Frye of Maine, Whitelaw Reid of New York, and George Gray of Delaware.

The American and Spanish commissioners entrusted with the details of the evacuation of Cuba held their first conference in the Hall of the Colonial Parliament on the 11th of September. Two days afterward, both houses of the Cortes, at Madrid, passed a bill sanctioning the action

of the government in signing the peace protocol, which involved the cession of territory. Before the end of the week the Queen Regent signed the bill.

On Saturday, September 18th, the American Peace Commissioners sailed from New York. The Spanish Commissioners, appointed to meet them at Paris, were : Señor Montero Rios, President of the Senate, General Cerero, and Señores Abarzuza, Villarrutia, and Garnica.

It was plain, at the time of closing this brief record, that the problems involved in or growing out of our new relations with Spain were so important that the period of active hostilities, from April 21st to August 12th and 13th, should be regarded as a phase of this national experience, rather than a completed event—a chapter, rather than a book. Turning once more to Cuba, we found distress there that challenged and commanded attention on the 15th of October, as it had on the 11th of April. Perhaps our efforts to send relief had been feeble, or perhaps the difficulties had been insurmountable. The Weyler edict forbidding the despatch of supplies to the interior was still in force. According to official reports, the people of the provinces, Cubans and Spaniards alike, were “perishing by the thousands every day, and the extinction of the population was a matter of only a short time. . . . The suffering among the reconcentrados in Weyler’s day was not greater.” The disbandment of the Spanish army seemed a threat of turning loose thousands of desperate and starving men. It even appeared to be a better plan “to enlist in the American army, under a special act of Congress, 75,000 Spanish soldiers to serve in Cuba until a stable government should be established, and then to remain as citizens or to be returned to Spain as they might prefer!”

WHY THE "MERRIMAC" DID NOT CLOSE THE CHANNEL

"When the *Merrimac* poked her nose into the channel our troubles commenced. The deadly silence was broken by the swash of a small boat approaching us from the shore. I made her out to be a picket-boat.

"She ran close up under the stern of the *Merrimac* and fired several shots from what seemed to be 3-pounder guns. The *Merrimac's* rudder was carried away by this fire. That is why the collier was not sunk across the channel.

"We did not discover the loss of the rudder until Murphy had cast anchor. We then found that the *Merrimac* would not answer to the helm and were compelled to make the best of the situation.

"The run up the channel was very exciting. The picket-boat had given the alarm, and in a moment the guns of the *Vizcaya*, the *Almirante Oquendo*, and the shore batteries were turned upon us.

"Submarine mines and torpedoes were exploded all around us, adding to the excitement. The mines did no damage, although we could hear the rumbling and feel the ship tremble.

"We were running without lights, and only the darkness saved us from utter destruction. When the ship was in the desired position and we found that the rudder was gone, I called the men on deck. While they were launching the catamaran I touched off the explosives.

“ At the same time two torpedoes, fired by the *Reina Mercedes*, struck the *Merrimac* amidships. I cannot say whether our own explosives or the Spanish torpedoes did the work, but the *Merrimac* was lifted out of the water and almost rent asunder.

“ As she settled down we scrambled overboard and cut away the catamaran. A great cheer went up from the forts and the warships as the hull of the collier foundered, the Spaniards thinking that the *Merrimac* was an American warship.

We attempted to get out of the harbour in the catamaran, but a strong tide was running, and daylight found us still struggling in the water. Then for the first time the Spaniards saw us, and a boat from the *Reina Mercedes* picked us up. It was then shortly after five o'clock in the morning, and we had been in the water more than an hour.”—LIEUTENANT HOBSON'S statement.

CÁNOVAS¹

Antonio Cánovas del Castillo was born at Malaga, February 8, 1828. His parents were people of slender means, though not, as has been often asserted, in abject poverty. We know, however, that they had marked out a somewhat modest career for their son before he convinced them that he was irresistibly drawn to the pursuit of literature; then, with their consent, he took up the study of the national classics, of history and philosophy. At the age of eighteen he founded a periodical, entitled *La Joven Málaga*, that soon met the common fate of such ventures. Roused to more strenuous efforts by this failure and by the difficult situation in which he found himself on his father's death, he went to Madrid to seek his fortune. In 1845, thanks to the influence of an uncle who was then *Consejero de Estado*, he got a clerkship in the office of the Madrid á Aranjuez Railway, and thus met expenses while studying law. But it was not long before he was sufficiently encouraged by the public recognition of his ability as a writer to abandon the law and enter the political field. This was in 1849, when he was made editor of *La Patria*, a journal founded by Joaquín Francisco Pacheco. Two years later *La Patria* ceased to exist, and Cánovas wrote special articles for the *Semanario Pintoresco*, *Las Novedades*, and *La Ilustración*. It was at this time that he published his *Cámpana de*

¹ See Chapter I., page 30.

Huesca, a study of Aragonese character, and his *Historia de la decadencia de España desde el advenimiento al trono de D. Felipe III. hasta la muerte de Carlos II.*, a work of real significance, which was afterwards continued in collaboration with Maldonado. Here, in the pages of this history, is the key to the author's belief and policy, as a staunch defender of the integrity of the kingdom and a redoubtable antagonist for anyone—on the throne, or in office, or in socialistic organisations—who would consent to its dismemberment.

The events of July, 1854, were drawing near, and Cánovas must be reckoned among the forces that accelerated the revolt. He took an active part in the revolution, was author of the famous *Manifiesto de Manzanares*, accepted office under the new government, and was elected deputy to the Cortes. Intrusted with the correspondence of the ministry and appointed agent *de preces* at Rome, he discharged this difficult office so satisfactorily that, after O'Donnell's fall in 1856, the Marquis de Pidal invited him to retain the position. In 1857 he was Civil Governor of Cadiz ; in the following year Director-General of Administration ; in 1860 Assistant Secretary ; and in 1864 he accepted the same portfolio in a so called "conciliation" government, composed of Moderates and Unionists—in which he was associated with Pacheco (mentioned above), Mon, Ulloa, Mayans, Salaverria, and other distinguished statesmen ; and now, having "found himself," he gave expression to inherent tendencies in abolishing the constitutional reforms of 1857, and curtailing the freedom of the press and the right of the people to hold meetings for the discussion of grievances. For our present purpose his connection with the González Bravo government is less significant, and we pass to the year 1866—to the opposition with which Cánovas confronted the sorry advisers

of Isabel II., and to his banishment, which he himself must have contrived, for it now appears to have been a politic evasion of responsibility. When Isabel II. was dethroned, Cánovas decided to await developments, and declined office under the new government. In the constituent assembly of 1869 he urged his conservative principles, in opposition to the radical and democratic measures that were in the ascendant ; and in this contest he possessed the incalculable advantage of a style of oratory peculiar to himself, for it bore the same relation to ordinary Spanish oratory that realistic fiction bears to unmitigated romance. After the famous session of November 16, 1870, when the Duke of Aosta was elected King of Spain, he saw that this princely graft could never flourish, and was once more obliged to chafe in enforced inaction. He declined office under Amadeo. But with the proclamation of the republic his opportunity returned, and he was tireless in his efforts to hasten the restoration of the Bourbons—indeed he was recognised by the exiled royal family as their virtual representative in Spain. In part guiding, in part guided by events during the year 1874, he was so largely instrumental in shaping public sentiment that, though the Cortes proclaimed Don Alfonso XII., Cánovas at one step took the grade of king-maker.

On the last day of the year, as representative of Alfonso and incumbent of the highest political office, he began to develop the most interesting phase of his public life. He established at Madrid a ministerial regency (himself its head) to exercise dictatorial powers pending Alfonso's arrival ; and, when the latter was seated on the throne, Cánovas retained his leadership, calling an assembly of notables to prepare the constitution which was adopted in the Cortes of 1876. Until February, 1881, he held in his hands the destinies of his country, excepting those brief

intervals during which he gave place to Jovellar and to Campos. One of his first measures was the suppression of liberal journals ; but, on the other hand, he succeeded in winning over to his party the less fervent Carlists, with many influential politicians of the revolutionary epoch. In other words, with a whip in the right hand and a fat office in the left, he contrived both to increase his following and to give it a marked conservative character. It was evident to him that Alfonso, to retain his throne, must conciliate those elements that had banished his mother, and so no awkward questions were addressed to the many applicants for admission into the Conservative-Liberal party. Cánovas welcomed the support and co-operation even of Robledo ; he conceded religious toleration as a sop to the Liberals, but won in that class more largely through a calculated distribution of government favours. In his attitude toward the country at large, Cánovas showed that he recognised the universal desire for peace, and he spared no effort to put an end to the Carlist civil war and the Cuban insurrection (the so-called Ten Years' War). His policy in respect to the latter struggle has been a subject for extreme misrepresentation. It must be clear from the facts we have just been tracing that only measures of stern repression in Cuba were to be expected from this champion of the integrity of Spain.

Another statement that will be read with interest, in view of the speaker's fate, is the following : Cánovas was frequently heard to declare that enemies of institutions had no legal rights ; that violence such as theirs must be restrained by equal violence on the part of the authorities.

In foreign relations Cánovas solicited for Spain the friendship of Austria and Germany rather than that of its more liberal neighbours, and on the death of Alfonso's wife Mercedes he probably set on foot the negotiations

that resulted in the King's marriage with the Austrian princess Maria Christina. In February, 1881, he went out of office in order to defend, as leader of the opposition, the principles he had advocated as minister. He was recalled in 1883, and was retained in power until 1885. Alfonso died in that year, and his widow instructed Señor Sagasta, the Liberal leader, but none the less representative of a party that had accepted the constitution of 1876, to form a new ministry. On the same day Cánovas became President of the Cortes. In 1890 he again formed a Conservative cabinet to succeed Sagasta's. During the next five years Sagasta and Cánovas alternated several times in forming cabinets, but in March, 1895, the latter was again made Prime Minister to meet a crisis the precise nature of which need not be explained, so completely have all purely domestic concerns been dwarfed by the enormous importance and interest of the insurrection in Cuba.

In that island his policy was of a piece with the principles he had manifested in the affairs of the Peninsula a score of years before. Offering home-rule to the Cubans, on terms that were even criticised by his own party for their excessive liberality, he at the same time looked to it that the war of repression—of extermination, if nothing less would serve—should be relentlessly prosecuted.

This consistency of character might easily receive further illustration. Cánovas never relaxed his attentive interest in everything pertaining to scholarship and letters. A member of the Académiá de la Historia (1859), of the Académiá de la Lengua (1865), and of the Ateneo Científico y Literario, he produced, in addition to the works mentioned above, and to a volume of poems (which put weapons of offence into the hands of his political enemies), a collection of articles and addresses entitled

Problemas Contemporáneas, two volumes of *Estudios Literarios*, and *El Solitario y su Tiempo*. The collection of books in his library, including many rare volumes, gradually assumed admirable proportions. In his private life he was a loyal and loyally cherished friend ; his marriage with a daughter of the noble house of Sotomayor crowned a courtship that had endured the test of fifteen years.

Overhanging and overshadowing this arduous career was, of course, the constant threat of assassination. Several years ago, at the gate of "La Huerta," Cánovas's residence in Madrid, a bomb was thrown by anarchists as he came out to enter his carriage. But the terrible penalty attaching to distinction seems never to have been suffered in advance, through fear, even at Santa Agueda.

Cánovas had been somewhat out of health for a time, and had gone to Santa Agueda for a course of sulphur baths. On the morning of August 8, 1897, he was present at the celebration of mass in the chapel. After mass he was reading, and conversing with several persons, when an anarchist named Michel Angiolino, a native of Foggia, in Italy, approached and fired three shots at him with a revolver. The first bullet, which struck the Premier in the head, passed through from the right to the left temple. Cánovas rose to his feet, but immediately fell, crying, "Long live Spain!" He again tried to rise, and while in the act a second shot entered his chest, the ball lodging near the spine. He fell back unconscious, and a third shot struck him while he lay on the ground. He was carried to his room, and expired at 1.30 P.M. To Señora Cánovas del Castillo, wife of the Premier, who was near her husband when the crime was committed, the murderer made this statement: "I have done my duty, and I am now easy in my mind, for I have avenged my friends and brothers of Montjuich." Montjuich is the fortress of

Barcelona under the walls of which anarchists were executed for the crime of throwing a bomb into a procession, upon the occasion of the Corpus Christi celebration in 1896.

Such is the story, to which I need not add the comments of the world—though the world, startled into attention, discussed this tragedy so freely that almost every point of view is now matter of record ; even the exultation of anarchists, printed and illustrated ! All of which is important, too, in a way ; but more important are the facts of a courageous and consistent life, whether wholly to one's taste or not : facts which have now been sketched, but too hastily and imperfectly.

THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS¹

I

Two chapters in the story hold most of the plot : two periods separated by a century will take us, if we can realise them, in an instant, almost, and in a glance of the eye, to the essential and significant thing in Hawaiian history. The first period is that of the conquests of Kamehameha I., or Kamehameha the Great—as great a savage as one would have cared to know—and this period includes also the extension and maintenance of his rule as savage autocrat of the island group. And that seems only yesterday, in one way. Kamehameha's war-cloak of mamu feathers draped the bier of Kalakaua in 1891, when the body of the last of the kings lay in state. Into the second period we may gather, and gather without crowding (as three gold pieces may lie easily in a pocket), the overthrow of the monarchy, the establishment of a republic, and annexation to the United States.

II

When Captain Cook, seeking a northern passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic in 1778, happened upon this isolated, strangely beautiful outpost of the Western Continents, he noted its attractions to good purpose,

¹ See Chapter VIII., page 243.

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and with an enthusiasm that betrayed itself in a tendency to exaggerate certain details. A year later, in the winter of 1779, he returned from Alaska, to be worshipped as a god for a time, and then to be killed by the natives, who took that emphatic means of expressing their remonstrance against the human frailties of this bluff navigator.

Kamehameha, a nephew of Chief (or King) Kalaniopuu, was living in Hawaii at the time, and, tradition says, was a witness of this tragedy. Now Kalaniopuu died in 1782, and in the division of his estates Kamehameha got control of two districts in the island. The assassination of his only prominent rival, the late King's son, made him lord of the remaining districts in 1791; then by force, by craft, and especially by enlisting the services of English sailors, he became overlord of at least seven of the eight inhabited islands. This result was attained in 1810.

Meantime (in 1792 and 1794) Captain George Vancouver visited Hawaii, with a better motive and with beneficent results, for he brought cattle and sheep, unknown before, and gifts of seeds and useful plants.

King Kamehameha died in 1819—not before long-continued success had proved his wisdom in holding and governing new territory, as well as talent for extending his boundaries. The total area of these eight islands is one third greater than that of Connecticut; and this he was able to keep well in hand when voyages from one island to another could only be made in war-canoes.

That was the heroic age of Hawaii, when its population of Kanakas was perhaps ten times as numerous as at present, and the 300,000 Kanaka men and women were physically as superb, maybe, as those distant South Sea cousins of theirs with whom Robert Louis Stevenson made us so well acquainted. Certainly no other savage or barbarian, in all the stories of all the Pacific islands, is

Kamehameha's superior. The race that produced him had possibilities within itself.

But just what possibilities we shall never know. In 1891 (Kalakaua then lying in state under Kamehameha's feather cloak) only 34,436 pure Hawaiians were left, with 6186 half-castes, in a total population of 89,000. In other words, only forty-five per cent. of the total population of the country were then pure Hawaiians or half-castes, while the foreigners—Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, and other Europeans and Americans—constituted fifty-five per cent. The census of 1896 shows a further loss for one element and gains for the other elements, as follows: Hawaiians, 31,019; part Hawaiians, 8485; Americans, 3086; British, 2250; Germans, 1432; French, 101; Norwegians, 378; Portuguese, 15,191; Japanese, 24,407; Chinese, 21,616; South Sea Islanders, 455; other nationalities, 600—total population, 109,020. So far as the pure Hawaiians are concerned, this means a decrease of 9.9 per cent. between the years 1890 and 1896. In 1832 the native population was about 130,000. It is apparent from these figures that the rate of decrease among the aborigines has of late been somewhat checked, but this is inconsiderable in view of all the circumstances.

And with this statement we find that we have advanced from the beginning to the end of the century; that we are already in the midst of the second period, and know how to explain its happenings.

Liliuokalani was made Queen on the 29th of January, 1891. Two years later, when she had "announced her intention to arbitrarily promulgate a new constitution," as the report of the Committee of Safety put it, a popular uprising dispossessed her. The Hawaiian monarchical system of government was abrogated, and a provisional government was proclaimed, January 17, 1893; and at

this juncture the United States cruiser *Boston* (Captain Wiltse), which had opportunely arrived three days before, landed a force of 162 officers and men—marines and blue-jackets—with a Gatling gun and a 37-millimetre revolving gun, to protect the lives and property of American citizens. Professor Alexander, in his *History of the Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 1893*, makes the very cautious statement that “ the knowledge of the fact that the United States troops were on shore undoubtedly served to repress disorder, and gave the community a grateful sense of security. There was a band concert at the Hawaiian Hotel that evening, which was well attended ! ”

Commissioners sent to this country to ask for annexation reached Washington at the beginning of February, 1893 ; our minister at Honolulu assumed a protectorate on the 9th, and President Harrison’s message of the 15th advised Congress to accept the suggestion. Two days later an envoy of Queen Liliuokalani came to win sympathy and aid for a lost cause, and presently the governments of other nations as well were addressed in favour of her restoration. The treaty of annexation was withdrawn by President Cleveland, who sent ex-Representative James H. Blount, of Georgia, as a special commissioner to take evidence and report the actual condition of affairs (March 11th). By Mr. Blount’s order our flag was removed from the government building in Honolulu. On May 9th Mr. Blount was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hawaiian Islands ; on the 22d of August he returned to Washington. Albert S. Willis, of Kentucky, received his appointment as minister a fortnight later, and presented his credentials to President Dole, of the provisional government, November 7th. The ardent controversy that accompanied these moves, here so

briefly stated, makes an interesting chapter by itself; it is not essential in this story, for events proved that the actual power had passed out of Kanaka hands. On July 4, 1894, the Republic of Hawaii was proclaimed, with Sanford B. Dole as President. The commercial relations of the new republic with this country were so intimate that in 1895 the United States took 99.04 per cent. of all Hawaiian exports (total value in that year, \$8,474,138.15), while supplying 79.04 per cent. of all Hawaiian imports (total value in 1895, \$5,714,017.54). On July 6, 1898, the United States Senate, by a two thirds vote, passed the Newlands annexation resolution. President McKinley's signature was affixed the next day.

And something was said about stepping across the Pacific Ocean, westward, without wetting one's feet.

III

The change wrought during the years that intervened between the apotheosis of Captain Cook and the landing of Captain Wiltse's marines should be shown with rather more detail, for it is perhaps the most perfect example that history offers of the displacement of vigorous barbarians without violence.

While Kamehameha I. lived, the King was all—the strongest, bravest, and most skilful warrior; absolute master of the land, and of every life and of every product; defender also of the ancient religion. His reign extended to May 8, 1819. The first American missionaries (from Boston) arrived April 4, 1820. It has been customary to ascribe all the changes to the efforts of Mr. Bingham, Mr. Thurston, and their successors, but the records will not support such a contention. Disintegration of the old system had been begun by European

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man-o'-war's men, who could work incredible destruction with their powder and shot and who taught that mere men were superior to the forces of nature which the Hawaiians had blindly worshipped. The Hawaiian, accordingly, learned part of an indispensable lesson from rough seamen.

Kamehameha II. publicly defied the system of "tabu" in October, 1819; the idols and their temples were burnt; and when Bingham and Thurston reached Kilauea Bay, April 4, 1820, some of the rough preliminary work had already been done. The fact seems to be, therefore, that the islanders got the seed of their new faith at a time when the old faith had been uprooted.

The first treaty between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States was concluded in 1826. In the following year Roman Catholic missionaries from France arrived, but never quite succeeded in making themselves at home. In 1832 they were deported to California. Returning in 1837, they barely secured the privilege of landing; and this permission was positively withheld from other representatives of the same faith and nationality. The French frigate *Artémise* reached Honolulu July 9, 1839, requiring an indemnity of \$20,000, and a proclamation of full religious liberty. Of course this demand was acceded to; in fact, a "declaration of rights" preceded it by a month, and an edict of toleration by several weeks.

In 1840 the first constitution was proclaimed, providing for a legislature to consist of two houses, on the English plan. Between 1840 and 1843 a series of disputes with France and England culminated in a provisional cession to England, February 25, 1843, which was declined by the government of that country. Near the close of the year a joint declaration by France and England was published, recognising the independence of the islands, and engaging

The War with Spain

“ never to take possession, either directly or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.”

Liberty, with a French, English, or American accent, was speaking to these islanders who, half a century before, had been slaves of a clever savage chieftain. But America was coming very near, through the settlement of California. In 1850 the suggestion of a United States protectorate was declined by our government. A constitution providing for universal suffrage in the choice of members of the lower house was adopted in 1852.

The election of David Kalakaua as successor to King William Lunalilo, in 1874, brought to the already insecure office a person whose arbitrary methods alienated his friends, and whose dishonest practices utterly destroyed the credit of the monarchy. But instead of rehearsing the scandals of his reign, we may prefer to remember that they were personal, and therefore all covered (after he had died at San Francisco, in 1891, and after the cruiser *Charleston* had carried his remains back to Honolulu) by the yellow-feather mantle of the founder of the dynasty—who, “ when six spears were cast at once at him, caught three, parried two, and avoided the sixth by a quick movement of the body,” as Vancouver relates.

Which brings us back to the point of departure.

GENERAL GARCIA'S VIEW OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

“ On the 6th of June the steamer *Gloucester* brought me a communication from General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, in which he informed me of the project to attack by land and sea the city of Santiago de Cuba, and that it was necessary that the greater part of the Cuban forces should advance on that city to cooperate with him. Immediately¹ I gave orders that the forces that had been armed should move forward toward the territory of Cuba,² a very difficult operation, on account of the infantry being almost worn out, and of the scarcity of food for so many people. Surmounting those difficulties, the forces arrived at Palma Soriano, and on the 18th I marched to Aserraderos, where I arrived on the 19th at 7.30 A.M., having been summoned there to confer with the Admiral of the American Navy, Sampson, to decide on the best plan of attacking Santiago de Cuba. This conference took place on board the flagship *New York*.

“ I must now declare that my object in moving my forces on Santiago de Cuba and meeting the Admiral of the United States Navy has been to obey the orders I received from the Council of Government, to obey and respect the orders and instructions of the commanders of the American Army on their commencing operations in the territory under my command.

“ On the 20th, at half-past two o'clock, Brig.-Gen. Demetrio Castillo, commander of the brigade of Ramon de las Taguas, landed in Aserraderos from Sigua (east of

¹ “ *Al combate corred, Bayameses . . .* ”

² That is, Santiago.

Cuba), brought over by an American man-of-war to receive my orders. A short time after I was advised that Major-Gen. William R. Shafter, commander of the Fifth Army Corps of the United States Army, had landed to confer with me on the attack by land of Santiago de Cuba. After a long conference, and after the American general had accepted the plan I laid before him for the landing of his troops and to carry out with success the advance on Cuba, he returned to the ship. The following day, Augustin Cebreco, General of Division, marched toward the west with forces of his division, with the object of preventing the enemy from reinforcing its garrisons of the coast in that part, and at 8 P.M. a force of 530 men belonging to the divisions of Bayamo and commanded by Brig.-Gen. Demetrio Castillo was shipped on board an American transport to go to the reinforcement of the brigade of Ramon to protect the landing of the American Army and advance by the east. These forces landed in Sigua, and they advanced at once on Daiquiri with their commander, Col. Carlos Gonzales, and with 500 men of the brigade of Ramon under Brig.-Gen. Castillo. The Spaniards in a great hurry abandoned Daiquiri, which Castillo occupied as the American Navy began to bombard it, but firing was suspended as soon as our flag was hoisted. The Americans landed their first regiments at Daiquiri and advanced on Firmeza and Siboney with the Cuban forces always in the vanguard, they being the first to occupy said villages. In Siboney the landing of American troops was continued, while the Cuban forces, under Col. Carlos Gonzales, advancing on Santiago de Cuba, sustained a severe encounter with the enemy in Las Guásimas, suffering some losses, but inflicting greater on the Spaniards.¹

¹ In accounts of Las Guásimas, written by American correspondents, it has been stated that Cuban scouts brought word of the Spanish position and strength to General Wheeler, and that the Rough Riders, just before they received the enemy's fire, came upon dead Cubans; but, so far as the writer has gone, in his effort to see and to make use of everything, no one has said that the Cubans got their information by dint of attacking two thousand Spaniards and "suffering some losses."

“ In my conference with Admiral Sampson and Major-Gen. Shafter we decided that I should embark with 3000 men at Aserraderos and land east of Santiago de Cuba. With this object I sent for the forces at Aguacate (near Palma) and on the 25th, at 7 A.M., we began to embark, which operation was finished in the evening. These forces, forming three distinct columns, were respectively under the command of Major-General Capote, Generals of Division Cebreco and Lora, and Brig.-Gen. Sanchez Hecheverria, the entire force being under the immediate command of Major-Gen. Jesus Rabi.

“ I was on board of the *Alamo* with my staff and some officers invited by General Ludlow, who had superintended the embarkation. Brig.-Gen. Sanchez, with a force of 800 men, who embarked first in the steamer *Leona*, landed at 5 o'clock P.M. in Siboney. There were already camped the other Cuban forces which had arrived before, as well as many thousands of the American Army.

“ General of Division Estrada marched on the 25th to Aguacate to gather the forces that were there to form a column of 800 to 1000 men and to march with them toward Santiago in readiness to fight any forces that might be sent to the help of said city. At dawn on the 26th the steamers *Orizaba* and *Seneca* were opposite Siboney carrying the rest of my forces. At 7 o'clock A.M. the landing commenced at Siboney, ending at 10 P.M., all Cuban forces camping around the village. Our forces which had arrived earlier also camped around Siboney, as well as many thousands of the American Army. Perfect fraternity reigned among the Cuban and American soldiers, who vied with each other in good feeling. On account of the scarcity of food in the territory in which we were, from the first, the Americans supplied us with the necessary rations for the subsistence of our forces. On the 29th, General Shafter and myself had completed the plan of attack and I received from him the order to march on the morrow with my forces toward Santiago, which he himself would do that same day, some regiments and cannon having already advanced. In the extreme vanguard, in sight of the fortified Spanish outposts, was Col. Carlos

Gonzales, commanding the Division of Bayamo and part of the brigade of Ramon de las Taguas.

“ On the 30th I encamped with my forces at El Salado, nine miles from Siboney and four and a half miles from Santiago. At the same point General Shafter established his headquarters. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon I received orders to place myself at Marianajo, between Caney and San Juan, to protect against any attack from the enemy the batteries which were going to fire on both points, should the enemy come from Santiago.

“ At the commencement of the attack on Santiago de Cuba there were 15,000 men in the American Army. There were 4000 Cubans under my immediate orders around the city. At 5.30 in the morning of the 1st of July I began the march toward Marianajo, and at seven o'clock I occupied the positions allotted to me in the following order : To the left on San Juan and fronting Santiago, Major-Gen. José Ma Capote, with his column of 1000 men ; next to him, in the centre, General of Division Saturnino Lora and 500 men ; to the right of the former, General of Brigade Francisco Sanchez Hecheverria with his column of 800 men, forming part of General Cebreco's command, and General Cebreco himself with 500 men of his division ; on the right flank on the heights of Marianajo General Rabi and myself with our staffs and escorts facing the village of Caney ; on the left flank of my forces an American battery to fire on Fort San Juan, protected by the forces of Colonel Gonzales and part of those of Ramon with some of the American forces ; on the right flank the batteries which were to fire on Caney, and General Lawton with a division of the American army which was to assault the village. With that division, and also under General Lawton, were 200 Cubans of Ramon commanded by Major C. Victor Duany. All the forces of Ramon were under the direct command of Col. Carlos Gonzales.

“ At seven o'clock the American batteries fired on the fortifications of the hill of San Juan, the Spaniards answering with their artillery, and shortly afterward firing also commenced from the batteries against Caney, the garrison of the place answering with heavy fire. Caney was defended by 1500 men, troops of the line or regulars,

under the command of Brig.-Gen. Vara del Rey, and San Juan was defended by 2000 men, also regulars. At 4 P.M., after a gallant assault, the Americans took San Juan, its garrison being either killed or prisoners, except a few who had escaped to Santiago de Cuba. At six, after repeated assaults, in which the Cuban forces under Major Duany took part, the Americans occupied Caney. The garrison of this village perished mostly in the assaults, and those who escaped died in the field, among them Gen. Vara del Rey, who was already fatally wounded. The enemy attempted to make a sortie from Santiago de Cuba and was repulsed. This day General Linares, commanding the garrison, was wounded in the trenches of Santiago. He turned his command over to General of Division Toral.

"The Americans advanced to the suburbs of the city by the road leading from Caney, the vanguard being the Cuban forces under Colonel Gonzales. Our losses this first day of July were about 100, all our forces being under the enemy's fire. General Shafter ordered me to occupy the right flank of his army on the advance on Santiago, and I made a night march, camping at ten o'clock the same night at the country house Ducureau, after ordering some forces almost on to Santiago. At dawn of the 2d I continued to advance by the right flank toward the north side of the city, General Cebreco going with his division in the vanguard, and, at the extreme of the same, General Sanchez Hecheverria with his forces. On reaching the railway line from Santiago to San Luis the centre and vanguard halted, the vanguard occupying the heights across the line.

"When General Francisco Sanchez advanced by the railway line on Santiago on the morning of the 2d he met four guerrillas, who fired on our forces, which returned the fire and killed them. Colonel Ferrero advancing by the right met and defeated a guerrilla [party?] on the hill of Quintero, occupying the position, which we held, as also the height of La Caridad. During the day I ordered a column to advance by the railway line toward San Luis. The enemy, after a light fire, abandoned the villages of Cuabitas and Boinato and several forts, reconcentrating in San Vicente.

“During the whole day of the second heavy fire was exchanged with the enemy in Santiago, who from fortifications fired with rifles and guns at our positions. We had ten casualties. This day the French colony left the city, accompanied by the consul of their country, taking shelter under our flag. My forces slept in the positions occupied, within rifle-shot of the city.

“On the morning of the 3d there was firing with the city. At ten o'clock the Spanish navy sailed out of the bay of Santiago, where it had been for some weeks, and within one hour it was destroyed by the American men-of-war. Admiral Cervera, with his officers and seamen, about 600, escaped by land west of Santiago, but the Cuban forces on the coast compelled him to surrender to Col. José Candelario Cebreco, who afterward delivered them to the American navy, taking a receipt.

“At twelve o'clock I ordered a force to fire on the village of San Vicente, which the Spanish abandoned, retreating toward El Cristo, and they also abandoned Dos Bocas, on the railway line of San Luis. On the night of the 3d and by the road of El Cobre a column of the enemy, 5000 strong, entered the city under Colonel Escario,¹ having left Manzanillo on the 22d of June and being hurried by the Manzanillo division up to Baire. From Baire to Palma that column was attacked by forces of Gen. Francisco Estrada, suffering heavy losses, the dead having been left strewn by the roads. With that column Lieutenant-Colonel Lora fought, aided by the cavalry of the division of Bayamo, and also my escort of cavalry under Lieut.-Col. C. M. Pooy. Colonel Escario recovered somewhat at Palma, where he left his wounded, and from there by zigzags he arrived in Santiago de Cuba by the Cobre road, having sustained some firing. Perhaps the entry of this column into the city might have been prevented had I been able to go to meet it with my forces, but in that case I should have been obliged to abandon my position on the right flank of the American army.

“On the 4th I received an official message that the

¹ Escario's force was but 2800 strong, and it entered Santiago during the night of July 2d, General Shafter says.

enemy had evacuated the town of El Cobre and the forts Bartolon, Montereal, Coletto, and San Miguel. After twelve o'clock firing was suspended to allow General Shafter to parley with the Spanish. As a result of this the Spanish government permitted all families to leave the city for fear of a bombardment by the Americans. All the families took refuge in the houses and streets of Cuabitas and Caney.

"On the 7th General Estrada incorporated his forces of 700 men with the besieging army. On this day, also, some American regiments arrived from the United States. My forces continued to gain positions on the right flank, reducing the circle around the city.

"On the 9th, the armistice continuing, the enemy asked permission to evacuate the city and retire to Holguin. General Shafter replied that he would submit the proposition to his government. I pointed out to General Shafter the un wisdom of allowing evacuation in that form. I had reliable information from Holguin that a strong force under General Mario, about 6000 or 7000 men, was ready to come to the assistance of Santiago de Cuba. In view of this I covered all the roads approaching our rear guard, to prevent the enemy realising their plans, and also to prevent those who were besieged from making a sortie to reach Holguin. I reinforced all that part of my line at points where they might make the break. At the same time I repeated the order that the forces of Camaguey, which were in the east, and the two divisions of Holguin should so place themselves as to cut Mario off.

"On the 10th I advanced my right flank to completely close the circle ; and at twelve o'clock, when the armistice came to an end, I ordered my forces to execute a flank movement, that the enemy might think I intended to surround their position and trenches of Dos Caminos and compel them to give up. The operation gave good results. The enemy in great haste abandoned the villages of Dos Caminos and El Cobre and all the forts and trenches on this side of Jarago. With this evolution the circle was completed, the west of the city being occupied by the forces of the Division of Cuba as far as the shores of the bay, including the cemetery.

“ As the government of the United States did not accept the proposition of the Spaniards to evacuate the city and retire to Holguin, General Shafter notified General Toral that if the city did not surrender by three o'clock he would fire upon it. The Spaniards not giving in at three o'clock, tremendous firing of rifles and guns opened against the city from all the American line and part of the Cuban line. At the same time the navy commenced to bombard the city from the coast, continuing until twilight, when firing was suspended.

“ On the 11th, the firing and bombardment continued until 9 A.M., at which time another armistice was concluded, the enemy taking advantage of this to make some defences and place cannon, and the Americans to place their batteries just landed, and ourselves to make some trenches and mount two cannon, 12-pounders, on a height at the side of Dos Caminos, to fire on the fortifications between the bull-ring and the bay. The armistice lasted all of the 12th and 13th, we having mounted our cannon and finished our trenches in the cemetery on this side of the city.

“ On the 14th, firing should have commenced at twelve o'clock, but the enemy asked for a prolongation of the armistice, giving as a reason that the Spaniards had decided to surrender the city and all the villages and towns comprised in the general command of Santiago de Cuba, occupied to the east of the State of Oriente inside of a line commencing at Aserraderos, passing by Palma Soriano, and ending at Sagua de Tanamo on the north, with the condition that all their forces be sent to Spain by the government of the United States. The Spanish troops comprised in this capitulation amounted to 23,000 men, as communicated by General Toral to General Shafter.

“ With the surrender of the city of Santiago and other towns which will be evacuated shortly, the territory of the First Army Corps will be free. In that of the Second the enemy has only Holguin, Jibara, and the villages on the railway line between the cities in the north and Manzanillo in the south, with two or three neighbouring villages.

“ The American Government has decided to occupy

the city of Santiago at present with two regiments, and, as General Miles has not given me orders to co-operate in any further undertakings, I retire with my forces. I shall give directions in accordance with which the 1500 men you [*i.e.*, the insurgent government] have asked for from the Department of the East will be placed at the disposal of Gen. Juan Ducasse in the manner that he may desire.

“ CALIXTO GARCIA.”

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
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